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Abrevieri

Between the diplomacy of war or peace and the Ottoman occupation of the Romanian Principalities (1821-1822)**

Introduction

In the years following the events of 1821, an “epochal threshold”, as Paul Cornea so eloquently formulated it¹, the political scene in the Romanian Principalities experienced great turmoil, plots, intrigues, reforming initiatives, but also the efforts of the refugee nobility to undermine the legitimacy and authority of the newly appointed princes. The Ottoman military occupation, oppressive and costly for the two Romanian countries², was also a central political issue at domestic and international level. We will not insist on the known aspects related to the establishment of this occupation, its perpetuation over time, its impact on the internal situation between 1821 and 1824³, which led to the breaking of Russian-Ottoman diplomatic relations and lengthy negotiations on the total or partial withdrawal of Turkish troops to the south of the Danube⁴. We will attempt an

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¹ Paul Cornea, *Originile romantismului românesc. Spiritul public, mișcarea ideilor și literatura între 1780-1840*, București, Editura Minerva, 1972, p. 172-181.

² *Documente privind istoria României: Răscoala din 1821*, III, *Documente interne*, ed. Andrei Oțetea, București, Editura Academiei Române, 1960, p. 120 (July 1822, *Perilipsis de suma încărcăturilor și cheltuielilor de la venirea oștilor turcești în Moldova*); Petronel Zahariuc, *Începutul domniei lui Ioniță Sandu Sturza. Un fragment din istoria anului 1822*, in *In honorem Mircea Ciubotaru*, edited by Lucian-Valeriu Lefter, Mihai-Bogdan Atanasiu, Iași, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2015, p. 497-499.

³ Ioan C. Filitti, *Frământările politice și sociale în Principatele Române de la 1821 la 1828*, București, „Cartea Românească”, 1932, p. 73-77.

⁴ Vlad Georgescu, *Din corespondența diplomatică a Țării Românești (1823-1828)*, București, Muzeul Româno-Rus, 1962; Gheorghe Cliveti, *La révolution de 1821 et la restauration des règnes*

analysis of some political plans and intentions with an impact on the elite of the Principalities, especially on the refugee boyars, which aimed at solving the crisis caused by the events of 1821 and the Ottoman military occupation, in accordance with the interests and projects of those who proposed them, from the Russian or Greek political sphere. The subject is particularly relevant in the context of the internal and diplomatic tensions generated by this prolonged occupation⁵. Until the Congress of Verona, followed by the meeting in Cernăuți between the Emperors of Austria and Russia⁶, all options were on the table regarding the Principalities: either their occupation by Russia⁷, or the appointment of new Phanariot princes under Russian pressure, invoking the previous Russo-Turkish treaties, or, on the contrary, the appointment of native princes by the Sultan alone, even with the risk of war with Russia⁸.

Capodistria, the Russian “war party” and the salvation of “our brothers in faith”

The defeat of the Romanian and *Etairist* movements of 1821, together with the Ottoman military occupation, proved to be heavy blows to the politics and influence of Capodistria and of the Philohellenic circles in the Russian Empire. However, until the Congress of Verona, Capodistria maintained a relevant influence, skilfully manoeuvring, under much more complicated conditions than before 1821, in favour of a *political solution* in order to undermine Ottoman authority in the Balkans, to maintain Russian control over the emancipation movements of the Orthodox peoples in the region⁹. His views were shared by

autochtones dans les Principautés Roumaines – une « pierre de touche » pour la diplomatie européenne dans la question d'Orient, Istanbul, The ISIS Press, 2020; Cristian Ploscaru, *Un complot și un plan de reformă „constituțională” în vremea lui Ioniță Sandu Sturdza*, in *Mari familii boierești din Moldova în veacurile XVII-XIX. Referințe identitare și manifestări de putere*, edited by Mihai-Bogdan Atanasiu, Mihai Mirza, Iași, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2020, p. 61-81; idem, *Regulamentele organice și istoria constituțională: Principatele Române de la „țări închinete, nesupuse cu sabia” la autonomia politică (1822-1828)*, in *AIIAI*, LVII (2020), p. 81-99.

⁵ George Meitani, *Acțiunea diplomatică a Europei față de Principatele Române între anii 1821 și 1824*, București, 1903, p. 28-29.

⁶ *Recueil de documents relatifs à la Russie pour la plupart secrets et inédits*, Paris, 1854, p. 217-218 (*Précis de l'exposé des différends survenus en 1821, entre la Russie et la Porte, présenté à l'empereur Nicolas Ier, à son avènement au trône*); *Memoirs of Prince Metternich 1815-1829*, IV, edited by Prince Richard Metternich, translated by Alexander Napier, New York, Charles Scribner, 1881, p. 20, 25-26; Irby C. Nichols, *The European Pentarchy and the Congress of Verona*, 1822, Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, p. 245-247.

⁷ *Vneshnaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka: Dokumenty rossiiskogo ministerstva inostrannykh del*, XII, *Mart 1821-dekabr' 1822*, Moskva, Polițičeskoj Literatury, 1980, p. 257-259 (9/21 August 1821, Capodistria to Alexander I).

⁸ Christine Philliou, *Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in the Age of Revolution*, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 2011, p. 89-90.

⁹ Alexander Bitis, *Russia and the Eastern Question: Army, Government, and Society, 1815-1833*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 161-167; Marie-Pierre Rey, *Alexander I: The Tsar who Defeated Napoleon*, DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 2012, p. 337-338; Konstantina

several influential Russian officials, – the diplomats Pozzo di Borgo, Khristofor Lieven and Stroganov, the military Pavel Kiselev and Carol Fr. Diebitsch, some even advocating a new war with the Ottoman Empire¹⁰, not just “active diplomacy”, as Capodistria wanted¹¹ – but were counterbalanced by Nesselrode, a firm believer in the consolidation of the “Viennese system” of 1815, an attitude towards which Tsar Alexander I was increasingly inclined¹². In an instruction to the special envoy to Vienna, Dmitry Tatischev, the Tsar stated that the pacification of the Balkans and the avoidance of new “revolutions” could be achieved by reconfirming Russia’s right of protection over the Orthodox subjects of the Porte on the basis of previous treaties, and hoped that Austria would support this political line and play the role of intermediary in relation with the Ottoman Empire¹³. Distrustful of Russian intentions and suspicious even of Austro-British mediation, Ottoman dignitaries claimed to have evidence that “the idea of a general insurrection of the Greeks was conceived by Count Capodistria and that this insurrection was to extend to the Ionian Islands”, which were under British control¹⁴.

The first Russian ultimatum addressed to the Porte (16/28 June 1821) reflected Capodistria’s ideas¹⁵ of justifying the revolts, since “the measures taken

Zanou, *Transnational Patriotism in the Mediterranean, 1800-1850: Stammering the Nation*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 89.

¹⁰ Numerous details about the “war party” in relation to the Ottoman Empire and about the documents attesting this orientation, at Theophilus Prousis, *Russian Society and the Greek Revolution*, DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 1994, p. 38-44; Alexander Bitis, *Russia and the Eastern Question*, p. 110-112.

¹¹ Capodistria’s account of his plea to the Tsar on Russia’s policy towards the Orthodox subjects of the Porte and the negotiations with the Ottoman Empire in this matter, on the strategy of “active diplomacy” (Ioannis Capodistrias, *Aperçu de ma carrière publique depuis 1798 jusqu’à 1822*, in „Sbornik ruskovo istoriceskovo obcestva”, III (1868), 269-270) is confirmed by the contents of a correspondence from late 1821 (*Vneshnaia politika Rossii*, XII, p. 244-245; 29 July/10 August 1821, Capodistria to Alexander I; p. 375-377; 27 November/7 December 1821, Capodistria to Lieven). See Elise Kimerling Wirtschafer, *From Victory to Peace: Russian Diplomacy after Napoleon*, London, Northern Illinois University Press, 2021, p. 145, 148.

¹² *Vneshnaia politika Rossii*, XII, p. 370-371 (27 November/9 December 1821, Nesselrode to Lieven). See Barbara Jelavich, *Russia’s Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914*, Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 62-63; Alexis Heraclides, Ada Dialla, *Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century: Setting the Precedent*, Manchester University Press, 2015, p. 108.

¹³ *Vneshnaia politika Rossii*, XII, p. 508-509 (14/26 May 1822, Alexander I to Tatischev).

¹⁴ Theophilus C. Prousis, *Lord Strangford and the Sublime Porte (1821): The Eastern Crisis*, I, Istanbul, The Isis Press, 2010, p. 52 (Constantinople, 24 March 1821, Strangford to Castlereagh). We thank Gabriel Leanca, who kindly offered me for study the precious volumes of British documents published by Theophilus Prousis.

¹⁵ Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen vom Türkischen Reiche im Jahre 1821*, III, Wien, 1867, p. 95-101 (*Copie d’une note à remettre au Gouvernement Turc par Mr. le Baron de Stroganoff*); Ioannis Capodistrias, *Aperçu de ma carrière publique*, p. 267; Theophilus Prousis, *British Embassy Reports on the Greek Uprising in 1821-1822: War of Independence or War of Religion?* in „Archivum Ottomanicum”, 28 (2011), p. 197-200. About the radical character of this ultimative note, in Lord Strangford’s opinion, impossible for the Ottomans to accept, see the report

by the Ottoman ministry [in the preceding years – ed.] have imprinted upon the enterprise of the authors of the revolution the character of a legitimate defence against the total destruction of the Greek nation and of the religion which it practices”¹⁶. These ideas, along with other interesting considerations, were contained in a letter to Ignatius of Arta, former Metropolitan of Wallachia (17/29 July 1821)¹⁷. The danger of the pursuit of subversive actions and of the secret societies for the Greek cause, leading to the compromise of the whole emancipation movement and to the loss of any support from Russia, was pointed out, as well as the need to find *political solutions* to the “Eastern question”, including in the Principalities. Ignatius reiterated these ideas a year later, in a memorandum to Nesselrode on 1/13 October 1822 (*Grèce. Causes de sa révolution et son état actuel*), in which he justified the Greek revolt and condemned the occupation regime in the Romanian Principalities, presenting the newly appointed native princes as instruments of Ottoman tyranny¹⁸.

Even if at the present stage of the documentation we do not have enough data to outline a complete picture, reading Capodistria’s memoir, the fragments to which we had access from the memoir of Ignatius of Arta¹⁹ and the one written by Alexander Mavrocordat²⁰, a prominent leader of the Greek revolution and a member of the circle of intellectuals who guided the work of the *Philomusos Etaireia*, in Italian exile, together with Ignatius of Arta, Georgio Mocenigo, Andreas Mustoxidi and Spiridone Naranzi²¹, suggests a tendency to identify

from Constantinople to Castlereagh of 23 July 1821 (idem, *Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte*, I, p. 138-141).

¹⁶ Prokesch-Osten, *op. cit.*, III, p. 96; Theophilus Prousis, *op. cit.*, p. 101 (Constantinople, 12 June 1821, Strangford to Castlereagh).

¹⁷ Zacharias Tsirpanlis, *Mémoires et rapports de Jean Capodistriais (1809-1822: Problèmes et recherche*, in *BS*, XIX (1978), no. 1, p. 28.

¹⁸ Konstantina Zanou, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

¹⁹ The memoir was published in full in Greek by Emmanuel Protopsaltis (*Υπόμνημα συναφή Ιγνατίου Μητροπολίτου Ουγγροβλαχίας και Ιω. Καποδιστρίου περί της τύχης της Ελλάδος (1821)*), in „Αθηνά”, nr. 60 (1956), p. 145-182).

²⁰ Prokesch-Osten, *op. cit.*, III, p. 1-54 (*Coup d’oeil sur la Turquie*). In Western historiography, the authors have focused more on Alexander Mavrocordat’s connections with the circle of writers and philhellenists in Pisa, formed around the poets Shelley and Byron (Jane Blumberg, *Mary Shelley’s Early Novels: “This Child of Imagination and Misery”*, London, Macmillan, Press, 1993, p. 69-71), but politically important are the connections with Ignatius of Arta and other Greeks from the diaspora residing in Italy (David Brewer, *The Greek War of Independence: The Struggle for Freedom from Ottoman Oppression*, New York, London, The Overlook Press, 2011, p. 145-147).

²¹ Konstantina Zanou, *Imperial Nationalism and Orthodox Enlightenment: A Diasporic Story Between the Ionian Islands, Russia and Greece, ca. 1800-30*, in *Mediterranean Diasporas: Politics and Ideas in the Long 19th Century*, edited by Maurizio Isabella and Konstantina Zanou, London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2016, p. 104-110, 118. A brief cultural biography of Andreas Mustoxidi, in idem, *Nostalgia, Self-Exile and the National Idea: The Case of Andrea Mustoxidi and the Early Nineteenth-Century Heptanesians of Italy*, in *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey*, edited by Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kizilyürek, Umut Özkirimli, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2010, p. 98-111. About the connections of Ignatius and Spiridone Naranzi with the members of the Philhellenic Committee in Geneva, in order to support the Greek movement, buying

political solutions, after the suppression of the *Etairist* movement, which would reconcile *the objectives of Greek emancipation and, more broadly, of the Balkan Orthodox with the interests of Russia and the requirements of European equilibrium in the Orient*. A friend and old collaborator of Capodistria, Giorgio Mocenigo, the Russian ambassador in Turin, appointed Andreas Mustoxidi as secretary of the embassy in 1821²², while his brother Angelo had been the Russian consul in the Dardanelles for some time²³. Since 1817, Ignatius, Mustoxidi and Naranzi, the consul of Russia in Venice, were under surveillance by the Austrian police as agents of Russian influence in Lombardy and the Ionian Islands²⁴. Called the “Greek-Russian” party by British partisans in Morea and Hydra, these leaders of the Greek diaspora in Italy advocated the creation of a Greek principality in Morea with a status similar to that of Wallachia and the retention of the Phanariots as rulers of the Romanian Principalities²⁵. The success of this strategy, however, depended on the Tsar’s decision to act unilaterally, diplomatically and possibly militarily against the Ottoman Empire. The intervention of the other powers, especially Austria and England, with the Russian-Turkish treaties as a point of reference, Capodistria believed, could only be to the Ottomans’ advantage²⁶.

In his turn, Alexander Mavrocordat reiterated an idea presented earlier in a Capodistria’s memoir to the Tsar²⁷: “if Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia were elevated to the status of independent and confederated Principalities, under the common guarantee of the three neighbouring powers, Turkey would then acquire a

arms and recruiting volunteers, see Olivier Reverdin, *La Toscane, les philhellènes genevois et l’envoi des secours à la Grèce*, in *Le relazioni del pensiero italiano risorgimentale con i centri del movimento liberale di Ginevra e Coppet*, Rome, 1979, p. 63-74.

²² Niccolo Tomasseo, *Andrea Mustodoxi*, in “Archivio Storico Italiano”, nuova serie, XX (1860), 1, Firenze, p. 48.

²³ Lucien J. Frary, *Russian Consuls and the Greek War of Independence (1821-1831)*, in „Mediterranean Historical Review”, 28 (2013), no. 1, p. 48.

²⁴ In a surveillance account written by the Venetian secret police, it was stated that Mustoxidi “is of Greek origin, awarded by Emperor Alexander with the Order of St. Vladimir for a work of his dedicated to him, a friend of Count Capodistria, his fellow countryman, and of that gentleman Consul General of Russia [in Venice – ed.], the Chevalier Naranzi, and of all the partisans of this government”, that of Petersburg (*Carte segrete e atti ufficiali della Polizia austriaca in Italia dal 4 giugno 1814 al 22 marzo 1848*, I, Capolago, Tipografia Elvetica, 1851, p. 178; Venezia, Report 3054, of 26 Novembre 1817). In close contact with “public and secret Russian agents in Italy”, Metropolitan Ignatius patronized a “Greek-Walachian colony” of young men coming for study, which “also seems to have political aims”, and therefore any contacts of these young men with persons known to be secret Russian agents had to be watched (*ibidem*, II, p. 213-214; Vienna, Report 289, of 27 May 1820). Followed by the secret police in 1821, Ignatius was suspected of secretly handling with the transit of Greek volunteers to the “fatherland” through Italian ports with the help of secret Russian agents (*ibidem*, II, p. 220; Venezia, Report 296, of 2 May 1822).

²⁵ Konstantina Zanou, *Imperial Nationlism and Orthodox Enlightenment: A Diaspora Story Between the Ionian Islands, Russia, and Greece, 1800-1830*, in *Mediterranean Diaspora Ideas and Politics in the Long Nineteenth Century*, edited by Maurizio Izabella and Konstantina Zanou, London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2016, p. 126-129.

²⁶ *Vneshnaia politika Rossii*, XII, p. 501-503 (1/13 May 1822, Capodistria to Alexander I).

²⁷ Ioannis Capodistrias, *Aperçu de ma carrière publique*, p. 210-211.

much more secure and defensible border line”²⁸. The same Mavrocordat concluded in 1824 that “our revolution was premature” and could easily have been avoided if the Great Powers had assured the Greeks a legitimate government, as in the other Christian countries of Europe²⁹. The question of the legitimacy of the Balkan Orthodox uprising, a heavy moral burden on the shoulders of some legitimists who in previous years had been promoting emancipation projects, such as Alexander Sc. Sturdza³⁰, the author of a brochure – *La Grèce en 1821 et 1822*³¹ – published in Paris in 1823, was a favourite theme of political questioning: “can an authority whose fundamental dogma regarding Christians is reduced to this terrible word, *apostasy* or *servitude*; an authority which has no respect for religion, life, honour or property of those it governs, claim the sacredness of legitimacy”?

In conclusion, the rebellious Greeks were guilty not against the Sultan, but towards the Tsar of Russia, associating his image and his aura of imperial legitimacy over all the Orthodox with the “fatal” idea of revolution. This was their cardinal sin, which could only be rectified by a political solution coming from Petersburg, continuing the so-called work of “national regeneration [of Orthodox Christians] created by Catherine II”. The confirmation of the Russian protectorate over Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia, together with “a territorial pact between Turkey and the Greeks, written by the sword, would have saved the suffering humanity and prevented the revolution”, establishing the peace and a regime of freedom for the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan³².

For the same reasons, Ignatius of Arta also vehemently opposed the appropriateness of Alexander Ypsilanti’s action, because “the Christian nations under Turkish rule were not prepared to revolt and take up arms against a domination which was not yet to be despised, both because of its means and its relations with the other powers of Europe. We have also the certainty that Russia (which the foolish leaders of the revolution dared to slander as approving their movement) will also be opposed, because her justice and honor demanded it”³³. In his opinion, the solution to the crisis caused by the *Etaireist* movement could be only a political one, namely the appointment of new princes in the Principalities, with Russia’s consent and on the basis of previous treaties.

²⁸ Prokesch-Osten, *op. cit.*, III, p. 42.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, IV, Wien, 1867, p. 133 (Missolonghi, 5/17 February 1824, Alexander Mavrocordat to Gentz).

³⁰ Alexandru Boldur, *Relațiile lui Tudor Vladimirescu cu eteriștii*, in *România în istoria universală*, II, edited by I Agrigoroaiei, Gh. Buzatu, V. Cristian, Iași, 1987, p. 239; Stella Ghervas, *Reinventarea tradiției: Alexandru Sturdza și Europa Sfintei Alianțe*, Chișinău, Cartier, 2014, p. 81.

³¹ *La Grèce en 1821 et 1822: Correspondance politique publiée par un grec*, Paris, P. Dufart, 1823. The same main ideas were summarized by Alexander Sc. Sturdza in a letter to Capodistria, in which he expressed his dissatisfaction with Russia’s cautious policy in the matter of the *Etaireia* revolt (*Vneshnaia politika Rossii*, XII, p. 94-96; 2/14 April 1821, Alexandru Sturdza către Capodistria).

³² Stella Ghervas, *Reinventarea tradiției*, p. 80.

³³ *Documente 1821*, II, *Documente interne*, 1959, p. 390 (Pisa, October 1821, Ignatius to Dionisie Lupu).

Also, from the notes of Serghei Turghenev, an attaché at the Russian embassy in Constantinople – *Notice sur insurrection des Grecs contre Empire Ottoman en 1821*³⁴ – it is quite clear what political solution was hoped for by those who, hostile to the idea of revolution, were convinced that the Turks could not ensure a regime of peace and freedom for the Balkan Orthodox subjects, because of the nature of the Ottoman state and the religious fanaticism of many Muslim subjects of the Sultan. First of all, Turghenev speaks of a division among the Greek diaspora, which began with the rise of Alexander Ypsilanti as “plenipotentiary of the Supreme Council of the Regency and *commander-in-chief* of the Greek troops”, separating the supporters of the general uprising in the Balkans from the moderates, who preferred the strategy of emancipation based on the “enlightenment of the people”, the expansion of the philhellenic movement in Europe and, crucially, the diplomatic support of Russia³⁵. Turghenev considered Ottoman reprisals against the Christians and the British intrigues as the main causes of the break in Russian-Ottoman relations, which blocked a political negotiation capable of leading to the pacification of the Balkans on the basis of previous treaties, in other words, a new confirmation of Russian tutelage over the Orthodox Christians subject to the Ottoman Empire³⁶.

The ideas expressed by these influential figures among the Greek elite supporting the emancipation were felt in 1821-1822 in Bessarabia, and through their reverberations, across the Prut, in the Romanian Principalities. On the one hand, the protection and support given to the *Etaireist* refugees in the first months after the catastrophes of Drăgășani, Secu and Sculeni³⁷, turned into caution or even harassment, with the launching of investigations against those responsible for the

³⁴ Serghei Ivanonici Turghenev, *Notice sur Insurrection des Grecs contre Empire Ottoman en 1821*, text published in Glynn R. Barratt, *Notice sur l'insurrection des Grecs contre l'Empire Ottoman: A Russian View of the Greek War of Independence*, in *BS*, 14 (1973), no. 1, p. 72-107.

³⁵ Serghei Ivanonici Turghenev, *op. cit.*, p. 76-77. „Depuis plusieurs années une société s'était formée pour la propagation des lumières en Grèce. Composée de Grecs de tous les pays [...], elle fut secondée par les vœux et les secours de plusieurs étrangers [...]. Quelques membres de cette société conçurent l'idée d'employer leur réunion pour atteindre un but plus vaste, plus essentiel, plus grand, mais aussi plus difficile et plus dangereux. Ils eurent l'idée de travailler à la liberté de leur patrie [...]. Comme ses premiers travaux, consacrés à répandre l'instruction en Grèce, et par là même préparer sa régénération, avaient été favorisés du dehors, cette société crut que son nouveau plan rencontrerait la même approbation”. On the ideological role of the *Philomusos Etaireia* in the orientation of the Greek national movement, see Ada Diaila, *Thinking Europe on Europe's margins: Alexander Sturdza, Konstantinos Oikonomos and Russian Greek orthodoxy in the early nineteenth century*, in „The Historical Review/La Revue Historique”, 16 (2020), p. 141-166; Konstantina Zanou, *Transnational Patriotism*, p. 95-102.

³⁶ Serghei Ivanonici Turghenev, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

³⁷ *Documente 1821*, II, p. 274-278 (July 1821, *Notă informativă a căpitanului de gardă Burțov*); I. P. Liprandi, *Răscoala pandurilor sub conducerea lui Tudor Vladimirescu în anul 1821*, *Documente 1821*, V, *Izvoare narrative*, 1962, p. 330-331; *Vneshnaya politika Rossii*, XII, p. 150-152 (1/13 May 1821, Nesselrode către Stroganov).

disturbances of 1821, following the instructions given by Capodistria himself³⁸. Some new attempts to reignite the anti-Ottoman uprising in the Romanian Principalities and Serbia were tempered and attempts were made to involve the refugee boyars in the efforts to promote the plans devised by the partisans (Greeks and Russians) of an Russian active policy towards the Ottoman Empire³⁹. By openly discouraging any new insurrection on the Danube, these leaders of the Greek diaspora, in connection with prominent Russian officials, partisans of the war with the Ottoman Empire, played an important role in maintaining a state of uncertainty and instability in Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia. The aim could not have been other than the preparation of a *political solution* to restore the Russian power in the Lower Danube and over the anti-Ottoman movements, as long as the prospect of an immediate war with the Porte was contrary to the Tsar's supreme will⁴⁰.

It should be noted that even people with revolutionary options, willing to change the political system in a constitutional sense, did not see things very differently. Historiography has discussed the connections of the *Etairists* located in Odessa and Bessarabia with the Masonic lodges in Kishinev, with certain liberal, reformist Russian figures⁴¹ (Generals Mikhail Orlov and Pavel Pushcin, poet Al. Pushkin, Major Vladimir Raevski, Colonel Pavel Pestel)⁴². Some members of the Masonic lodge founded in 1818, *Union of Prosperity (Soiuz blagodenstviia)*, with branches in Odessa and Kishinev⁴³, are sensitive to the Greek national aspirations⁴⁴, others⁴⁵, like Vladimir Raevski and Pavel Pestel, suspect the leaders

³⁸ The financial aid to Greek refugees in Russia, based on private donations and budgetary allocations, is analysed in detail, on the basis of impressive documentary references, in Theophilus Prousis, *Russian Society*, p. 55-83.

³⁹ Radu R. Florescu, *Lord Strangford and the Problem of the Danubian Principalities, 1821-1824*, in „The Slavic and East European Review”, 39 (1961), nr. 93, p. 473-474; H. Şükrü İlicak, *The Revolt of Alexandros Ipsilantis and the Fate of the Fanariots in Ottoman Documents*, in *The Greek Revolution of 1821: A European Event*, edited by Petros Pizaniyas, Istanbul, The ISIS Press, 2011, p. 226.

⁴⁰ Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 620; George F. Jewsbury, *The Greek Question: The View from Odessa 1815-1822*, in „Cahiers de monde russe”, 40 (1999), no. 4, p. 758-759; Alexander Bitis, *Russia and the Eastern Question*, p. 111, 117.

⁴¹ An excellent analysis of the relations between the Philhellenism and liberalism (moderate or radical) of the various future Decembrists, in Theophilus Prousis, *op. cit.*, p. 46-47.

⁴² The existence of a short-lived Masonic lodge in Kishinev in the spring of 1821, *The Lodge of Ovid*, was attributed to them (Gh. Bezviconi, Scarlat Callimachi, *Puşkin în exil*, Bucureşti, 1947, p. 42-46; Sergei Davydov, *Pushkin's Biography*, in David Bethea, *The Superstitious Muse: Thinking Russian Literature Mythopoetically*, Academic Studies Press, 2009, p. 213).

⁴³ Marc Raeff, *The Decembrist Movement*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1966, p. 10-11; Patrick O'Meara, *The Decembrist Pavel Pestel. Russia's First Republican*, London, Palgrave McMillan, 2003, p. 42, 55-56.

⁴⁴ Gh. Bezviconi, Scarlat Callimachi, *op. cit.*, Bucureşti, 1947, p. 134; Demetrios J. Farsolas, *Alexander Pushkin: His Attitude Toward the Greek Revolution, 1821-1829*, in *BS*, XII (1971), no. 1, p. 57-80. On the correspondence between Alexander Ypsilanti and two Russian generals, Mikhail Orlov and Pavel Kiselev, who were revealed certain intentions of the *Etairiea*, see Alexander Bitis, *Russia and the Eastern Question*, p. 102-103.

of the *Etaireist* movement of personal ambitions and reproach them their haste and political stupidity. Impressed by the boldness of Alexander Ypsilanti's action in Moldavia and the content of his first proclamations⁴⁶, Pavel Pestel later accused him of recklessness as well as the Moldavian boyars of cowardice and of "hating the Greeks more than the Turks"⁴⁷. He feared, however, that Russian inaction might turn the hopes of the Balkan Orthodox for emancipation towards another European power⁴⁸.

The presence of so many heated spirits with radical ideas in southern Russia, in Odessa and Kishinev, can only arouse legitimate suspicions. On the south-western borders of the Empire, where the Serbian exiles had stirred only two years before⁴⁹, near Odessa, the core of the *Etaireia* plans, Kishinev was a curious destination to say the least for a young poet, Al. Pushkin, who had scandalized the Petersburg aristocracy and the Russian secret police with his revolutionary verses in the poem *Ode to the Liberty*. Capodistria, who proposed to the Tsar to send Pushkin to Kishinev for "punishment"⁵⁰, acted as suspiciously as in 1817, when, "terrified" by the revelations of Nicholas Galatis about the *Etaireia* plans, rescued him from arrest and sent him, "under escort", to the Russian consul in Iasi, where he immediately began to recruit followers!⁵¹. It is also unusual that Pushkin's description of *Etaireia* as a secret organization, in a letter to V. L. Davydov (March 1821), coincides, in parts *mot à mot*, with that contained in the *official report* of 8 March by Pavel Pestel to Pavel Kiselev⁵². At the time of the outbreak of the *Etaireist* movement, Pavel Pestel had been posted to Smolensk, but his presentation to the new post was postponed at the order of Pavel Kiselev, *Chief of Staff* of the Russian Second Army, who sent him to the Prut border and to Kishinev, where he met Inzov, Katakazi, Generals Pushcin and Orlov, then the Russian consul in Iasi, Andrei Pisani, and the Moldavian boyar Iordache Roset Roznovanu⁵³.

⁴⁵ Glynn R. Barratt, *Notice sur l'insurrection des Grecs contre l'Empire Ottoman: A Russian View of the Greek War of Independence*, in *BS*, 14 (1973), nr. 1, p. 47-48.

⁴⁶ *Vneshnaia politika Rossii*, XII, p. 119 (15/27 April 1821, Pestel to Kiselev); O'Meara, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁴⁷ *Documente 1821*, I, *Documente interne*, 1959, p. 357 (Tulcin, 8/20 March 1821, Pavel Pestel to Pavel Kiselev).

⁴⁸ Theophilus Prousis, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁴⁹ P. Morozov, *Kara-Georghii ii serbskie emigranty vi Rossii 1814-1830*, in *Istoricheskiye materialy iz Arkhiva Ministerstva gosudarstvennykh imushchestvi*, I, Petersburg, Tipografiya V. Bezobrazova, 1891, p. 109-115; M. Vukcević, *Pis'ma iz provog i drugog ustanka*, in „Spomenik”, Beograd, Kraljevska Akademija Srbije, XXXVII (1900), p. 148-149 (Hotin, 29 December 1816, Metropolitan Leontie to Mihail Gherman).

⁵⁰ *Aleksandr Sergeyevich Pushkin 1817-1825*, in „Russkaia Starina”, LIII (1887), no. 1, p. 239-240 (4 May 1820, Capodistria to Inzov). Details and documentary references at Demetrios J. Farsolas, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

⁵¹ Ioannis Capodistrias, *Aperçu de ma carrière publique*, p. 215-216.

⁵² *The Letters of Alexander Pushkin*, Translated, with Preface by J. Thomas Shaw, Madison, London, University of Wisconsin Press, 1967, p. 79-81 (Kishinev, March 1821).

⁵³ B. E. Siroechkovski, *Balkanskaya problema v politicheskikh planakh dekabristov*, in *Ocerki iz istorii dvizheniya dekabristov*, Sbornik statey, N. M. Druzhinina, B. E. Siroechkovski, Moskva, 1954, p. 196-197.

We cannot repress the feeling, produced by reading the sources and some valuable works, that the presence of characters such as Pestel, Raevski or even Pushkin in Kishinev and Odessa in those years, if not premeditated, was intended to be used, especially to maintain a certain atmosphere of excitement and determination towards an immediate war with the Ottoman Empire. Up until 1823, the conspiratorial activity and liberal rhetoric of these young men was tolerated and covered up. Thus, on the basis of an order from the Tsar, Capodistria asked General Inzov, the military governor of Bessarabia, for some information about the state of mind of the young officers in Bessarabia after the outbreak of the *Etairist* movement, the answer being reassuring and not entirely in accordance with reality⁵⁴. Afterwards, the disappointment of many young Russian intellectuals or officers with liberal views in the Kishinev-Odessa area in 1821-1824, some of them future Decembrists, with the outcome of the *Etairist* uprising and the behaviour of some of the Greek refugees – “bandits, beggars, thieves” – generated doubts about the liberal character of the Greek movement, about its belonging to the “revolutionary wave”, and a detachment from liberal ideas, as in the case of Al. Pushkin⁵⁵.

Gathering information about these complicities, the British and Austrian diplomats suspected the preparation of new plans, of concerted actions, with ramifications in Bessarabia and to the south of the Danube, leading to a widespread rebellion of the Orthodox subjects of the Porte, in the context of the confrontations between the Ottomans and the rebellious Greeks in Morea and in the Aegean archipelago⁵⁶. The refugee Moldo-Wallachian boyars were also considered to be part of these plans, despite Russia’s official public political line and in anticipation of the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war, considered inevitable and imminent. *It was therefore preferable that their exile be prolonged.*

The Romanian refugee boyars and the “war party”

Since the months immediately following the Turkish invasion, the Russian General Consul in the Principalities, Alexander Pini, who was in Sibiu, tried to influence the political situation in the Principalities and not to allow the boyars to comply with the appeals from Iasi and Bucharest to return to their country. Refugees in Transylvania, the *Etairists* Gheorghe Leventis and Nicholas Mavros

⁵⁴ Aleksandr Sergeyevich Pushkin, in „Russkaia Starina”, p. 242 (Laybach, 13/25 April 1821, Capodistria to Inzov); p. 243 (Kishinev, 28 April/10 May 1821, Inzov to Capodistria).

⁵⁵ T. J. Binyon, *Pushkin: A Biography*, New York, Vintage Books, 2002, p. 165.

⁵⁶ Theophilus Prousis, *op. cit.*, I, p. 231 (Constantinople, 25 September 1821, Strangford to Castlereagh); *Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington*, edited by Duke of Wellington, I, *January 1819 to December 1822*, John Murray, London, 1867, p. 337-339 (Vienna, 2 October 1822, Wellington to Nesselrode); Dan Berindei, Emil Cojocaru, *La crise orientale et le problème des Principautés roumaines en été 1821: Informations tirées des archives de Vienne*, in *RESEE*, IX (1971), no. 2, p. 203-224; V. N. Vinogradov, *George Canning, Russia and the Emancipation of Greece*, in *BS*, 22 (1981), no. 1, p. 6-9.

were dissatisfied that some of the boyar staying in Brasov “acted foolishly” and claimed that “the Turks behaved well” with the population, having thoughts of returning to the country. They considered that it would be the duty of the Wallachian boyars to remain in exile and to send memoirs to the Tsar about the abuses of the Turks, demanding military intervention of Russia⁵⁷. Another *Etaireist*, the merchant Polihronie, claimed that the Greeks were “badly defamed and only the pro-Turkish boyars are guilty”, who spread the information that “there is an *Etaireist* house in Sibiu and Orșova”⁵⁸. In a letter to Metropolitan Dionisie Lupu, Alexander Pini threatened the boyars who were inclined to accept the political situation created by the Ottoman occupation⁵⁹.

The Russian consul was one of the main sources of the rumours that regularly circulated among the refugee boyars, announcing a new Russo-Turkish war, reached their ears through individuals associated with the Greek cause: in May 1821, a rumour reached Bucharest from Iași, which was attributed to the desire to “revive the lost courage of the Greeks”, that the Russians were ready to enter in Moldavia, without knowing if the Tsar had ordered the beginning of the hostilities⁶⁰; in July, in addition to new assumptions related to the war, there was information circulating that “Mr. Pini put himself at the head of a group of boyars from Bucharest [located in Brasov and Sibiu – n.n.] and formed a kind of provisional government, which he was supposed to lead as interim president”⁶¹. Later, a memoir sent to the Tsar Alexander by the refugee boyars in Brașov would clarify the meaning of Alexander Pini’s policy. He promised that if they did not return to the country and support him to be confirmed as General Consul of Russia, he would then take the necessary measures so that the next prince of Wallachia would be elected by the great native boyars. The different course of events convinced them that they had been deceived⁶².

This whole context, related to the *political solutions* for the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans, designed by Capodistria and other followers of the “active policy” towards the Ottoman Empire, but critical regarding new actions that could be considered as “revolutions”, either among the Russian officials or among the

⁵⁷ *Documente 1821*, II, p. 225-226 (Sibiu, 8/20 July 1821, Gh. Leventis to Alecu Villara). The memoir in question (12/24 July 1821) was drafted and sent to the Tsar through Alexandru Pini. The signatures of Grigore Brâncoveanu, Barbu Văcărescu, Ghigore Ghica, Dinu and Istrate Crețulescu, Iordache and Dinicu Golescu were missing, showing which was the faction of the followers of the Russian consul (*ibidem*, II, p. 227-229).

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, II, p. 285 (Orșova, 4 August 1821, Polihronie to Hagi Ianuș).

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, II, p. 238 (Sibiu, 20 July 1821, Al. Pini to Dionisie Lupu).

⁶⁰ *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor*, Colecția Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, XX, *Correspondență diplomatică și rapoarte consulare austriace (1812-1822)*, published by Ion Nistor, Cernăuți, 1940, p. 625 (Sibiu, 16 May 1821, Fleischhackl to Metternich).

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, XX, p. 656 (Sibiu, 11 July 1821, Fleischhackl to Metternich).

⁶² *Documente 1821*, III, p. 130 (Brașov, 14/26 August 1822, Memoir of the Metropolitan, Bishops and Boyars of Wallachia to the Tsar); *Acte și fragmente cu privire la istoria românilor*, II, published by Nicolae Iorga, București, *Impromeria Statului*, 1896, p. 646 (Constantinople, 10 June 1822, Von Miltitz to the King of Prussia).

exponents of the Greek diaspora, we believe better explains certain petitioning initiatives of a part of the refugee boyars from the Romanian Principalities. First, a curious memoir (30 March 1821) addressed to the Tsar, written in the first days after the authors' arrival in Braşov, contained vehement critiques of the "rebel" Tudor Vladimirescu, but also of "le système du libéralisme grec", although some of the signatories had connections with *Etaireia*. The petitioners were advocating Pini's policy and asking for the Tsar's protection⁶³.

This memoir was followed by two other projects, which contain ideas similar to those present in the texts cited belonging to Capodistria, Ignatius of Arta, Alexander Sc. Sturdza or Serghei Turghenev⁶⁴. The first, written by one of the signatories, Grigore Băleanu and addressed to the Tsar, is an important document for any research on the ideological and political origins of the Romanian nationalism⁶⁵. At the same time, the author sent the memoir to Alexander Ypsilanti for approval, after the assassination of Vladimirescu, which raises some questions about Grigore Băleanu's political orientation⁶⁶, mainly that the *Etaireia* captains proposed to Ypsilanti that Grigore Băleanu should take Tudor's place as leader of the *pandurs*⁶⁷. In the text, the rebels led by Tudor Vladimirescu are exonerated because they proved to be not "simple revolutionaries", but motivated by "a patriotic purpose" of recovering the ancient rights of the "Dacian land". This land that must "wrest itself [...] from the dominion of Ottoman power", being inhabited by a "free, sovereign, autonomous people, bound by the sole protection" of Russia, unjustly and against reason treated until now as "slave of the Ottoman Porte"⁶⁸. The similarities with the language in the *quoted texts* of Ignatius of Arta and Alexander Sturdza regarding the lack of legitimacy of Ottoman domination are obvious.

The second, dated by the publisher in December 1822, without any explanation, is a memoir found in the *Alexandru Villara Collection* at the Romanian Academy Library. Written in 1821, if we take into consideration the

⁶³ Grigore and Manuel Băleanu, Iordache and Grigore Filipescu, Constantin Samurçaş, Alexandru Villara, Nicolae Văcărescu and Nicolae Mavros (*ibidem*, I, p. 431-432; Cronstadt, 30 March/11 April 1821, Some of the fugitive boyars in Brasov reveal to the Tsar the situation of Wallachia).

⁶⁴ See also Victor Taki's considerations on Capodistria's "constitutional" ideas and projects (Victor Taki, *Russia on the Danube: Empire, Elites and Reform in the Moldavia and Wallachia 1812-1834*, Budapest, Vienna, New York, Central European University Press, 2021, p. 99-101), and the specification in his autobiography that Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia, organized as autonomous Principalities, should become a place of refuge for the oppressed Orthodox of the Ottoman Empire (Ioannis Capodistrias, *Aperçu de ma carrière publique*, p. 210-211).

⁶⁵ Apostol Stan, *Revoluția de la 1821 și statutul internațional al Principatelor Române*, in *SRdI*, XXXIII (1980), no. 5, p. 863-864; Dan Berindei, *Zorii unei activități moderne de politică externă (1821-1828)*, in „Revista istorică”, new series, II (1991) no. 9-10, p. 505.

⁶⁶ Cristian Ploscaru, *Originile „partidei naționale” din Principatele Române*, I, *Sub semnul „politicii boierești” (1774-1828)*, Iași, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2013, p. 624-626).

⁶⁷ *Documente 1821*, II, p. 184-185 (Pitești, 24 May/5 June 1821).

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, II, p. 54-55 (Câmpulung, 10/22 April 1821, Grigore Băleanu sends to Al. Ypsilanti for approval the draft of a memoir to the Tsar of Russia).

specification referring to “an account given last year, 1820, at the Russian embassy in Constantinople”, the memoir contains 29 “points”, preceded by a systematic critique of the political and social organization of Wallachia⁶⁹. Focusing on the economic aspects and related to the separation of the territory of Wallachia from the Ottoman Empire, the text articulates the features of state autonomy⁷⁰, but also its transformation into a place of free and prosperous living for the Orthodox subjects coming from the south of the Danube. With reference to a paragraph in the memorandum of 30 March 1821 – in Wallachia, “le capitaliste ne trouvant plus aucune garantie ni de son bien ni de ses actions”⁷¹ – the content of the text in question becomes intelligible from the point of view of the interests of a whole category of Levantine merchants established in Wallachia: complete freedom of the foreign trade, on land and at sea (points 3-7), the right of any Christian subject of the Porte who has settled in the Principalities to enjoy legal status (point 10), the stability of taxes and of the rules of exploitation for the salt mines and customs (point 12), public transport (point 22), recognition of the privileges previously granted to foreigners settled in the Principalities (point 25)⁷².

This memoir has a special significance, especially if we relate it to a letter of Gheorghe Leventis, former dragoman of the Russian consulate in Bucharest and famous *Etairist*, to Alexander Villara, author of this elaborate political text⁷³. Leventis informed Villara of the dissatisfaction of Alexander Pini, Dominic Domnando and Nicholas Mavros with the attitude of some of the refugee boyars, who were prepared to return to their country if they received certain guarantees from the Ottomans, and advised him to act to prevent their return to Bucharest⁷⁴. Villara’s ties with the group of *Etairist* refugees in Transylvania became known to the Turks. Returned to the country after the appointment of the native prince, Alexander Villara was arrested and investigated by order of the Pasha of Silistra,

⁶⁹ In particular, the author criticizes the “utterly chaotic organization of the ruling system” (*Documente 1821*, III, p. 226; *Memoir on the causes of the “war of the poor against the rich” in Wallachia*) and the power of the boyars, based on the authority exercised over the inhabitants of the villages they own (*ibidem*, p. 228).

⁷⁰ In this respect, the text contained the following requirements: “To draw the border [...] to half of the entire Danube basin”, “to add from now these fortresses”, Turnu, Giurgiu and Brăila “to the whole body of the state of Wallachia”, “unrestricted trade for all the products of Wallachia, both on land and sea”, “to form a regular national guard of the country”, “to be named always after the choice of the nation [...] an native price [...] and to rule for life”.

⁷¹ *Documente 1821*, I, p. 432.

⁷² *Ibidem*, III, p. 232-238.

⁷³ To the arguments presented by Ioan C. Filitti (*Frământările politice și sociale*, p. 89) and Emil Vîrtosu (*1821. Date și fapte noi*, București, 1932, p. 140-141, n. 1), who identified Alexander Villara as the author of this memoir, it is necessary to add those resulting from the comparison with a text certainly belonging to Alexander Villara (*Memoriu către Rusia, pentru reorganizarea Țării Românești*), where many ideas are reproduced in a similar manner, some paragraphs being almost identical (*ibidem*, p. 117-141).

⁷⁴ *Documente 1821*, II, p. 225-226 (Sibiu, 8/20 July 1821).

who accused him of having “united with Pini” and donated 50000 piastres “pour faire venir les Russes”⁷⁵.

The Ottoman intention to invite to Constantinople two delegations of native boyars from the Principalities and to appoint new rulers before the resumption of Russo-Turkish diplomatic relations deepened the confusion of the boyars and the pressure on them not to return to their countries. The Metropolitan of Wallachia, Dionisie Lupu received the advice to remain in exile in Transylvania from Ignatius of Arta, “until a new prince will come to Bucharest” and “the privileges of the Wallachia will be ratified”, of course, with the consent of Russia, so that the country “will return to its former state”, with a new ruler, accepted by Russia⁷⁶. On the other hand, the governor of Transylvania, Count Bánffy, urged the Wallachian boyars to return to their country, summarizing in his argument the decisions that were emerging from *the Russian-Austrian agreement on the prevention of war and the restoration of Russian-Turkish diplomatic relations*: “according to the hopeful news I have, in a short time the Turks will defeat the Greek rebels [...]. And through the mediation of the foreign powers, the Turks will sooner or later be driven out of Wallachia, through the work of the pen and reconciliation”⁷⁷.

The Moldavian boyars who had taken refuge in Bessarabia were also bewildered. Serban Costache, brother of the Metropolitan of Moldavia, Veniamin, was confused about the political meaning of a letter from Prince Golitzin, waiting for urgent clarifications “word for word”, in order to prepare a memoir to Petersburg, together with Grigoras Sturdza, one of the leaders of the refugee boyars, the father of the future prince, Mihail Sturdza⁷⁸. Prince Alexander Golitzin’s position is not surprising, however, given his support for the Greek cause as Minister of Education and Religious Affairs, but also as the main organiser of (initial) humanitarian support for Greek insurgents taking refuge in Russia⁷⁹, and his known support for the outbreak of a new Russo-Turkish war,

⁷⁵ *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor*, Colecția Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, X, p. 229-229 (26 May 1823, Kreuchely to von Miltitz).

⁷⁶ *Documente 1821*, II, p. 390.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*, II, p. 345 (Cluj, 18 September 1821, *Autoritățile austriece sfătuiesc pe boieri să se întoarcă în țară*); T. G. Bulat, *Mărturii din timpul revoluției lui Tudor Vladimirescu*, in *RI*, XII (1926), no. 7-9, p. 199-203.

⁷⁸ Constantin Erbiceanu, *Istoria Mitropoliei Moldaviei și Sucevei și a Catedralei mitropolitane din Iași*, București, Tipografia Cărților Bisericești, 1888, p. 104 (1821, Șerban Costache Negel către Veniamin Costache). Also through Golitzin, the Metropolitan of Wallachia, Dionisie Lupu, sent a memoir to Petersburg, critical of “some of the boyars” who returned to the country and “joining the ungodly Turkish rulers, make the greatest abuses” (*Documente 1821*, II, p. 362 - Brașov, 1/13 October 1821, *Memoriul mitropolitului Dionisie către sinodul bisericii rusești*).

⁷⁹ Theophilus Prousis, *Dēmētrios S. Inglezēs: Greek Merchant and City Leader of Odessa*, in „Slavic Review”, 50 (1991), nr. 3, p. 675-676; idem, *Russian Philorthodox Relief during the Greek War of Independence*, in “Modern Greek Studies Yearbook”, no.1 (1985), p. 31-62.

through the immediate occupation of the Principalities⁸⁰. The main issue at stake, the stay of Moldavian boyars in exile in Bessarabia, was invoked as a “patriotic obligation” by the Greek bishop Gregory Irinopoleos in a harsh letter to Metropolitan Veniamin – “Do not do any mischief to go to Iași, you have many paradigms and these lessons are enough to make you not cross into Moldavia, not only your Holiness, but no one among the boyars should dare to cross into Moldavia” – as if it were an order from “above”, from Petersburg⁸¹. The Metropolitan also learned from Jordache Roset Roznovanu that he and Grigoras Sturdza were “not going back to the country”, while his son, Nicolae Roset Roznovanu, had already sent a whole “package” of memoirs to Odessa, addressed to Stroganov, who had just arrived in the city, and to General Wittgenstein, both partisans of the war with the Ottoman Empire⁸². These texts, with an explicit political and military meaning – the formation of a single committee, composed by great Moldavian boyars and imperial officials from Bessarabia, with authority on both sides of the Prut, to ensure the supply of the Russian army in case of war⁸³ – were put forward precisely in the weeks when General Wittgenstein’s army was moving from Novorossiia to the Dniester and into Bessarabia⁸⁴. A similar initiative was requested by Alexander Pini to the refugee Wallachian boyars⁸⁵. A draft was prepared for this purpose, but the disagreements between the boyars and the erosion of the Russian Consul influence⁸⁶ prevented the signing and dispatch of the memoir to General Wittgenstein.

⁸⁰ Ada Dialla, *Thinking Europe on Europe’s Margins: Alexander Sturdza, Konstantinos Oikonomos and Russian-Greek Orthodoxy in the Early Nineteenth Century*, in „The Historical Review/La Revue Historique”, 16 (2020), p. 147.

⁸¹ *Documente 1821*, II, p. 127 (4/16 July 1821).

⁸² *Aperçu des moyens d’opérer administration en Moldavie* (ANI, Documente, 546/14, f. 9-10) contains at the end the name of the author, “le grand Trésorier actuel de la Moldavie Nicolas Rosetti Roznovan” and was addressed to Count Wittgenstein, “général en chef de la seconde armée”, on 5 July 1821. The other memoirs, entitled *Première mémoire. Project d’organisation provisoire pendant l’occupation*, “envoyé au Baron de Stroganoff le 27 août 1821 à Odessa” (ibidem, f. 7-7v), *Etat de la Moldavie*, “envoyé au Baron de Stroganoff le 27 septembre 1821 à Petersbourg” (ibidem, f. 6-6v) and *Deuxième mémoire* (ibidem, f. 1-4), undated.

⁸³ See an analysis of these memoirs in Cristian Ploscaru, *op. cit.*, p. 95-96.

⁸⁴ Theophilus Prousis, *Lord Strangford at the Sublime Porte*, p. 165 (Constantinopol, 6 August 1821, Strangford către Castlereagh). In his answer to the letters of Iordache (17 August) and Nicolae Roznovanu, Stroganov stated that only in the case of Russian-Turkish negotiations on the situation of the Principalities could the ideas put forward by them come to the attention of the imperial court, not if the war broke out (*Documente 1821*, II, p. 309; Odessa, 22 August 1821, Stroganov to Iordache Roset)

⁸⁵ This memoir, prepared to be sent to Petersburg, arguing the necessity of Russian military intervention, in *Documente 1821*, II, p. 397-399 (November 1821, *Memoriul boierilor țării Românești către Alexandru I*), sent through Alexander Pini (ibidem, II, p. 399-400) and includes a letter from the authors of the memoir to the Russian Consul (Cristian Ploscaru, *Originile “partidei naționale”*, I, p. 627).

⁸⁶ Some of them, who remained loyal to the orientation pursued by Consul Pini, were to draft memoirs in which demanded the “prompt” appointment of a certain Phanariot ruler (*Documente 1821*, II, p. 227-229; Brașov, 12/24 July 1821, *Memoriul boierilor refugiați către țarul Rusiei*). About the contents of this memoir and the political orientation of the authors, see Cristian Ploscaru, *op. cit.*, I,

Until the appointment of the new prince, the turmoil among the refugee Moldo-Wallchian boyars was to continue⁸⁷. Russian diplomatic channels did not always prove reliable and alternative contacts were sought. Thus, the correspondence interrupted by the events in Moldavia between the Abbot of the Greek church Pantocrator of Petersburg and Metropolitan Leontie of Belgrade, refugee in Bessarabia, was to be renewed through Metropolitan Veniamin of Moldavia, in order to maintain the flow of information about the events on the Danube, but also about Russian intentions⁸⁸. The same were the concerns of the former Metropolitan Ignatius, who, worried that more and more of the Wallachian boyars were returning to the country, was looking for a sure way to “show my letter to the Holy Metropolitan”, Veniamin, and, of course, to other trusted boyars, a letter in which he announced that as long as “the Russian guarantees given by treaties remain valid, things must remain as they were”, with the preservation of the Phanariot rule, but claimed that there would be premises for “new treaties with the Ottoman [...] making these provinces independent of the Porte, like other countries”, associating these alleged changes with the outbreak of the Greek revolution in Morea⁸⁹.

Conclusions

In 1822, the political context had changed significantly, as the main concern of the Great Powers in the “Eastern Question” was the conditions for the resumption of Russian-Ottoman diplomatic relations and the avoidance of a new war, followed by the discussion of solutions in the Greek question⁹⁰. Capodistria retired from the position of Russian Foreign Minister in August 1822, shortly followed by his friend Alexander Sc. Sturdza, who left the diplomatic service⁹¹.

p. 628-629. The other boyars, determined supporters of the restoration of the native prince rule, seek alternative support in order to transmit their demands to Petersburg, Vienna or Constantinople (*Documente 1821*, II, p. 324-346; Braşov, 31 August/12 September 1821, *Boierii Țării Româneşti refugiaţi la Braşov cer ocrotirea împăratului Austriei*). More details at Cristian Ploscaru, *op. cit.*, I, p. 629-630. See also the memoir sent by the Moldavian boyars to the Ottoman Empire, asking for “archontocratic” leadership, of a committee composed by native boyars and very critical with the last Phanariot rulers (*Documente 1821*, II, p. 401-406; November 1821, *Arzul boierilor moldoveni către Înalta Poartă*).

⁸⁷ Ioan C. Filitti, *op. cit.*, p. 73-94.

⁸⁸ Constantin Erbiceanu, *op. cit.*, p. 120-121 (Petersburg, 31 May/12 June 1821, *Sinisie de la biserica Pantocrator din Petersburg către Veniamin Costache*).

⁸⁹ *Documente 1821*, III, 1960, p. 28 (December 1821, *Fostul mitropolit Ignatie scrie boierilor refugiaţi*).

⁹⁰ *Memoirs of Prince Metternich 1815-1829*, IV, edited by Prince Richard Metternich, translated by Alexander Napier, New York, Charles Scribner, 1881, p. 84; *Recueil de documents relatifs à la Russie pour la plupart secrets et inédits*, Paris, 1854, p. 214-216 (1826, *Précis de l'exposé des différends survenus en 1821, entre la Russie et la Porte, présenté à l'empereur Nicolas Ier, à son avènement au trône, par le ministère russe*); Theophilus Prousis, *British Embassy Reports*, p. 181-182.

⁹¹ Stella Ghervas, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

The massacres of Chios (April-May 1822)⁹² and the Porte's intention to appoint native rulers to the princely dignities of Iasi and Bucharest (May 1822)⁹³, acts which dramatically strained Russo-Ottoman relations and confirmed a failure of the policy of "expectation" promoted by Tsar Alexander I⁹⁴, marked a turning point in the political situation of the Romanian Principalities, materialized by the appointment of the native princes⁹⁵. This was essentially the meaning of Lord Strangford's remarks:

„At a council held on Monday [6 May 1822 – ed.] the question of nominating the new princes, and of choosing them from among the native boyars, was proposed to the *ustaas* [officers] of the janissaries who were present, and unanimously approved. The slight offered to the Greek nation by this selection, has more than any other cause, induced the janissaries to approve of the nomination of princes being carried into effect. Had the choice of the government fallen upon the Greeks, I am convinced that the janissaries would have resisted to the very utmost.

In truth, the policy of the Porte seems now to be decided; and its resolution to reduce the Greek nation to a state of absolute nullity, may be considered as irrevocably fixed. That *imperium in imperio* [empire within an empire, or state within a state], which had made such silent but rapid progress during the last thirty years, will exist no longer. The great source of Greek influence, and with it that hitherto exercised by Russia, will now be cut off, by the employment of Turkish subjects as future *dragomans* of the Porte, and by the selection of natives to govern the two Principalities. Some observations which were lately made to me on this subject by one of the most intelligent Turks I have hitherto known, are perhaps not unworthy of Your Lordship's attention.

«What has Russia gained», he asked, «by precipitating the Greek affair? For that it originated in the hopes held out by her ministers at St. Petersburg, and her agents in Turkey, no man who has his eyes and ears, can for a moment doubt.

⁹² Theophilus Prousis, *Lord Strangford*, II, 2012, p. 225-226 (Constantinople, 14/26 August 1822, Strangford to Castlereagh); idem, „*Dreadful Scenes of Carnage on Both Sides*”: *The Strangford Files and the Eastern Crisis of 1821-1822*, in *Russian-Ottoman Borderlands: The Eastern Question Reconsidered*, edited by Lucien Frary, Mara Kozelsky, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2014, p. 88-89.

⁹³ Already in November 1821, the new Reis-Effendi, Mahomed Sadik, a follower of the moderate political line advocated by Galib Pasha, informed the ambassadors of Austria and England of the Porte's intention to appoint Christian rulers in the Principalities, but asked for time, because of the opposition of the janissaries against the "rebellious infidels" (*Acte și fragmente*, II, p. 604; Constantinople, 30 October/10 November 1821, Von Miltitz to the King of Prussia).

⁹⁴ This is how Capodistria called the political line adopted by the Tsar after the Congress of Laybach and in the context of the rapprochement to Metternich, a line he did not support, considering it unfavorable to Russian interests in the Balkans and likely to compromise the prestige of Orthodox power in the eyes of the co-religionists in the Ottoman Empire (Ioannis Capodistrias, *op. cit.*, p. 272-274).

⁹⁵ Much exaggerated information about the concentration of Russian troops in Bessarabia and completely false information about the fact that Capodistria had convinced the Tsar to give up to go "here and there to meet in congresses", the outbreak of war being imminent, was circulating from the *etairists* in Bessarabia to those who had taken refuge in the Habsburg Empire (*Documente 1821*, IV, *Eterea în Principatele Române*, 1960, p. 228; Palanca, 29 May 1822, Iordache Lascaris to Mihail Rizo).

However, praise be to God, that she acted as she did. But for the conduct of her consuls in the Archipelago, and the intemperance of her minister here, in hurrying matters to the extreme, we should have gone on in a false and fatal security. The Greeks would have slowly perhaps, but surely, appropriated to themselves, the entire government of this Empire. In commerce and in affairs of state they were already all powerful, and nobody among *ushad* begun to suspect the gradual increase of their influence. Had this state of things gone on for thirty years more, we should have been lost. Unintentionally, Russia has done us a great service, without intending it. She held a lever in its hands, with which she could at any time, have shaken this Empire to the foundations. It is now broken. She has (also without meaning it) rendered us another service. The powers of Europe have taught her, that she cannot make war upon us under flimsy pretences. [...]. The Russian influence here is no more. She will again seek to exercise it, under pretence of settling the affairs of the Principalities, and of restoring to them the blessings of peace and good order. But we mean to deprive her of this pretence. We shall anticipate her, by our new arrangements for the relief of the Wallachia and Moldavia; and when her minister returns here, he will find that everything is done, and that he has no excuse for meddling in our affairs»⁹⁶.

This is a lucid description of the political situation, which leaves little hope for a favourable change, in the short term, in the sense of restoring the Russian influence in the Danube Principalities. So, in such a situation, the political solution explored by the leaders of the Greek diaspora targeted the *centers of power*⁹⁷ – the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia, the collaboration of Milos Obrenović⁹⁸ – in order to revive, in the end, the position of the high Russian officials, partisans of a new war with the Porte, with the aim of reorienting Russia's official foreign policy⁹⁹.

⁹⁶ We have reproduced almost the entire contents of the document, because of its particular relevance to the question of the appointment of new princes in the Principalities, discarding the Phanariots in favor of native boyars (Theophilus Prousis, *Lord Strangford*, II, p. 128-129; Constantinople, 10 May 1822, Strangford to Castlereagh).

⁹⁷ A first interesting episode, in January 1822, concerned the new Ecumenical Patriarch Eugenius II, who succeeded Gregory V, executed by the Turks on Easter Sunday (10/22 April 1821). Accused by Capodistria of tolerating the Orthodox conversion to Islam in the context of the riots in Morea (*Vneshnaia politika Rossii*, XII, p. 373-374; Petersburg, 27 November/9 December 1821, Capodistria to Lieven), an attempt was made to overthrow him by the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki, who falsely accused him of "speaking insultingly of the Prophet and holding secret correspondence with the Greeks of Morea" (Theophilus Prousis, *op. cit.*, II, p. 38; Constantinople, 25 January 1822, Strangford to Castlereagh). In relation to this case, Strangford learned that the "defamatory" informations had the source in the Greek community of Odessa (*ibidem*, II, p. 42; Constantinople, 25 January 1822, Strangford to Castlereagh).

⁹⁸ Grégoire Yakschitch, *L'Europe et la Résurrection de la Serbie (1804-1834)*, avec une préface de Émile Haumant, Paris, Librairie Hachette, 1907, p. 451-452.

⁹⁹ This political strategy was no longer a secret in British diplomatic circles, where it was known that "there were two parties in the Russian cabinet – one was seriously committed to efforts to provoke a new war with the Turks, the other was intent to preserve peace – the first was the more popular, the other the more powerful, the Emperor himself supported it". The war party plan aimed to increase

In classic¹⁰⁰ and recent works¹⁰¹, the thesis of Alexander I's change of direction in policy after 1820, when "the conservative-liberal phase ended and he returned to the land – to Metternich's land, to be precise", has been convincingly argued. "Alexander could no longer play the role of a despot speaking vaguely about the rights of man and of nations. He became increasingly convinced over time that conservative-liberal solutions to the problems of the period – supported by Capodistria – must be sacrificed in order to preserve the system of alliances", the Vienna system¹⁰².

For this reason, the revolutionary movements of 1821 and the political turmoil of the following years cannot be understood, in their motivations and context, without taking into account the interests of the Great Powers, the diplomatic relations related to the "Eastern question". Treated only as episodes of "the revolutionary wave", in antithesis to the "spirit of Vienna", to the legitimist Europe of the Holy Alliance, they appear as the sequences of a kind of revolutionary romanticism, legacy of the Great French Revolution, carbonar, masonic and rather naive¹⁰³. Also, this approach in the logic of the "revolutionary wave", creates links between events and characters based on assumptions and logical constructions, on common ideological elements, leaving aside documentary inadequacies, but also differences in ideas, aims and means between the *Etaireists*, the "carbonars" from Moldavia and the future *Decambrists*. We should not forget the anti-Greek orientation of many "carbonars", the *Etaireists* perception after 1821 of the "betrayal" of the Moldo-Wallachian boyars or the extremely critical comments on the *Etaireists* present in the texts of Russian authors such as Filip Wiegel, Liprandi or Pestel.

On the other hand, the efforts of Capodistria and other supporters of an active policy or even war with the Ottoman Empire proved futile. Tsar Alexander did not order the occupation of the Principalities and could not influence the appointment of princes devoted to Russia and, as Capodistria would have hoped, to the Greek cause. In this respect, Metternich's ability to convince the Tsar of the danger posed by a Russo-Turkish war to the European peace system proved essential. But, in a contextual analysis, the diplomatic effort of Strangford, the British ambassador to Constantinople, to maintain a bridge of dialogue between the Russians and the

tension between the Ottoman Empire and its Orthodox subjects in order to win European sympathy and justify a new Russo-Turkish war (Augustus Granville Stapleton, *George Canning and his times*, London, John W. Parker, 1859, p. 454-455).

¹⁰⁰ Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969, p. 62; Irby C. Nichols, *The European Pentarchy and the Congress of Verona, 1822*, Haga, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, p. 48-53.

¹⁰¹ See *infra*.

¹⁰² We have reproduced this fragment (Konstantina Zanou, *Transnational Patriotism*, p. 100) because we fully subscribe to the conclusion formulated.

¹⁰³ Demetrios J. Farsolas, *op. cit.*, p. 77-78; Nassia Yakovaki, *The Philiki Etaireia Revisited: In Search of Contexts, National and International*, in „The Historical Review/La Revue Historique”, 11 (2014), p. 171-187.

Turks¹⁰⁴, to persuade the first to keep under surveillance the *Etairists* who had taken refuge in the Russian Empire and to take measures to counteract the suspicions of the Porte, and to persuade the Ottomans to stop the reprisals against the Christian population and to respect the letter of the previous Russian-Turkish treaties, should not be forgotten¹⁰⁵. However, beyond the diplomatic language and the interests of Russian-Turkish conciliation, Strangford was convinced that there was “not one of the Russian agents of Greek origin operating in the Ottoman Empire who was not more or less active in provoking and supporting the Greek revolt”¹⁰⁶. He was of the opinion that, despite formal assurances given by the Tsar on several occasions, he wished to keep open the option of a war with the Turks, and some initiatives originating from the group of former collaborators of Capodistria, in the Russian diplomatic apparatus or among the personalities of the Greek diaspora involved in the earlier activity of the *Philomusos Etairiea*, about which he had gathered information, confirmed these concerns.

Entre la diplomatie de guerre ou de paix et l'occupation ottomane des Principautés roumaines (1821-1822)

Résumé

Dans les années qui ont suivi les événements de 1821, la scène politique des Principautés roumaines a connu de grands bouleversements, des complots, des intrigues, des initiatives de réforme, mais aussi des efforts de la noblesse réfugiée pour compromettre la légitimité et l'autorité des Caimacams nommés par l'Empire ottoman et, plus tard, des nouveaux princes indigènes. Nous n'insisterons pas sur les aspects connus liés à l'établissement de l'occupation ottomane. Nous tenterons une analyse de quelques plans et intentions politiques ayant un impact sur l'élite des Principautés, en particulier sur les boyards réfugiés, qui visaient à résoudre la crise provoquée par les événements de 1821 et l'occupation militaire ottomane, conformément aux intérêts et aux projets de ceux qui les proposaient, issus de la sphère politique russe ou grecque.

Mots-clés: occupation militaire; diplomatie; révolution; parti de la “guerre”; boyards réfugiés.

¹⁰⁴ Theophilus Prousis, *op. cit.*, I, p. 147-150 (Constantinopol, 26 July 1821, Strangford to Castlereagh). The British diplomatic correspondence shows Strangford's role in countering some of the intrigues against Ioniță Sandu Sturdza towards the end of 1822, not because of any regard for him, but out of the conviction that the stabilization of the internal political regime in Moldavia was the best way to prevent new political turmoil, provoked from across the Prut (Radu R. Florescu, *op. cit.*, p. 479-480).

¹⁰⁵ Theophilus Prousis, *op. cit.*, I, p. 288-289 (Constantinopol, 10 December 1821, Strangford to Castlereagh); Allan Cunningham, *Lord Strangford and the Greek Revolt*, in idem, *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution: Collected Essays*, edited by Edward Ingram, London, Frank Cass, 1993, p. 190, 202-214.

¹⁰⁶ *Lord Strangford's Explanation of his Proceedings in respect to Greece*, in „The Diplomatic Review”, XV (1867), nr. 11, p. 171 (Viena, 5 October 1822, Strangford to Canning).

ABREVIERI

<i>AARMSI</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice
<i>AARMSL</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Literare
<i>AARPAD</i>	= „Analele Academiei Române”, seria II, București, 1879-1916
<i>AA.SS.</i>	= <i>Acta Sanctorum</i> , ed. Bollandisti, III ^a edițiune, Parigi 1863-1870
<i>AB</i>	= Arhivele Basarabiei
<i>ACNSAS</i>	= Arhivele Consiliului Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității
<i>AE</i>	= L'Année Epigraphique, Paris
<i>AIR</i>	= Arhiva Istorică a României
<i>AIAC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie Cluj
<i>AIIAI</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>AIIC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Cluj
<i>AIINC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională, Cluj
<i>AIIX</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>ALIL</i>	= Anuarul de Lingvistică și Istorie Literară, Iași
<i>ALMA</i>	= <i>Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi</i> . Genève.
<i>AM</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei, Iași
<i>AMAE</i>	= Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe
<i>AmAnthr</i>	= American Anthropologist, New Series, Published by Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
<i>AMM</i>	= Acta Moldaviae Meridionalis, Vaslui
<i>AMMB</i>	= Arhiva Mitropoliei Moldovei și Bucovinei, Iași
<i>AMN</i>	= Acta Musei Napocensis
<i>AMR</i>	= Arhivele Militare Române
<i>AMS</i>	= Anuarul Muzeului din Suceava
<i>ANB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, București
<i>ANC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Cluj
<i>ANDMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Direcția Municipiului București
<i>ANG</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Galați
<i>ANI</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Iași
<i>ANIC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale
<i>ANR-Cluj</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Cluj-Napoca
<i>ANR-Sibiu</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Sibiu
<i>ANRM</i>	= Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova, Chișinău
<i>ANRW</i>	= Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Berlin-New York
<i>ANSMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Municipiului București
<i>ANV</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Vaslui
<i>AO</i>	= Arhivele Olteniei
<i>AP</i>	= Analele Putnei
<i>APH</i>	= Acta Poloniae Historica, Varșovia
<i>AqLeg</i>	= <i>Aquila Legionis. Cuadernos de Estudios sobre el Ejército Romano</i> , Salamanca
<i>AR</i>	= Arhiva Românească
<i>ArchM</i>	= Arhiva Moldaviae, Iași
<i>ArhGen</i>	= Arhiva Genealogică
„Arhiva”	= „Arhiva”. Organul Societății Științifice și Literare, Iași
<i>ArhMold</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei
<i>ASRR</i>	= Arhiva Societății Române de Radiodifuziune
<i>AȘUI</i>	= Analele Științifice ale Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași

- ATS = Ancient Textile Series, Oxbow Books, Oxford și Oakville
 AUAIC = Arhiva Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași
 AUB = Analele Universității „București”
 BA = *Biblioteca Ambrosiana*, Roma, Città Nuova Editrice
 BAR = Biblioteca Academiei Române
 BArchB = Bundesarchiv Berlin
 BAR int. ser. = British Archaeological Reports, International Series
 BBR = Buletinul Bibliotecii Române
 BCIR = Buletinul Comisiei Istorice a României
 BCMI = Buletinul Comisiei Monumentelor Istorice
 BCU-Iași = Biblioteca Centrală Universitară, Iași
 BE = Bulletin Epigraphique
 BF = Byzantinische Forschungen, Amsterdam
 BJ = Bonner Jahrbücher, Bonn
 BMI = Buletinul Monumentelor Istorice
 BMIM = București. Materiale de istorie și muzeografie
 BNB = Biblioteca Națională București
 BNJ = Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher
 BOR = Biserica Ortodoxă Română
 BS = Balkan Studies
 BSNR = Buletinul Societății Numismatice Române
 ByzSlav = Byzantinoslavica
 CA = Cercetări arheologice
 CAI = Caiete de Antropologie Istorică
 CartNova = *La ciudad de Carthago Nova 3: La documentación epigráfica*, Murcia
 CB = Cahiers balkaniques
 CC = Codrul Cosminului, Suceava (ambele serii)
 CCAR = Cronica cercetărilor arheologice din România, CIMEC, București
 CCh = *Corpus Christianorum*, Turnhout
 CChSG = *Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca*
 CCSL = *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, Turnhout, Brepols
 CDM = *Catalogul documentelor moldovenești din Arhivele Centrale de Stat*, București, vol. I-V; supl. I.
 CDȚR = *Catalogul documentelor Țării Românești din Arhivele Statului*, București, vol. II-VIII, 1974-2006
 Chiron = Chiron: Mitteilungen der Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, 1971
 CI = Cercetări istorice (ambele serii)
 CIL = *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, Berlin
 CL = Cercetări literare
 CLRE = *Consuls of the Later Roman Empire*, eds. R. S. Bagnall, A. Cameron, S. R. Schwartz, K. A. Worp, Atlanta, 1987
 CN = Cercetări Numismatice
 CNA = Cronica Numismatică și Arheologică, București
 CSCO = *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium*, Louvain
 CSEA = *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiae Aquileiensis*, Roma, Città Nuova Editrice
 CSEL = *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, Wien, De Gruyter
 CSPAMI = Centrul de Studii și Păstrare a Arhivelor Militare Centrale, Pitești
 CT = Columna lui Traian, București
 CTh = *Codex Theodosianus*. Theodosiani, Libri XVI cum constitutionibus Sirmondianis, I, edidit adsumpto apparatu P. Kruegeri, Th. Mommsen, Hildesheim, 1970-1971
 Cv.L = Convorbiri literare (ambele serii)

„Dacia”, N.S.	= Dacia. Nouvelle Série, Revue d'archéologie et d'histoire ancienne, București
DANIC	= Direcția Arhivelor Naționale Istorice Centrale
DGAS	= Direcția Generală a Arhivelor Statului
DI	= Diplomatarium Italicum
DIR	= <i>Documente privind istoria României</i>
DIRRI	= <i>Documente privind Istoria României. Războiul pentru Independență</i>
DOP	= Dumbarton Oaks Papers
DTN	= <i>Din trecutul nostru</i> , Chișinău
DRH	= <i>Documenta Romaniae Historica</i>
EB	= Études Balkaniques
EBPB	= Études byzantines et post-byzantines
EDCS	= <i>Epigraphik-Datenbank Clauss-Slaby</i> (http://www.manfredclauss.de/)
EDR	= <i>Epigraphic Database Roma</i> (http://www.edr-edr.it/default/index.php)
EpigrAnat	= Epigraphica Anatolica, Münster
ERAsturias	= F. Diego Santos, <i>Epigrafiya Romana de Asturias</i> , Oviedo, 1959.
Gerión	= Gerión. Revista de Historia Antigua, Madrid
GB	= Glasul Bisericii
GCS	= <i>Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller</i> , Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1897-1969
GLK	= <i>Grammatici Latini Keil</i>
HEp	= <i>Hispania Epigraphica</i> , Madrid
„Hierasus”	= <i>Hierasus</i> . Anuarul Muzeului Județean Botoșani, Botoșani
HM	= Heraldica Moldaviae, Chișinău
HU	= Historia Urbana, Sibiu
HUI	= Historia Universitatis Iassiensis, Iași
IDR	= <i>Inscripțiile din Dacia romană</i> , Bucurști-Paris
IDRE	= <i>Inscriptions de la Dacie romaine. Inscriptions externes concernant l'histoire de la Dacie</i> , I-II, Bucarest, 1996, 2000
IGLN	= Inscriptions grecques et latines de Novae, Bordeaux
IGLR	= <i>Inscripțiile grecești și latine din secolele IV-XIII descoperite în România</i> , București, 1976
ILLPecs	= Instrumenta Inscripta Latina. <i>Das römische Leben im Spiegel der Kleininschriften</i> , Pecs, 1991
ILAlg	= <i>Inscriptions latines d'Algérie</i> , Paris
ILB	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae in Bulgaria repertae. Inscriptiones inter Oescum et Iatrum repertae</i> , Sofia, 1989
ILD	= <i>Inscripții latine din Dacia</i> , București
ILN	= <i>Inscriptions latines de Novae</i> , Poznan
ILLPRON	= <i>Inscriptionum Lapidarium Latinarum Provinciae Norici usque ad annum MCMLXXXIV repertarum indices</i> , Berlin, 1986
ILS	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i> , 1892
IMS	= <i>Inscriptiones Moesiae Superioris</i> , Belgrad
IN	= „Ioan Neculce”. Buletinul Muzeului Municipal Iași
ISM	= <i>Inscripțiile din Scythia Minor grecești și latine</i> , București, vol. I-III, 1983-1999
JGO	= Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas
JL	= Junimea literară
JRS	= The Journal of Roman studies, London
LR	= Limba română
MA	= Memoria Antiquitatis, Piatra Neamț
MCA	= Materiale și cercetări arheologice
MEF	= <i>Moldova în epoca feudalismului</i> , vol. I-XII, 1961-2012, Chișinău
MEFRA	= <i>Mélanges de l'École française de Rome: Antiquité</i> , Roma

- MGH = *Monumenta Germaniae Historica inde ab anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum auspiciis societatis aperiendis fontibus rerum Germanicarum medii aevi*, Berlin 1877-
 MI = Magazin istoric, București
 MIM = Materiale de istorie și muzeografie
 MM = Mitropolia Moldovei
 MMS = Mitropolia Moldovei și Sucevei
 MN = Muzeul Național, București
 MO = Mitropolia Olteniei
 MOF = Monitorul Oficial al României
 Navarro = M. Navarro Caballero, *Perfectissima femina. Femmes de l'elite dans l'Hispanie romaine*, Bordeaux, 2017.
 NBA = *Nuova Biblioteca Agostiniana*, Roma, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum
 NDPAC = *Nuovo Dizionario Patristico e di Antichità Cristiane*, I, A-E, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2006; III, P-Z, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2008
 NEH = *Nouvelles études d'histoire*
 OI = Opțiuni istoriografice, Iași
 OPEL = *Onomasticon provinciarum Europae latinarum*, vol. I-IV, Budapesta-Viena, 1994-2002
 PG = *Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Graeca*, ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris, 1886-1912
 PIR = *Prosopographia Imperii Romani. Saec. I.II.III*, editio altera, Berlin.
 PLRE = *Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*, 3 vol., eds. A. H. M. Jones, J. R. Martindale, and J. Morris, Cambridge, 1971-1992
 RA = Revista arhivelor
 RBAR = Revista Bibliotecii Academiei Române, București
 RC = Revista catolică
 RdI = Revista de istorie
 REByz = *Revue des Études Byzantines*
 RER = *Revue des études roumaines*
 RESEE = *Revue des études Sud-Est européennes*
 RHP = *Die römischen Hilfstruppen in Pannonien während der Prinzipatszeit. I: Die Inschriften*, Viena
 RHSEE = *Revue historique de Sud-Est européen*
 RI = Revista istorică (ambele serii)
 RIAF = Revista pentru istorie, arheologie și filologie
 RIB = *Roman Inscriptions of Britain*, Londra
 RIM = Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, Chișinău
 RIR = Revista istorică română, București
 RIS = Revista de istorie socială, Iași
 RITL = Revista de istorie și teorie literară
 RIU = *Die römischen Inschriften Ungarns*, Budapesta
 RJMH = *The Romanian Journal of Modern History*, Iași
 RM = Revista muzeelor
 RMD = *Roman Military Diplomas*, Londra
 RMM = *Römische Militärdiplome und Entlassungsurkunden in der Sammlung des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums*, Mainz
 RMM-MIA = Revista muzeelor și monumentelor, seria Monumente istorice și de artă
 RMR = Revista Medicală Română
 RRH = *Revue roumaine d'histoire*
 RRHA = *Revue roumaine de l'histoire de l'art*
 RRHA-BA = *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire de l'Art. Série Beaux Arts*
 RSIAB = Revista Societății istorice și arheologice bisericești, Chișinău
 Rsl = Romanoslavica

<i>SAHIR</i>	= Studia et Acta Historiae Iudaeorum Romaniae, București
<i>SAI</i>	= Studii și Articole de Istorie
<i>SCB</i>	= Studii și cercetări de bibliologie
<i>Sch</i>	= <i>Sources Chrétiennes</i> , Paris
<i>SCIA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istoria artei
<i>SCIM</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie medie
<i>SCIV/SCIVA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie veche (și arheologie)
<i>SCN</i>	= Studii și Cercetări Numismatice, București
<i>SCȘI</i>	= Studii și cercetări științifice, Istorie
<i>SEER</i>	= The Slavonic and East European Review
<i>SHA</i>	= <i>Scriptores Historiae Augustae</i>
<i>SJAN</i>	= Serviciul Județean al Arhivelor Naționale
<i>SMIC</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie contemporană, București
<i>SMIM</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie medie, București
<i>SMIMod</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie modernă, București
<i>SOF</i>	= Südost-Forschungen, München
<i>ST</i>	= Studii Teologice, București
<i>StAntArh</i>	= Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica, Iași
<i>T&MBYZ</i>	= <i>Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de recherches d'histoire et de civilisation byzantines</i>
<i>ThD</i>	= Thraco-Dacica, București
<i>TR</i>	= Transylvanian Review, Cluj-Napoca
<i>TV</i>	= Teologie și viața, Iași
<i>ZPE</i>	= Zeitschrift für Papyralogie und Epigraphik
<i>ZSL</i>	= Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde