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Abrevieri

The doctrine of lawful rebellion in the princely proclamations of the French wars of religion**

Introduction

For the French medieval and renaissance monarchy, noble rebellions were not something unheard of: the reigns of Louis XII (1498-1515), Francis I (1515-1547) and Henry II (1547-1559) were characterized by great internal stability, where even the defection of such a powerful nobleman as the constable Charles of Bourbon did not manage to trigger a significant revolt, but they stood in marked contrast with the reigns of most of their predecessors, who each had to confront major aristocratic rebellions. The Praguerie of 1440, during Charles VII, the war of the public weal, in 1465, under Louis XI, the mad war of 1485-1488, under Charles VIII, just to name the most significant examples of the fifteenth century, all saw coalitions of disgruntled nobles – including even members of the royal family – managing to pose a major challenge to the centralizing Valois monarchy. In the opinion of Michel de Waele, these “leagues had for objective a return to the old order of things, to a less centralized government” and showed that “the conservative tendencies were always present and that their defenders did not hesitate to take up arms in order to make their views prevail”¹. By far the most dangerous were the events of 1465, which, in the opinion of many historians, came really close of removing Louis XI from his throne. But the most interesting feature of this rebellion, carried out by the greatest aristocratic alliance the kings of France had to face during the fifteenth century, is the fact that, in the words of Jacques Krynen, this war was “a political rebellion in the truest sense of the word, not just an uprising against the legitimate government, but a revolt possessing a

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¹ Michel de Waele, *Reconcilier les français: Henri IV et la fin des troubles de religion 1589-1598*, Québec, Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2010, p. 31.

governmental project”². This rebellion, according to the same Jacques Krynen, “proclaimed itself legitimate”, because “its rallying cry, the public good of the kingdom, evoked its just cause and indicated its programme”³. The rebels took care to publish their goals through a manifesto issued on 10 March 1465, which charged the king with tyranny and faithlessness and demanded the reformation of the kingdom, the reduction of taxes and the convocation of the Estates General⁴. The most interesting particularity of the League of the Public Weal is that it did not attempt to justify its rebellion in purely feudal terms. The traditional relationship between vassal and liege lord envisioned the possibility of breaking the bond between them, because it was designed in contractual terms and involved specific obligations for both parties. If the lord broke faith, then the vassal was entitled to withdraw from obedience – but such a revolt was purely personal. The rebels from 1465, though, claimed to act for the whole kingdom and it was for the whole kingdom that they were seeking redress: their propaganda insisted not on their personal grievances, but on their capacity as representatives of the whole realm. This suggests a clear consciousness of the importance of the public opinion and the mobilizing force of the concept of “public good” – which were able to draw on the side of the rebellion important segments of the French society. Of course, there is reason to doubt the intentions of reform claimed by the rebel nobles – and the rebellion ultimately failed in its attempt to dislodge Louis XI. But it would provide a pattern to be followed by the rebellions of the Wars of Religion, which will share many of its characteristics – and the League of the Public Weal retained a positive image in the literature of the Wars of Religion, being remembered in the monarchomach tracts as a genuine effort at thwarting the tyranny of a despotic king, Louis XI. The War of the public weal was followed by the mad war of 1485-1488 and then more than 70 years of internal peace followed: but the outbreak of the French Wars of Religion confronted the monarchy again with major aristocratic rebellions in the name of the public good, for the purpose of preserving or reforming the kingdom. The texts chosen for analysis in this paper are the proclamations issued by the princes of the blood (Louis de Condé and Henri de Navarre) and the brother of the king (the duke of Alençon) at the start of their rebellions of 1562, 1575 and 1585, respectively: this choice is due to the fact that they represented the most prominent members of the rebel faction and, as such, they decided its political agenda and the terms of the peace with the king – and it will also facilitate the comparison with the fifteenth-century revolts, in particular with the League of the Public Weal, which also had members of the royal dynasty amongst their ranks.

² Jacques Krynen, *1465: Louis XI perd le pouvoir*, in *Prendre le pouvoir: force et légitimité*, edited by Marie Bernadette Bruguière, Toulouse, Presses de l’Université Toulouse, 2002, *Prendre le pouvoir: force et légitimité* – Presses de l’Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (openedition.org) (online version).

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ Georges Bordonove, *Louis XI, le diplomate*, Paris, Pygmalion, 1986, p. 88-89.

Condé's first rebellion (1562)

When Henry II died in a tourney accident in 1559, the religious situation in France was already becoming tense, due to the rapid progress of the Reformed religion, despite the authorities' best efforts to contain it. The death of the king plunged France straight into a major crisis, because his successor, Francis II, was too young to govern alone and was dominated by his Guise in-laws, who favored an intransigent Catholicism. The Huguenots unleashed an intensive propaganda campaign against the Guises, insisting on their foreign origin and on the idea that, as foreigners, they had no right to the power they exerted – in other words, that they usurped the lawful authority which, according to the Huguenots, fell upon the princes of the blood. The Huguenot propaganda insisted on the necessity to convoke the Estates General – which, according to them, was the only one entitled to make provisions for the government of the kingdom while the king was underage. The Huguenot attacks against the Guises reached a fever pitch in the bloody aftermath of the conspiracy of Amboise – a plot by a group of Huguenot nobles to kidnap the young king in order to remove him from under the pernicious influence of the Guise family. The plot failed and the reprisals of the Guises provided the Huguenots pamphleteers with a justified cause to accuse them of tyranny. The death of Francis II brought a respite, as Catherine of Medici, who assumed the regency for Charles IX, pursued a policy of conciliation which fed the hopes of the Protestants that the conversion of the kingdom might be at hand. This did not happen, but the Edict of Saint-Germain, in January 1562, gave a limited legal recognition to Protestantism. Despite this, tensions remained high: the Parlement of Paris was reluctant to register the edict and the massacre of Vassy, on 1 March 1562, provided the signal for the Huguenot rebellion. The Huguenots began to mobilize and the success of their enterprise was due to the fact that they had already been preparing for war over the last two years: a good number of cities were captured by the Huguenots and Orléans became their headquarters. At Orléans, the third national synod took place in April 1562, which proclaimed Louis de Condé not only the protector of the Calvinist churches in France, but also protector and defender of the House and Crown of France: according to Mack Holt, “most of the leading nobles in the Huguenot movement subscribed to this arrangement, with the result that the French Huguenot movement became dominated by the nobility for the duration of the first civil war. These nobles were not only independent of Geneva, but they clearly had superseded the local ministers and pastors who had formed the groundswell for the church in the 1550s”⁵.

Having assumed the leadership of the revolt, Condé, just like the League of the Public Weal a century before, sought to justify his actions and win the public

⁵ Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion 1562-1629*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 52.

opinion over through an appeal to the cause of the public good and, for this purpose, he issued a proclamation on 8 April 1562, listing the grievances and the goals of his party. Tatiana Debaggi Baranova argues that “the beginning of the Wars of Religion saw the emergence of more complex logic of justification around the same theme of the defense of the common good”, where “the princes of the blood declare themselves natural defenders of the public good” and show “the disfunction of the royal justice which they pretended to remedy”, the “legitimation of this public accusation finding its support in the prominent position of the noble leaders within the state”⁶. But, in my opinion, it would be more correct to say that this logic of justification reached its full maturity rather than to suggest that we are dealing with a new doctrine of rebellion, because, as pointed out above, the basic tenets proclaimed by Condé in 1562 were already drawn up by the League of the Public Weal one century before. There is an obvious continuity between the political thought of the League of the Public Weal and that of the Huguenot nobles of the 1560s, which the different religious circumstances of those revolts could not break. Condé’s task was made easier by the fact that he was not facing an adult king, but instead the eleven years old Charles IX. Arlette Jouanna remarked that, in this respect, the Huguenots were provided with a fortuitous opportunity in the death of Henry II, because, under the former, “it was difficult to dispute the legitimacy of the repression”, but, “under the Guises, this became possible”⁷. The Guises were no longer in power in 1562, but this suited Condé all the same, because a regency allowed him to claim that his rebellion was not directed against the king himself, but against those which usurped his authority. The difference from the Protestant propaganda of 1559-1560 lies in the fact that, in Condé’s proclamation, the Guises were no longer the only ones accused. The other two members of the Catholic triumvirate, the constable of Montmorency and the marshall of Saint-André, are also pointed out at having abused the king’s trust. There are two main accusations which Condé hurls against his adversaries: first and foremost, the duke of Guise’s action on 27 March 1562, when he arrived at Fontainebleau, where the royal family was, with an armed escort and took them back to Paris. As Janine Garrison correctly pointed out, “possession of the king’s person was worth half of France, and both men were ready to use force to legitimize their faction with that person”⁸. The monarchy was the main source of legitimacy in sixteenth-century France and having the king on your side allowed you to brand your opponents as traitors and rebels. Condé’s only recourse was to claim that the king was actually a “prisoner” of Guise and claim as the goal of his faction the “release” of Charles IX (and of the queen-mother). The second

⁶ Tatiana Debaggi Baranova, *À Coups des libelles: une culture politique au temps des guerres de religion (1562-1598)*, Geneva, Droz, 2012, p. 124.

⁷ Arlette Jouanna, *La France du XVI^e siècle, 1483-1598*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2009, p. 347.

⁸ Janine Garrison, *A History of Sixteenth-Century France 1483-1598: Renaissance, Reformation and Rebellion*, trans. Richard Rex, London, MacMillan Press, 1995, p. 339-340.

grievance included by Condé in his proclamation was the attacks against the Reformed Churches, in defiance of the Edict of January. Hugues Daussy argues that “the Reformed Churches are the other essential protagonist which the *Declaration* deliberately pushed in the background” and “there was never a question of religion which justified the taking up arms”; according to Hugues Daussy, if Condé “reproaches the triumvirs that they wanted to ‘exterminate the religion they called new’, it was only one grievance among others”⁹. But this is an opinion I cannot agree with, because it seriously underestimates the references to the Reformed cause in the proclamation. The argument that these references were limited to a single accusation that the Triumvirs intended to exterminate the Calvinist religion is wrong. The massacre of Vassy and the attacks against the Edict of January, both specific Huguenot grievances, feature prominently amongst the arguments brought up by Condé for his rebellion, and are described at length in the text of the proclamation. Most of the triumvirs’ misdeeds, up to the capture of the royal family, are related to the aftermath of the Vassy massacre and to their attempts to undermine the edict. It would be correct to speak of an “argumentation purely political and totally deconfessionalized” only if one had in mind, by this, the lack of a theologically-based justification in Condé’s proclamation – but that is not the same as asserting that the concern for the fate of the Reformed cause was given second place. On the contrary, I would argue that the declaration was basically an invocation of a right of self-defense for the Calvinist community in France – and this fact marks a significant difference between Condé’s first manifesto and the Monarchomach literature of later years, which was characterized, as remarked by Quentin Skinner and other historians, by a non-sectarian approach and lacked any references to the events affecting the Huguenot communities. This right of self-defense was to be exercised by Louis de Condé, who was entitled “as prince of the Blood, by natural law, to defend the subjects of the king against those who wanted to oppress them by force and violence”¹⁰. It must be pointed out that we are not dealing here with a reflection of the Calvinist theory of “inferior magistrates”, which was to feature so heavily in the monarchomach literature: Condé had indeed taken up arms to defend the Huguenots, but not against a tyrannical king, but against the duke of Guise and his allies. To drive the point home, the lack of consideration of the Catholic triumvirs for the king and the queen-mother is constantly emphasized throughout the text, which culminated in the “capture” of the royal family on 27 March 1562. Condé’s proclamation is thus not a resistance theory, because, unlike in the proclamations of the League of the Public Weal or in the monarchomach literature, the lawful authority in the kingdom is not cast as an antagonist. The Duke of Guise, the constable of Montmorency, the marshall of

⁹ Hugues Daussy, *Le Parti huguenot: chronique d’une désillusion (1557-1572)*, Geneva, Droz, 2015, p. 296-297.

¹⁰ *Déclaration faite par Monsieur le prince de Condé, pour monstrier les raisons qui l’ont contrainct d’entreprendre la défense de l’autorité du Roy, du gouvernement de la Royne et du repos de ce Royaume. Avec la protestation sur ce requise*, Orléans, 1562.

Saint-André are all acting *unlawfully*, by ignoring the king's will and laws and the proper government procedures. By acting only to counter their alleged malicious designs, Condé and his supporters are placing themselves within the boundaries of French law.

Condé was able to assert the notion that he was not actually fighting against the king because the latter was underage. Catherine of Medici might have angrily rejected Condé's claims that she and the king were the prisoners of the triumvirs, but a regency government was lacking that supreme legitimacy which made public authority uncontested and which only an adult king could have provided. Undoubtedly, the queen understood this as well, hence the rushed proclamation of Charles IX's majority in the Parlement of Rouen in 1563, at the age of thirteen. Yet, this did not cause many changes in Condé's rhetoric: at the start of the second war of religion, in 1567, it merely transitioned from the notion of a king in captivity to the utterly traditional trope of a king misled by his advisers, first and foremost by the most senior member of the Guise clan, namely the Cardinal of Lorraine. Hugues Daussy pointed out the emergence of more radical trends amongst Huguenot propaganda during this period, trends which already introduced the idea of a contractual monarchy and called into question the obedience due to the king¹¹, a phenomenon which Arlette Jouanna attributed to the gradual mood of suspicion which develops between the nobility and the king starting from 1567¹². Still, this collapse of the relationship of trust between the king and his subjects is prevalent especially amongst the lower ranks of the rebels: it is not really visible in the open statements of the princes of the blood, like the duke of Alençon in 1575 or Henri de Navarre in 1585, who, whatever private misgivings might have had, resorted to the same type of arguments used by Condé (who had been killed in 1569) and kept insisting on their confidence in the good faith of the king and their obedience to him. Henry III was a fully adult monarch – unlike Charles IX for most of his reign: ascending at the age of 23, it should have been more difficult to claim that he was in the thrall of his entourage – yet, this is what happened, as we shall see.

The manifesto of the duke of Alençon (1575)

After the massacre of Saint-Bartholomew, the Huguenots rebelled again, but this time without the leadership of the two princes of the blood, Henri de Navarre and Henri de Condé, held captive at court: the most important event of the new rebellion was the lengthy siege of La Rochelle by a royal army led by the duke of Anjou, siege which ended in a complete disaster for the Crown. A short peace followed, which quickly collapsed the next year, amongst aristocratic plots aiming

¹¹ Hugues Daussy, *Les Huguenots entre l'obéissance au roi et l'obéissance à Dieu*, in "Nouvelle Revue du XVIe Siècle", 22 (2004), p. 61.

¹² Arlette Jouanna, *Le Devoir de révolte: la noblesse française et la gestation de l'État moderne (1559-1661)*, Paris, Fayard, 1989, p. 154.

to free the hostage princes: those plots failed, but the Huguenots still took up arms and they received an invaluable support from the governor of Languedoc, Henri de Montmorency-Damville, who joined their actions in retaliation for the imprisonment of his brother, François, suspected of having taken part in the respective conspiracies. In the opinion of Arlette Jouanna, the events of Saint-Bartholomew succeeded in bringing together “the elites of both confessions around a common goal perceived as more urgent, in immediate terms, than the doctrinal reconciliation, that of a political reform of the monarchy. That this design was proposed as a restoration reflected only the ideological conventions of the period; it was, in truth, a refounding destined to protect the subject against royal arbitrariness”¹³.

The most important adherence to the rebel cause occurred in September 1575, when the king’s own brother – and heir to the throne –, François d’Alençon fled from the Court and joined the rebellion. Alençon brought his allies a level of legitimacy which they could not have otherwise achieved. In 1560, Calvin was recommending his coreligionists seeking to overthrow the Guises to seek the cooperation of Antoine de Bourbon, the first prince of the blood, but still, only distantly related to the king, in order for their action to be lawful. Now, the king’s closest kin was joining them, giving greater credence to their grievances: more so, as Mack Holt pointed out, “what made Alençon’s participation in the rebellion so dangerous was that he was Henry III’s heir presumptive. Should something happen to Henry, his younger brother could rightfully claim his place on the throne.”¹⁴ Some Huguenot pamphleteers, such as Innocent Gentillet, saw the solution to the crisis which afflicted France in an alliance of moderate Catholics and Huguenots under the leadership of François d’Alençon¹⁵. Yet, Alençon and the adherents grouped around him, although joining the Huguenots in a common action, were far from sharing all their ideas about the laws of the kingdom and the nature of these laws: while opposed to what seemed to them a slide towards tyranny, they invoked the laws of the kingdom to justify their rebellion, but they regarded them as established by tradition and never thought that it was the place of the people to change them¹⁶. From Dreux, the duke of Alençon issued a proclamation, on 18 September, where many echoes of the Protestant theories of resistance can be noticed. Unlike Condé thirteen years before, the duke of Alençon did not have the benefit of having to confront an underage king, therefore it should have been harder for him to portray his action as lawful. Yet, just like Condé, Alençon avoided criticizing the king directly: the declaration does attack specific policies of the Crown, in particular its fiscality, but the blame is assigned to the foreign

¹³ Idem, *La Saint-Barthélemy, les mystères d’un crime d’État*, Paris, Gallimard, 2007, p. 270-271.

¹⁴ Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion*, p. 105.

¹⁵ Victoria Kahn, *Reading Machiavelli: Innocent Gentillet’s Discourse on Method*, in “Political Theory”, 22 (4) (1994), p. 552.

¹⁶ André Lemaire, *Les Lois fondamentales de la monarchie française d’après les théoriciens de l’Ancien Régime*, Paris, 1907, p. 106.

advisers of the king, in particular the Italians in the royal council, but also to the Guise family (again). The declaration emphasizes that the main motivation of the duke is to ensure the observance of the laws of the kingdom – laws which the foreign advisers of Henry III had been breaking. Mack Holt argues that the duke “unintentionally allied himself with Huguenot resistance theory, which had opposed royal authority ever since St Bartholomew’s Day”¹⁷. Yet, his declaration is far from the “monarchomach theories”, in fact it is even less radical than the proclamation of the League of the Public Weal, which I have mentioned before: while both were blaming the king’s tyranny in no uncertain terms, Alençon claimed that it was his intention not to do anything against the authority of Henry III, but rather “remove the disturbers of the peace of the kingdom”¹⁸.

Alençon’s rebellion was not directed *against* the king, but, rather, it was about taking action *in the king’s place*. The reproach directed at the king is not tyranny, but a failure to do his royal duty, which, in turn, would have led to the ruin of the kingdom. In such a situation, it was the obligation of all loyal subjects to act and the only lawful avenue for such an action was the Estates General. Alençon’s declaration was thus much more ambitious than Condé’s proclamation of 1562, which did not set for itself such lofty goals, but limited itself to a demand for the observance of the status-quo established by the Edict of January: Alençon was seeking redress through a general reformation of the kingdom, which was to lead to the restoration of the peace – both Catholics and Protestants are urged to abandon violence until either the Estates General or a general church council would find a solution in order to restore religious unity. Alençon shared with the monarchomachs, especially Hotman and Beza, the almost blind confidence that the Estates General held the key to solving France’s problems – and it is an Estates General from where all foreigners’ influence must be eliminated. Mack Holt is perfectly right when he points out that there is nothing revolutionary in Alençon’s declaration: it might share with the monarchomachs the respect for the Estates General, but there is no hint that the Estates would possess sovereignty above the king – something which was a key feature of the monarchomach theories. The monarchomachs and the “malcontents” – the name given to the Catholic noble rebels of 1574-1576, of which Alençon and Damville were the most prominent members – had fundamentally different conceptions of sovereignty: the former were adepts of a people’s sovereignty exercised by the representatives within the Estates, the latter wanted to exercise this sovereignty in partnership with the king¹⁹.

¹⁷ Mack P. Holt, *The Duke of Anjou and the Politique Struggle during the Wars of Religion*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 54.

¹⁸ *Brieve remonstrance a la noblesse de France sur le fait de la Declaration de Monseigneur le Duc d’Alençon*, Paris, 1576, p. 6.

¹⁹ Alan Desrayaud, *Un Projet machiavelique de tyrannie turquesque au temps des guerres de religion*, in “Revue Française d’Histoire des Idées Politiques”, 3 (1996), p. 110-111.

The coalition between Alençon, Montmorency-Damville and the Huguenots was so threatening that it managed to obtain from the king, in addition to all the personal gains of its leaders, the most favorable peace terms which the Protestants would ever get during this period, through the Edict of Beaulieu. A devout Catholic himself, Henry III was not keen on granting such far-reaching concessions to the Protestants, but, at the same time, was also not willing to wage war against them at any cost and against all odds and understood well the limits placed on his freedom of action by the weakening of the royal power during that period. In the words of Penny Roberts, Henry III, “when writing to the pope in justification of the edict of Beaulieu, argued for the necessity of the path of reconciliation... before the wound became totally untreatable. It was not the remedy he wanted, but it was the one God opened to him; force was not working, and he hoped in time to restore religious unity”²⁰. The king’s lack of enthusiasm for the peace of Beaulieu and the subsequent Catholic reaction combined in order to nullify its effects very quickly. The Peace of Monsieur had stimulated the formation of the Holy League – its first phase – designed to rally Catholics to defend the faith, and its noble leadership was in the hands of the Guise-Lorraine family, who could include their own dynastic ambitions under that umbrella²¹. The king acted to remove the danger which the Holy League presented and forbade the formation of such associations without royal consent: the Holy League faded away for several years, without playing any major role in French politics until 1584. But Alençon’s demands expressed in the declaration also represented the peace’s undoing, because it requested the summoning of the Estates General. According to Mark Greengrass, “Damville and Alençon linked the Estates General with the closely allied myth of the summoning of a French council of the church to resolve, once for all, the religious discords that divided France”²². It was a grievous mistake from Alençon’s Protestant allies to have consented to this condition, because, instead of consolidating their gains, the Estates, which gathered at Blois from December 1576 until February 1577, cancelled them. Dominated by an overwhelming Catholic majority extremely displeased by the terms of the peace of Beaulieu, the Estates pushed for the resumption of the war against the Huguenots, although refusing to bear its costs. The conflict flared up again between 1577 and 1580 and the peace of Beaulieu was replaced by new edicts granting fewer concessions to the Huguenots. But the greatest crisis was going to come in 1584, when the death of the duke of Alençon (duke of Anjou from 1576) led to a succession problem which plunged France into a new civil war.

²⁰ Penny Roberts, *Peace and Authority during the French Religious Wars c. 1560-1600*, Houndmills, Palgrave MacMillan, 2013, p. 39.

²¹ Nancy Lyman Roelker, *One King, One Faith: The Parlement of Paris and the Religious Reformations of the Sixteenth Century*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996, p. 324.

²² Mark Greengrass, *Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in the French Kingdom 1576-1585*, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 69.

Navarre's declaration, Henry III and the Catholic League (1585)

When the duke of Anjou died in 1584, the Catholic majority of France was suddenly confronted with the prospect of a heretic, Henri de Navarre, assuming the throne: while some were, grudgingly, willing to accept this situation, an important part, which coalesced rapidly into a new Catholic League, were determined to prevent this at any cost. For this purpose, it entered into a formal alliance with Spain through the treaty signed by the Guises at Joinville in December 1584 and in the next spring it published a manifesto, the so-called declaration of Péronne, which rejected Navarre as the heir, recognizing instead his uncle, cardinal Charles de Bourbon, as next in line to the throne, and subjected the government of Henry III to the harshest criticism for its failure to suppress heresy and its general misrule. Henry III responded with an apparent capitulation to the demands of the League, embodied in the treaty of Nemours, from July 1585, which revoked all concessions granted to the Protestants, up to the point of exiling the pastors and forcing all the other Huguenots to abjure or leave the kingdom.

For the Protestants, the treaty of Nemours equated with a declaration of war: Henri de Navarre, who had already protested against the accusations made against him in the declaration of Péronne through a manifesto of his own issued on 10 June 1585, took up arms once again and published a justification on 10 August 1585, signed also by Henri de Condé, his cousin, and the duke of Montmorency-Damville. Once again, the target was not the king, to whom the signatories pledged formal obedience: in this, it was quite similar to Louis de Condé's proclamation of 1562. Even though the king was at this time an adult, Navarre and his allies pretended that he was in the power of the newly-formed Catholic League, and, in this, they were, to a great extent, right, as the Edict of Nemours had literally been extorted from Henry III by force: the declaration is aimed at this Edict, which the signatories indicate from the title of their protestation that they consider it "prejudicial to the House of France". The House of Guise is once again cast in the role of villains, who try to usurp the royal authority with the final goal of seizing the throne: it is against them that Navarre took up arms, for the defense of the (helpless) king and for the well-being of the kingdom despoiled by the foreigner House of Lorraine. The latter's concern for the Catholic religion is declared a sham, as their designs preceded any prince having become a Protestant. According to the signatories of the declaration, Henry III himself had understood the true goals of the Guise clan and of the Catholic League, hence he declared them rebels, while reassuring the Huguenots that the previous edicts of pacification were still valid²³. This alleged attitude of the king is essential for the justification of the rebels: it goes to show that the Edict of Nemours could not have been genuinely desired by the king, because, to issue it, would have meant to go against the laws of

²³ Simon Goulart, *Mémoires de la Ligue, contenant les événemens les plus remarquables depuis 1576, jusqu'à la paix accordée entre le roi de France & le roi d'Espagne, en 1598. Nouvelle édition, revue, corrigée, & augmentée de notes critiques & historiques*, Vol. I, Amsterdam, 1758, p. 187.

the kingdom and against his own honor which was engaged towards the Huguenots. The good faith of the signatories and their willingness to make whatever sacrifices were necessary for the sake of the kingdom is emphasized and contrasted with the perfidy of the Guises. Yet, despite these attacks, the declaration of Navarre and the similar proclamations of the Catholic League have something in common: they both blame the king's entourage, in case of the former, for the signing of the injurious peace of Nemours. Despite that this peace was directed against the Protestants specifically, Navarre takes care to point out that his cause was the cause of the whole realm: the presence amongst the signatories of Catholic nobles such as Montmorency was by itself a testimony to that. The misdeeds of the Guises damaged the third Estate, the nobility and even the clergy they pretended to defend, while their proclaimed goal, the extermination of the Reformed religion, was completely unachievable. In his turn, Navarre takes great pains to reject any possible concern over the fate of French Catholicism and, thus, to remove the most potent weapon from the Guises' rhetorical arsenal: the declaration asserts that neither the king of Navarre, nor the prince de Condé had any intention "to cause any harm to Catholics, or to the religion they profess, having always been of the opinion that consciences must be free and, as far as their own was concerned, they were ready to submit to a council"²⁴. His only enemies are the Guises and the League and, to drive the point home, an interval of two months is given to anyone who had been deceived and wished to abandon the Catholic League.

N. M. Sutherland argues that the declaration included a "warning to the king", namely, that if Navarre's offers "were again rejected, he could no longer remain inactive"²⁵. The assertion is excessively harsh, because it could imply that the declaration included some potential threats against the king. That is not the case: the tone of the proclamation towards the king is, overall, protective. The signatories play the role of concerned subjects and they constantly emphasize that they were not acting only in self-defense, but also for the defensive of the king and his kingdom against some intrusive and grasping foreigners. The warning that military action might follow is, in fact, a plea for the king to sanction it: Navarre's offers might have been addressed to the king but their acceptance depended on the Catholic League and Navarre was undoubtedly aware that the Guises could not be dissuaded from their hostile actions against the Huguenots and himself.

Out of all three proclamations discussed in this study, the one issued by Henri de Navarre and his allies was the closest to the truth when describing the position of the king: while undoubtedly Catholic fervor against the Protestants played a significant part in the motivations of the League, it was also equally true that the Guise clan was using this opportunity to undermine Henry III and the Valois monarchy. Navarre was basically correct in pointing out that the treaty of Nemours had been extorted from the king and the biggest threat for Henry III came

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 197.

²⁵ N. M. Sutherland, *Henry IV of France and the Politics of Religion (1572-1596)*, Bristol and Portland, Elm Bank, 2002, p. 99.

from the Guises and their adherents from the Catholic League. Subsequent events will prove this right. They may have still paid formal respect to the king, directing their criticism, in the good medieval tradition, at the king's "evil" advisors, but both the Guises and the lower-ranking members of the League were slowly moving towards an open conflict with Henry III. The ambitions of the Guise clan were simply incompatible with a strong monarchy, while the lower ranks were deeply suspicious about the king's willingness to repress heresy. In fact, Henry III was willing to accept Henri de Navarre as his heir to the throne of France and, in 1584, he had dispatched one of his most trusted advisors, the duke d'Épernon, to persuade the latter to convert to Catholicism. Navarre had declined for the moment, but that was a perspective which was unacceptable for the Guises and the League, especially its Parisian section, the Seize. The discontent increased until it turned into open rebellion on 12 May 1588, when the population of Paris rose up and expelled Henry III from the city: the consequence was the Edict of Union, in July 1588, where the king accepted all the demands of the league, namely the disgrace of his favorites, reaffirmation of the treaty of Nemours, recognition of cardinal de Bourbon as his heir presumptive instead of Henri de Navarre and the appointment of Henri de Guise as lieutenant-general of the kingdom²⁶. The Estates General, summoned at Blois in October 1588 and dominated by the League, took further measures to weaken the royal power, intending to gain for the Estates the right to determine the fundamental laws of the kingdom²⁷. Henry III retaliated by having the principal leaders of the League, Henri de Guise and his brother, the cardinal Charles de Guise, assassinated on 23 and 24 December 1588: the consequence was a general rebellion of the League against the king, but one where, unlike in other times, the declared goal was his overthrow. To counter this, Henry III allied himself with Henri de Navarre and officially acknowledged him as his heir – thus the latter finally gaining the opportunity to act as the king's protector also in fact, not just in words only, as he stated in his proclamation of 1585.

Conclusions

It was often pointed out in historiography how the French Wars of Religion led to the emergence of radical doctrines of popular sovereignty which envisioned the possibility of the king being held accountable by the people, resisted or even deposed in case of tyranny. Yet there is only little trace of it in the political declarations of the most prominent aristocratic leaders of the period. The texts analyzed here were all issued by nobles associated with the Protestant movement in France: Louis de Condé and Henri de Navarre as its military and political leaders, François d'Alençon as its occasional ally. But there is no "monarchomach" line of thought identifiable in them: in fact, the justifications provided by the authors of

²⁶ J.H.M. Salmon, *Society in Crisis: France in the Sixteenth Century*, London, Methuen, 1979, p. 243.

²⁷ Frederic J. Baumgartner, *France in the Sixteenth Century*, Houndmills, MacMillan, 1995, p. 287.

the texts are not even fully-fledged resistance theories. If we compare them with the noble rebellions of the previous century, it is more than a little conspicuous that the goals of the League of the Public Weal were more radical than any expressed by its sixteenth-century counterparts: the former was open about its intention to remove Louis XI and replace him with a regent – there is not even the slightest suggestion of this sort in the analyzed texts. The fact that their signatories were related to the royal family cannot account for this particularity: the League of the Public Weal also had amongst its members the king's brother, Charles, yet it did not shy away from threatening the king directly. Condé, Alençon, Navarre did not depict their relationship with the king as broken – on the contrary, in their view, it was stronger than ever and it was this relationship that their decision to resort to arms was based on. The rebel princes were acting in service of the king – the lawfulness of their rebellion was contingent upon fulfilling a public and personal duty. Even when acting to defend their own interests, they were actually protecting *the king's* peace and *the king's* laws. In my opinion, it is the Crown's weakness which acts as a protective shield and prevents the princes from attacking the king directly: there were certainly enough precedents if they desired to go the “monarchomach” route. But it was not necessary and, more so, it could have been damaging for their goals: there was always the possibility of them getting the chance to dominate the weak king and mold his policies according to their interests.

Referring in particular to the revolts of the 1560s, Jules Racine St.-Jacques asserts that the noble revolt can be considered “a ritualized part of an control mechanism of the monarchy supplanting the absence – or the insufficiency – of institutional ways of access to the decision-making process” and it “unfolds in a precise order which grants it an aura of legitimacy and assures the participants (...) of being reintegrated under the clement wing of the king”²⁸. This assessment applies to all the proclamations issued by the princes of the blood and discussed in this paper: the restoration of the relationship between the king and the revolted princes was always an open possibility and, in fact, it was the common goal of Condé, Alençon and Navarre. All three texts include repeated appeals to the king to consider such a course. As members of the royal family, they were also less threatened than the lower members of their factions and therefore had less incentive for truly revolutionary proposals. Since the monarchy, even in its weakened state it found itself in the second half of the sixteenth century, still was the principal source of legitimacy, the princes had little desire to completely alienate the king and associate with a popular radicalism which could have become uncomfortable for their own pretensions. Popular sovereignty remained thus the preserve of the lower ranks.

²⁸ Jules Racine St.-Jacques, *L'Honneur et la foi: le droit de résistance chez les Réformés français*, Geneva, Droz, 2012, p. 106-107.

The doctrine of lawful rebellion in the princely proclamations of the French wars of religion

Abstract

The historiography of the French Wars of Religion has devoted a lot of attention to the “monarchomach” literature of that period, examining the ideas of legitimate resistance and popular sovereignty expressed in these works. But the “monarchomach” authors, influential as they might have been in the field of ideas, were not key policy-makers, even though some of them got close to the centers of power by being part of the inner circle of the potentates of that time. The “official” position of the rebellious factions was expressed in the proclamations issued by their princely leaders when hostilities broke out anew. These princes embraced the idea of lawful rebellion of the “monarchomachs”, but did so on their own terms. This paper aims to analyze how was the doctrine of lawful rebellion constructed in these proclamations, in contrast with the popular radicalism in some of the “monarchomach” tracts.

Keywords: France; Wars of Religion; Rebellion; Royal Power; Huguenots.

ABREVIERI

<i>AARMSI</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice
<i>AARMSL</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Literare
<i>AARPAD</i>	= „Analele Academiei Române”, seria II, București, 1879-1916
<i>AA.SS.</i>	= <i>Acta Sanctorum</i> , ed. Bollandisti, III ^a ediție, Parigi 1863-1870
<i>AB</i>	= Arhivele Basarabiei
<i>ACNSAS</i>	= Arhivele Consiliului Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității
<i>AE</i>	= L'Année Epigraphique, Paris
<i>AIR</i>	= Arhiva Istorică a României
<i>AIAC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie Cluj
<i>AIIAI</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>AIIC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Cluj
<i>AIINC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională, Cluj
<i>AIIX</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>ALIL</i>	= Anuarul de Lingvistică și Istorie Literară, Iași
<i>ALMA</i>	= <i>Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi</i> . Genève.
<i>AM</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei, Iași
<i>AMAE</i>	= Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe
<i>AmAnthr</i>	= American Anthropologist, New Series, Published by Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
<i>AMM</i>	= Acta Moldaviae Meridionalis, Vaslui
<i>AMMB</i>	= Arhiva Mitropoliei Moldovei și Bucovinei, Iași
<i>AMN</i>	= Acta Musei Napocensis
<i>AMR</i>	= Arhivele Militare Române
<i>AMS</i>	= Anuarul Muzeului din Suceava
<i>ANB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, București
<i>ANC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Cluj
<i>ANDMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Direcția Municipiului București
<i>ANG</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Galați
<i>ANI</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Iași
<i>ANIC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale
<i>ANR-Cluj</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Cluj-Napoca
<i>ANR-Sibiu</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Sibiu
<i>ANRM</i>	= Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova, Chișinău
<i>ANRW</i>	= Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Berlin-New York
<i>ANSMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Municipiului București
<i>ANV</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Vaslui
<i>AO</i>	= Arhivele Olteniei
<i>AP</i>	= Analele Putnei
<i>APH</i>	= Acta Poloniae Historica, Varșovia
<i>AqLeg</i>	= <i>Aquila Legionis. Cuadernos de Estudios sobre el Ejército Romano</i> , Salamanca
<i>AR</i>	= Arhiva Românească
<i>ArchM</i>	= Arhiva Moldaviae, Iași
<i>ArhGen</i>	= Arhiva Genealogică
„Arhiva”	= „Arhiva”. Organul Societății Științifice și Literare, Iași
<i>ArhMold</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei
<i>ASRR</i>	= Arhiva Societății Române de Radiodifuziune
<i>AȘUI</i>	= Analele Științifice ale Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași

- ATS = Ancient Textile Series, Oxbow Books, Oxford și Oakville
 AUAIC = Arhiva Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași
 AUB = Analele Universității „București”
 BA = *Biblioteca Ambrosiana*, Roma, Città Nuova Editrice
 BAR = Biblioteca Academiei Române
 BArchB = Bundesarchiv Berlin
 BAR int. ser. = British Archaeological Reports, International Series
 BBR = Buletinul Bibliotecii Române
 BCIR = Buletinul Comisiei Istorice a României
 BCMI = Buletinul Comisiei Monumentelor Istorice
 BCU-Iași = Biblioteca Centrală Universitară, Iași
 BE = Bulletin Epigraphique
 BF = Byzantinische Forschungen, Amsterdam
 BJ = Bonner Jahrbücher, Bonn
 BMI = Buletinul Monumentelor Istorice
 BMIM = București. Materiale de istorie și muzeografie
 BNB = Biblioteca Națională București
 BNJ = Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher
 BOR = Biserica Ortodoxă Română
 BS = Balkan Studies
 BSNR = Buletinul Societății Numismatice Române
 ByzSlav = Byzantinoslavica
 CA = Cercetări arheologice
 CAI = Caiete de Antropologie Istorică
 CartNova = *La ciudad de Carthago Nova 3: La documentación epigráfica*, Murcia
 CB = Cahiers balkaniques
 CC = Codrul Cosminului, Suceava (ambele serii)
 CCAR = Cronica cercetărilor arheologice din România, CIMEC, București
 CCh = *Corpus Christianorum*, Turnhout
 CChSG = *Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca*
 CCSL = *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, Turnhout, Brepols
 CDM = *Catalogul documentelor moldovenești din Arhivele Centrale de Stat*, București, vol. I-V; supl. I.
 CDȚR = *Catalogul documentelor Țării Românești din Arhivele Statului*, București, vol. II-VIII, 1974-2006
 Chiron = Chiron: Mitteilungen der Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, 1971
 CI = Cercetări istorice (ambele serii)
 CIL = *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, Berlin
 CL = Cercetări literare
 CLRE = *Consuls of the Later Roman Empire*, eds. R. S. Bagnall, A. Cameron, S. R. Schwartz, K. A. Worp, Atlanta, 1987
 CN = Cercetări Numismatice
 CNA = Cronica Numismatică și Arheologică, București
 CSCO = *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium*, Louvain
 CSEA = *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiae Aquileiensis*, Roma, Città Nuova Editrice
 CSEL = *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, Wien, De Gruyter
 CSPAMI = Centrul de Studii și Păstrare a Arhivelor Militare Centrale, Pitești
 CT = Columna lui Traian, București
 CTh = *Codex Theodosianus*. Theodosiani, Libri XVI cum constitutionibus Sirmondianis, I, edidit adsumpto apparatu P. Kruegeri, Th. Mommsen, Hildesheim, 1970-1971
 Cv.L = Convorbiri literare (ambele serii)

„Dacia”, N.S.	= Dacia. Nouvelle Série, Revue d'archéologie et d'histoire ancienne, București
DANIC	= Direcția Arhivelor Naționale Istorice Centrale
DGAS	= Direcția Generală a Arhivelor Statului
DI	= Diplomatarium Italicum
DIR	= <i>Documente privind istoria României</i>
DIRRI	= <i>Documente privind Istoria României. Războiul pentru Independență</i>
DOP	= Dumbarton Oaks Papers
DTN	= <i>Din trecutul nostru</i> , Chișinău
DRH	= <i>Documenta Romaniae Historica</i>
EB	= Études Balkaniques
EBPB	= Études byzantines et post-byzantines
EDCS	= <i>Epigraphik-Datenbank Clauss-Slaby</i> (http://www.manfredclauss.de/)
EDR	= <i>Epigraphic Database Roma</i> (http://www.edr-edr.it/default/index.php)
EpigrAnat	= Epigraphica Anatolica, Münster
ERAsturias	= F. Diego Santos, <i>Epigrafiă Romana de Asturias</i> , Oviedo, 1959.
Gerión	= Gerión. Revista de Historia Antigua, Madrid
GB	= Glasul Bisericii
GCS	= <i>Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller</i> , Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1897-1969
GLK	= <i>Grammatici Latini Keil</i>
HEp	= <i>Hispania Epigraphica</i> , Madrid
„Hierasus”	= <i>Hierasus</i> . Anuarul Muzeului Județean Botoșani, Botoșani
HM	= Heraldica Moldaviae, Chișinău
HU	= Historia Urbana, Sibiu
HUI	= Historia Universitatis Iassensis, Iași
IDR	= <i>Inscripțiile din Dacia romană</i> , Bucurști-Paris
IDRE	= <i>Inscriptions de la Dacie romaine. Inscriptions externes concernant l'histoire de la Dacie</i> , I-II, Bucarest, 1996, 2000
IGLN	= Inscriptions grecques et latines de Novae, Bordeaux
IGLR	= <i>Inscripțiile grecești și latine din secolele IV-XIII descoperite în România</i> , București, 1976
ILLPecs	= Instrumenta Inscripta Latina. <i>Das römische Leben im Spiegel der Kleininschriften</i> , Pecs, 1991
ILAlg	= <i>Inscriptions latines d'Algérie</i> , Paris
ILB	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae in Bulgaria repertae. Inscriptiones inter Oescum et Iatrum repertae</i> , Sofia, 1989
ILD	= <i>Inscripții latine din Dacia</i> , București
ILN	= <i>Inscriptions latines de Novae</i> , Poznan
ILLPRON	= <i>Inscriptionum Lapidarium Latinarum Provinciae Norici usque ad annum MCMLXXXIV repertarum indices</i> , Berlin, 1986
ILS	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i> , 1892
IMS	= <i>Inscriptiones Moesiae Superioris</i> , Belgrad
IN	= „Ioan Neculce”. Buletinul Muzeului Municipal Iași
ISM	= <i>Inscripțiile din Scythia Minor grecești și latine</i> , București, vol. I-III, 1983-1999
JGO	= Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas
JL	= Junimea literară
JRS	= The Journal of Roman studies, London
LR	= Limba română
MA	= Memoria Antiquitatis, Piatra Neamț
MCA	= Materiale și cercetări arheologice
MEF	= <i>Moldova în epoca feudalismului</i> , vol. I-XII, 1961-2012, Chișinău
MEFRA	= <i>Mélanges de l'École française de Rome: Antiquité</i> , Roma

- MGH = *Monumenta Germaniae Historica inde ab anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum auspiciis societatis aperiendis fontibus rerum Germanicarum medii aevi*, Berlin 1877-
 MI = Magazin istoric, București
 MIM = Materiale de istorie și muzeografie
 MM = Mitropolia Moldovei
 MMS = Mitropolia Moldovei și Sucevei
 MN = Muzeul Național, București
 MO = Mitropolia Olteniei
 MOF = Monitorul Oficial al României
 Navarro = M. Navarro Caballero, *Perfectissima femina. Femmes de l'elite dans l'Hispanie romaine*, Bordeaux, 2017.
 NBA = *Nuova Biblioteca Agostiniana*, Roma, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum
 NDPAC = *Nuovo Dizionario Patristico e di Antichità Cristiane*, I, A-E, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2006; III, P-Z, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2008
 NEH = *Nouvelles études d'histoire*
 OI = Opțiuni istoriografice, Iași
 OPEL = *Onomasticon provinciarum Europae latinarum*, vol. I-IV, Budapesta-Viena, 1994-2002
 PG = *Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Graeca*, ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris, 1886-1912
 PIR = *Prosopographia Imperii Romani. Saec. I.II.III*, editio altera, Berlin.
 PLRE = *Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*, 3 vol., eds. A. H. M. Jones, J. R. Martindale, and J. Morris, Cambridge, 1971-1992
 RA = Revista arhivelor
 RBAR = Revista Bibliotecii Academiei Române, București
 RC = Revista catolică
 RdI = Revista de istorie
 REByz = *Revue des Études Byzantines*
 RER = *Revue des études roumaines*
 RESEE = *Revue des études Sud-Est européennes*
 RHP = *Die römischen Hilfstruppen in Pannonien während der Prinzipatszeit. I: Die Inschriften*, Viena
 RHSEE = *Revue historique de Sud-Est européen*
 RI = Revista istorică (ambele serii)
 RIAF = Revista pentru istorie, arheologie și filologie
 RIB = *Roman Inscriptions of Britain*, Londra
 RIM = Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, Chișinău
 RIR = Revista istorică română, București
 RIS = Revista de istorie socială, Iași
 RITL = Revista de istorie și teorie literară
 RIU = *Die römischen Inschriften Ungarns*, Budapesta
 RJMH = *The Romanian Journal of Modern History*, Iași
 RM = Revista muzeelor
 RMD = *Roman Military Diplomas*, Londra
 RMM = *Römische Militärdiplome und Entlassungsurkunden in der Sammlung des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums*, Mainz
 RMM-MIA = Revista muzeelor și monumentelor, seria Monumente istorice și de artă
 RMR = Revista Medicală Română
 RRH = *Revue roumaine d'histoire*
 RRHA = *Revue roumaine de l'histoire de l'art*
 RRHA-BA = *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire de l'Art. Série Beaux Arts*
 RSIAB = Revista Societății istorice și arheologice bisericești, Chișinău
 Rsl = Romanoslavica

<i>SAHIR</i>	= Studia et Acta Historiae Iudaeorum Romaniae, București
<i>SAI</i>	= Studii și Articole de Istorie
<i>SCB</i>	= Studii și cercetări de bibliologie
<i>Sch</i>	= <i>Sources Chrétiennes</i> , Paris
<i>SCIA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istoria artei
<i>SCIM</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie medie
<i>SCIV/SCIVA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie veche (și arheologie)
<i>SCN</i>	= Studii și Cercetări Numismatice, București
<i>SCȘI</i>	= Studii și cercetări științifice, Istorie
<i>SEER</i>	= The Slavonic and East European Review
<i>SHA</i>	= <i>Scriptores Historiae Augustae</i>
<i>SJAN</i>	= Serviciul Județean al Arhivelor Naționale
<i>SMIC</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie contemporană, București
<i>SMIM</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie medie, București
<i>SMIMod</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie modernă, București
<i>SOF</i>	= Südost-Forschungen, München
<i>ST</i>	= Studii Teologice, București
<i>StAntArh</i>	= Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica, Iași
<i>T&MBYZ</i>	= <i>Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de recherches d'histoire et de civilisation byzantines</i>
<i>ThD</i>	= Thraco-Dacica, București
<i>TR</i>	= Transylvanian Review, Cluj-Napoca
<i>TV</i>	= Teologie și viața, Iași
<i>ZPE</i>	= Zeitschrift für Papyralogie und Epigraphik
<i>ZSL</i>	= Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde