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*Abrevieri* .....

## **New contributions on the dispute at the Peace Conference (February-March 1920) concerning the Romanian- Hungarian border**

The Romanian-Hungarian border, included in the Treaty of Trianon and still valid today, was proposed by a group of diplomats who were part of the Commission for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Romania, an advisory body to the Paris Peace Conference, was validated by the leaders of the Great Powers on the winning side in the Great War – both in the “Council of Five”, of Foreign Ministers and the Supreme Council, represented by the ‘Big Four’, i.e. Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, David Lloyd George and Vittorio Emanuele Orlando – was publicly announced in June 1919, and was then subject to attempts to modify it, either in favour of Romania (May-November 1919) or in favour of Hungary (February-May 1920).

The aim of our article is to make some new contributions on the penultimate attempt<sup>1</sup>, that of February-March 1920, to change the Romanian-Hungarian border, the one made at a time when the peace meeting had briefly moved to London and the British and Italian leaders proposed to renegotiate the border line, a position that seemed capable of prevailing despite French opposition. In the end, nothing changed, and the line proposed by the experts in 1919 was to find its place in the peace treaty Hungary signed with the Allied and Associated Powers on 4 June 1920 at Trianon.

We aim to provide evidence, from unknown or relatively little-known sources, about the man who, in early March 1920, succeeded in blocking the attempt to change the borders established in 1919 in favour of Hungary. Allen Leeper is the name of the Australian-born British diplomat who managed to convince his superiors – Sir Eyre Crowe, Lord Curzon and David Lloyd George –

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<sup>1</sup> The last attempt took place in March-May 1920, when the authorities in Budapest, through official and mostly unofficial channels, offered France exceptional economic advantages in Hungary, hoping to obtain significant territorial compensation in return. Although the initiative aroused interest in Paris, France was unable and probably unwilling to offer what the Hungarians wanted.

that it was neither fair, just nor practical to alter the border lines already established and announced to all parties concerned.

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Throughout 1919 there were several key factors that decisively influenced the establishment of what was to become the Romanian-Hungarian border:

- Romania was reinstated in the camp of the “Allied and Associated Powers” and invited to the Peace Conference; Hungary was not recognised and was not invited;

- The advance of the Romanian army in Transylvania and Hungary (November 1918, early 1919, April 1919, August 1919, November 1919): the Romanian occupation of Hungary (April 1919-May 1920);

- The Commission for the study of territorial questions relating to Romania;

- Tensions in Romania and the Great Powers leading the Paris peace forum.

Romania’s return to the winning side was not easy, especially as the Romanian state had signed peace with the enemy. Reintegration among those who were to decide what the “New Europe” was to look like was also complicated by the fact that the French leaders seemed to try to make it conditional on a political figure who seemed more willing to act in the mutual interest, namely Take Ionescu, taking over the government in Bucharest. The failure of this little blackmail and the firm installation of Ion I. C. Brătianu’s government dispelled the doubts, and the recognition by the Great Powers of Romania’s status quickly followed at the end of 1918 and in the first days of 1919<sup>2</sup>. As a consequence, the invitation to the Paris peace forum followed. On the other hand, the new authorities in Budapest did not receive Allied recognition, and a Hungarian delegation did not arrive in the French capital until January 1920, when almost all aspects of the peace to be signed by defeated Hungary had already been settled. This discrepancy in status, and therefore in proximity to the place where decisions were made, had a decisive influence in many respects, but especially on the drawing of the Romanian-Hungarian border.

The gradual advance of the Romanian army into Transylvania, starting with the Szekler area in November 1918, the region being the only one in Transylvania controlled by the troops of the Kingdom of Romania at the time of the Great Assembly of Alba Iulia, then by controlling about two thirds of Transylvania in the second decade of January 1919, when the Paris Peace Conference began, followed by the settlement of the Romanians on the Tisza River in early May 1919, following the first military confrontation with the Republic of the Councils in Hungary, and the second stage of the Romanian-Hungarian war

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<sup>2</sup> Lucian Leuștean, *La France et la reprise du statut de pays allié par la Roumanie à la fin de la Grande Guerre*, in *TR*, vol. XXVII (2018), supplement no. 2, p. 44-45.

ended in early August 1919 with the occupation of Budapest, from where the Romanian troops did not leave until November 1919, only to settle again on the Tisza, which they left only in April-May 1920, a sign that the authorities in Bucharest had accepted the border that was to be included in the Treaty of Trianon, was an essential element in the odyssey of establishing the border between Romania and Hungary. Many of the leaders of the Parisian peace process wondered, sometimes even during official meetings, whether a border that was unsatisfactory to the Romanians could even be imposed; in other words, it was not clear how the Romanian army could be forced to retreat behind a border that was unacceptable to Romania.

The Commission for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Romania met 12 times in February and March 1919, and the Commission's report was finalised on 6 April 1919<sup>3</sup>. We do not have the space to describe all these meetings in detail. But from the perspective of the Romanian-Hungarian border, it must be said that all the Commission's experts agreed that Romania should receive a large part of what we know today as Transylvania, as well as a significant part of Banat. At the same time, all the members of the Commission were of the same opinion that the August 1916 treaty line, now requested by Ion I. C. Brătianu as a border, was difficult to accept for ethnic reasons. Leaving aside the Italians, whose changing attitude did not decisively influence the evolution of the discussions, it can be said that it was the French, the British and the Americans who finally took the decision<sup>4</sup>.

The line proposed by the Americans was the most easterly; it laid east of Satu Mare, Carei, Oradea and Arad. The American motivation was the following: those towns were predominantly Hungarian. But there was a significant Romanian population in the areas around the four urban centres. In the end, the Americans had to give in to European views, which, while not opposed, were more pragmatic and imbued with *Realpolitik*.

Historical arguments (for centuries, only the "privileged nations" could live in Transylvanian towns), economic arguments (to ensure the economic viability of the region) and economic arguments (to ensure the economic viability of the region, Romania had to receive at least one of the two railways that crossed Transylvania in the north-south direction)<sup>5</sup> and especially of a strategic-military nature (Romania needed the aforementioned railway for reasons of strategic viability, as well as to be able to participate in the anti-Bolshevik actions conceived

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<sup>3</sup> Mária Ormos, *From Padua to the Trianon, 1918-1920*, Boulder, New York, Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 187-194.

<sup>4</sup> *Conférence de la paix, 1919-1920. Recueil des actes de la Conférence, Partie IV Commissions de la Conférence. Procès-verbaux, rapports et documents, C- Questions territoriales, Commission des affaires roumaines et yougoslaves*, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1923, p. 16-190.

<sup>5</sup> The French expert Jules Laroche considered that 'the separation of those towns would have ruined the whole region' (Jules Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay avec Briand et Poincaré, 1913-1926*, Paris, Hachette, 1957, p. 73).

by the French military at the time). In the end<sup>6</sup>, the experts reached a compromise. According to the information at our disposal, the British expert, Allen W. Leeper, played, together with the chairman of the 'Romanian commission', André Tardieu, a key role in drawing the Romanian-Hungarian border<sup>7</sup>.

The Commission for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Romania sent its report to the Central Territorial Commission on 6 April 1919<sup>8</sup> and, with very slight modifications, these frontiers were forwarded to the Council of Five (of Foreign Ministers) on 15 April. As most of the leading members of the Great Powers' delegations were concentrating their efforts on finalising the treaty with Germany, the report of the 'Romanian' Commission was not discussed until early May<sup>9</sup>, after the treaty with Germany had been finalised. The Council of Foreign Ministers accepted the Romanian frontiers on 8 May 1919<sup>10</sup>, and it was not until 12 May 1919 that the Council of Four finally approved the report, essentially unchanged from the original version<sup>11</sup>. However, the decision of the Conference was not communicated to the countries concerned, mainly because at that time the attention of the Supreme Council was clearly focused on concluding peace with Germany. This delay was important, as it allowed Ion I. C. Brătianu to declare in June 1919, when the Romanian army was in control of the left bank of the Tisza, that he was unaware of the Conference's decisions. The Romanian-Hungarian

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<sup>6</sup> There was an important pro-Romanian military lobby in France. In this respect, the French generals Alby and Le Rond attended several meetings of the Commission, their opinions having a significant influence on the final decision (Taline Ter Minassian, *Les géographes français et la délimitation des frontières balkaniques à la Conférence de la paix en 1919*, in "Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine", tome 44 (1997), 2, p. 283-284, note 147).

<sup>7</sup> Ignác Romsics, *The Dismantling of Historic Hungary: The Peace Treaty of Trianon, 1920*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 76-85.

<sup>8</sup> Interestingly, Ion I. C. Brătianu was present at the Commission meeting of 21 February 1919 (when Mihály Károlyi was still in power in Hungary) and supported the line established by the 1916 treaty; later, after the Communists had taken power and the Smuts mission had failed, the Romanian Prime Minister sent a memo to the Commission on 22 April 1919, asking, in principle, for the Tisza River as a natural border (see Zeno Câmpeanu's work, *Frontiera româno-ungară*, in AMAE, Fond 71, Transylvania, 1920-1944, vol. 348, f. 23-24).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 26.

<sup>10</sup> Department of State, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference* (hereinafter *F.R.U.S., P.P.C.*), 1919, vol. IV, p. 672-674). The American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, wondered whether a more "equitable" solution could not have been found from an ethnic perspective. Tardieu denied this, arguing that it had been discussed with the greatest care, the solution had been unanimously adopted, and in those "very difficult circumstances" it was "the best possible thing". Fed up, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour asked the Council not to reopen a discussion already held in the Commission; it would have meant calling into question the Commission's effort to find the "fair solution". Lansing withdrew his criticism and the Romanian-Hungarian border was adopted unanimously.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 501-507. The consensus of the 'Big Four' was temporarily dissipated by Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, who proposed changing the borders in north-eastern Hungary in favour of Czechoslovakia and Romania, but Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd George reacted immediately, unwilling to tackle anything already 'settled'. In other words, on 12 May 1919, the Supreme Council approved the Romanian-Hungarian border, almost identical to the one that exists today.

border proposed in this report was certainly favourable to the Romanians, who received much of what had been promised to them in the secret treaty of 1916.

After the draft treaty with Germany was finalised in April 1919, French anxieties grew, as many of France's security demands were opposed by the American President and the British Prime Minister, promoters of a compromise that many French considered unsatisfactory. The handing over of the terms of the peace to the German delegation on 7 May 1919 monopolised the attention of the Paris meeting, as well as European public opinion.

Under these circumstances, it is not hard to understand why events east of the Tisza could not arouse much interest in Paris. However, even this lack of interest in Central and Eastern European developments was to have its importance. As already mentioned, although the Romanian-Hungarian border had been adopted by the committee of experts as early as the end of March 1919, and the report was finalised on 6 April and sent to the Conference leadership on 15 April, it was not discussed by the Council of Five (of foreign ministers) until 8 May, i.e. the day after the draft treaty had been handed over to the German delegation and at a time when Romanian troops were in possession of the entire left bank of the Tisza. So it is not surprising that the foreign ministers' discussions were brief, and the border was accepted with relative ease. And on 12 May, the Council of Four also agreed, almost without comment. It was, in fact, the first border of the Romanian state to receive the Conference's approval, a boundary line that could not be changed in the 13 months that followed the signing of the Treaty of Trianon!

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Having been defeated in the first direct confrontation with the Romanians at the end of April 1919, when the Romanian army stopped along the Tisza, the Hungarians (under a full Bolshevik regime) began an offensive against the young Czechoslovak state on 30 May 1919<sup>12</sup>. To everyone's amazement – from Prague, Bucharest, Belgrade, Paris and even Budapest – success was on the Hungarian side<sup>13</sup>. Within days, the Hungarian Red Army troops had succeeded in severing the link between the Romanian and Czechoslovak military forces and conquering about a third of Slovakia, where a Slovak Soviet republic was proclaimed<sup>14</sup>.

The evolution of the hostilities frightened those in Paris, who decided, on 7 June 1919, to send a telegram to the Hungarian government requesting an end to the fighting, even suggesting that the Hungarians might be invited to the Peace

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<sup>12</sup> Josef Kalvoda, *The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Dispute*, in vol. Béla K. Király, Peter Pastor, and Ivan Sanders, eds., *War and Society in East Central Europe*, vol. VI, *Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking. A Case Study on Trianon*, New York, Brooklyn College Press, 1982, p. 287.

<sup>13</sup> Antoine Marès, *Mission militaire et relations internationales: L'exemple franco-tcheoslovaque, 1918-1925*, in "Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine", tome XXX (1983), p. 569-570.

<sup>14</sup> AMAE, Fond 71-1920-1944, Hungary, Relations with Romania, 1919-1929, vol. 84, f. 12; J. Kalvoda, *op. cit.*, p. 287; *Desăvârșirea unității național-statale a poporului român. Recunoașterea ei internațională 1918. Documente interne și externe*, vol. III, București, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1986, p. 435-436.

Conference. Alexandru Vaida-Voevod wrote to Iuliu Maniu on 11 June: “Wilson is indifferent to who will make the treaty, as he is in a hurry to return to America with peace. The more chaos remains in Europe, the more it will become tributary to America”<sup>15</sup>. Those guilty of that unfortunate situation were, of course, the Romanians, who had “crossed the armistice lines and then those of the neutral zone”<sup>16</sup>.

On 10 June, the Council of Four had to hear Brătianu and the Czechoslovak leaders, especially as Kun’s reply had reached Paris<sup>17</sup>. The series of diatribes against the Romanians continued. Wilson accused them of “bringing the Kun government to power (sic!)”<sup>18</sup>. Brătianu replied sharply, accusing the Council of ignorance; then he presented events from the Romanian point of view<sup>19</sup>. Asked by Lloyd George about the frontier established by the Commission for the study of territorial questions concerning Romania, Brătianu said that nothing official had been communicated to him, although there had been many rumours and the press had echoed them. The British Prime Minister then accused Brătianu of Romania having facilitated the rise of Bolshevism. In reply, the Romanian Prime Minister expressed regret that ‘Mr Lloyd George does not understand the problem’, but that this was probably due to a lack of information<sup>20</sup>. Brătianu added that Romania behaved in relation to Hungary exactly as the Allied and Associated Powers did in relation to Germany! But no one was willing to listen to this common-sense argument. The little guys were not allowed to act like the big guys. In the end, it was decided that the next day the borders established by the territorial commissions would be communicated<sup>21</sup>.

Indeed, on the morning of 11 June 1919, the Council of Foreign Ministers relayed to the Romanian delegation the decision concerning the Romanian-Hungarian border<sup>22</sup>. The Romanian leader pointed out that this border had been established without the participation of the Romanian representatives at the Peace Conference and, after a lengthy procedural discussion and despite pressure from the American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, and the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Arthur Balfour, he asked for a postponement of 10-12 days so that the Romanian Government could express its views on the matter<sup>23</sup>. In any case, by then Brătianu proposed the establishment of a provisional line to end the hostilities, while expressing doubts about the correctness of the proposed border on the Careii Mari-Csap and Oradea-Szeged<sup>24</sup> sections.

<sup>15</sup> *Desăvârşirea unităţii naţional-statale...*, vol. III, p. 430.

<sup>16</sup> *F.R.U.S., P.P.C., 1919*, vol. VI, p. 246-247.

<sup>17</sup> *Desăvârşirea unităţii naţional-statale...*, vol. III, p. 437.

<sup>18</sup> *F.R.U.S., P.P.C., 1919*, vol. VI, p. 281-282.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 282-283.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 284.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 288-289.

<sup>22</sup> *F.R.U.S., P.P.C., 1919*, vol. IV, p. 803-804.

<sup>23</sup> See *ibidem*, p. 804-811, 818-819.

<sup>24</sup> *Desăvârşirea unităţii naţional-statale...*, vol. III, p. 431; it seems that the French expert E. de Martonne had already prepared a new Romanian-Hungarian border, more favourable to the Romanian

After another day, on 12 June, the Supreme Council, i.e. the “Big Four”, reconfirmed the Romanian-Hungarian border, although Clemenceau warned that the Romanians would be unhappy and raise “serious objections”, suggesting that the “Romanian border” be adopted only provisionally<sup>25</sup>. Lloyd George and Wilson decided that the Romanians should be threatened into accepting the frontier, although Clemenceau once again expressed doubt that “the Romanians could be forced to retreat behind the frontier line”<sup>26</sup>. In the end, the American and British leaders made their point, and the following day telegrams were sent to the governments of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania, informing them of the new frontiers<sup>27</sup>.

After the conquest of Budapest by the Romanian army in early August 1919 and the removal of the Communist regime from the heart of Europe, the leaders in Bucharest began to hope that they could change the border announced by the conference a few months earlier. However, on 11 October, a telegram was sent to the Romanian government<sup>28</sup> stating that no territorial changes to the line already communicated on 11 June 1919 would be accepted<sup>29</sup>. This put an end to Brătianu’s hopes that military victory against the Hungarians could also produce territorial gains at the expense of Hungary. On the other hand, the reconfirmation, on 11 October, of the Romanian-Hungarian border was of particular importance from the point of view of the discussions on the peace treaty with the Hungarian state, which took place in February-March 1920 and revolved around the question of changing the border, this time in favour of Hungary.

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If during the entire duration of 1919 the fate of the Romanian-Hungarian confrontation seemed to be almost invariably in favour of the Romanians, including from the perspective of drawing the common border, the situation began to change in the first months of 1920. Significant changes occurred on the French political scene, with Georges Clemenceau losing the presidential elections and the office of Prime Minister, his replacement, Alexandre Millerand, being both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, but also applying relevant nuances in French foreign policy. And from the point of view of the Peace Conference, the intensity of which was waning because the main treaties had been signed and the United States was in the process of withdrawing from the European scene, the news was the arrival of the Hungarian delegation in January 1920 and the agreement to hold

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side (see Sherman David Spector, *România și Conferința de pace de la Paris, Diplomația lui Ion I. C. Brătianu*, translated by Sorin Pârnu, Iași, Institutul European, 1995, p. 200, note 80).

<sup>25</sup> *F.R.U.S., P.P.C., 1919*, vol. VI, p. 351.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 352.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 411-416; AMAE, Fond 71-1914, E2, partea a II-a. Diverse, 1914-1924, vol. 48, f. 236.

<sup>28</sup> See *Desăvârșirea unității național-statale...*, vol. IV, p. 499-505.

<sup>29</sup> *F.R.U.S., P.P.C., 1919*, vol. VIII, p. 584.

meetings in London<sup>30</sup> in February-March 1920. This was the context in which the dispute over the Romanian-Hungarian border suddenly became acute, and there was a real risk that the line established in 1919 would be altered, this time in favour of Hungary.

Regular meetings of the Peace Conference were held in London on 26 February and 3 and 8 March 1920, the dates on which the Romanian-Hungarian border was discussed again. At the first of these meetings, Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister, proposed that decisions should be taken only on the major issues, with the details to be left to the Conference of Ambassadors, the body charged with resolving the remaining problems after the Peace Conference had ended. Alexandre Millerand, however, announced that in his view there was no point in reopening the debate on the peace treaty with Hungary, as decisions on borders and financial matters had already been taken in 1919. But British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Italian Prime Minister Francesco Nitti strongly opposed Millerand's views. The British Prime Minister claimed that the Hungarian borders were not acceptable in any way. He called for a thorough and unprejudiced investigation into the matter, as did Nitti, the Italian Prime Minister. Since Philippe Berthelot had tried to transfer the justification for Hungarian criticism to financial matters, Lloyd George firmly stressed that not only these, but the whole draft treaty needed to be re-examined<sup>31</sup>.

Romania's situation had again become delicate, because the leaders of the great powers had stepped up their pressure to obtain from Prime Minister Alexandru Vaida-Voevod a firm and early date for the withdrawal of Romanian troops from the Tisza line<sup>32</sup>, not to mention the difficulties the Romanian delegation was facing in the international settlement of the question of Bessarabia's belonging to Romania<sup>33</sup>. Since Millerand was forced to return to Paris to carry out his usual government duties, France was represented at the new session of the London Conference, which began on 1 March, by the political director of the Foreign Ministry, Philippe Berthelot. He was performing his last major political task before being forced to step aside in favour of Maurice Paléologue<sup>34</sup>, but only to return in the autumn of 1920 as Secretary General at the Quai d'Orsay<sup>35</sup>.

<sup>30</sup> Lloyd George, *A Diary by Frances Stevenson*, ed. by A.J.P. Taylor, New York, Harper&Row, 1971, p. 204.

<sup>31</sup> *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*, (hereafter *D.B.F.P.*), ed. by E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, First Series, 1919, vol. VII, p. 247-249.

<sup>32</sup> See the transcripts of the meetings of the Supreme Council of 20 January (*F.R.U.S., P.P.C., 1919*, vol. IX, p. 910-914) and 26 February 1920 (*D.B.F.P.*, vol. VII, p. 263-265).

<sup>33</sup> See Traian Sandu, *La France et la Bessarabie roumaine de 1918 à 1920: une reconnaissance difficile*, in vol. *L'Établissement des Frontières en Europe après les deux guerres mondiales. Actes des colloques de Strasbourg et de Montréal (juin et septembre 1995)*, Publiés sous la direction de Christian Baechler et Carole Fink, Strasbourg and Montréal, 1996, p. 369-387.

<sup>34</sup> M. Ormos, *From Padua to the Trianon...*, p. 376.

<sup>35</sup> Richard D. Challener, *The French Foreign Office: The Era of Philippe Berthelot*, in *The Diplomats, 1919-1939*, ed. by Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1953, p. 69-70.

The atmosphere of the meeting of 3 March 1920 was not at all encouraging for the Romanian cause or for the French hopes that there would be no changes in the draft treaty with Hungary. First of all, there was an obvious discrepancy between the Great Powers: Britain and Italy were represented by prime ministers and foreign ministers, while France was present only with senior officials from the French Foreign Ministry. David Lloyd George began the debate by presenting the main ethnic data in the documents and maps submitted by Apponyi, listed the Hungarian groups to be assigned to other countries, and said it would not be easy to defend this proposal. As a result, Lloyd George said Hungarians were clearly being treated unfairly. Francesco Nitti defended the Hungarian cause on the grounds that a last stand had to be built against Bolshevism. At the end of the debate, the British Prime Minister announced once again that he knew nothing about the announcement of the Hungarian borders, that he had never had anything to do with them and had not taken part in drawing them.

Between March 3 and 8, 1920, Lloyd George gave up the attempt he had so spectacularly launched<sup>36</sup>. During a private conversation on 7 March 1920, Lord Curzon indicated to Berthelot that he could be sure of success on the Hungarian question, that the frontiers would not be changed<sup>37</sup>. Berthelot was astonished by this turn of events. He tried to explain it by the firmness of his government and the prestige of France, but he probably didn't quite believe this either.

On March 8, 1920, Lord Curzon opened the debate at the Foreign Ministers' meeting by declaring that radical change was out of the question<sup>38</sup>. Several issues relating to the Hungarian borders were discussed, and Allen Leeper, the British expert on the Commission for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Romania, was invited and gave some technical details which clearly stated the impossibility of significant change. The Italian Vannutelli Rey's proposal to leave Bratislava to Hungary was rejected by Berthelot. All gladly accepted Curzon's proposal to empower the Border Commission to investigate matters of minor interest. However, Berthelot immediately made it clear that this commission could not discuss the borders themselves<sup>39</sup>. Probably all the members of the Supreme Council, because of their experience in 1919, could not contradict Berthelot, who had warned them earlier that if Hungary's borders were changed, "the small powers would refuse to sign the treaty and the Supreme Council would be powerless"(!)<sup>40</sup>.

Within a few days, in early March 1920, the crisis was defused, and it was the British who calmed the situation after they, through David Lloyd George, had

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<sup>36</sup> V. V. Tilea (*Acțiunea diplomatică a României, noiembrie 1919 - martie 1920*, Sibiu, 1925, p. 73) considers that the attitude of the British Prime Minister was only aimed at "teasing" the French, David Lloyd George not really intending any change in the treaty with Hungary.

<sup>37</sup> M. Ormos, *From Padua to the Trianon...*, p. 377-378.

<sup>38</sup> *D.B.F.P.*, vol. VII, p. 440-449.

<sup>39</sup> AMAE, Fond 71, Transilvania, 1920-1944, vol. 348, f. 88.

<sup>40</sup> *D.B.F.P.*, vol. VII, p. 387-388.

stirred it up. Romanian and Hungarian historians who wrote monographs on the Treaty of Trianon came to similar conclusions decades ago. Our conclusion in 2002 was that it was the French opposition, but also the position of Lord Curzon and the *Foreign Office*, which changed David Lloyd George's attitude<sup>41</sup>. Mária Ormos had expressed similar views<sup>42</sup>, as had Ignác Romsics<sup>43</sup>, who suggested that the British Foreign Secretary had persuaded his boss to agree to close the case. An American historian who wrote in favour of the Hungarian cause, Thomas L. Sakmyster, was of the same opinion, and even pointed to Allen Leeper<sup>44</sup> as the main 'culprit'.

Recently, another Western historian, a British one, Mark Cornwall, came to a similar conclusion that the decisive role in David Lloyd George's change of heart would have been played by *the Foreign Office* and, in particular, Allen Leeper: "In the end, it was the Foreign Office loudspeaker which would triumph, because its "experts", like Allen Leeper, were deferred to as the key policymakers. They were already insisting that Hungary's frontiers had been permanently fixed, all the more so, as precisely that message had been sent to the surrounding states in June 1919"<sup>45</sup> or "Curzon continued to listen to the "expert" Allen Leeper, who stridently expounded his opposition to Hungary's "anachronistic" arguments. The result was that, during a meeting of Allied foreign ministers in London on March 8, the idea of making any changes to the treaty was rejected. The overriding argument, as detailed in writing by Leeper, was that Hungary's borders must be settled quickly and short-term stability must be prioritized over any long-term dangers"<sup>46</sup>.

The similarity of historians' views in recent decades on this was mainly due to the fact that the only direct source concerning what had happened in London in February-March 1920 was published British diplomatic documents<sup>47</sup>. Even the forays these historians made into the Foreign Office archives at The National Archives of Kew, Richmond, London, did not shed any further light. But research into Allen Leeper's papers, particularly his diary, held at The Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge University, provides such relevant details. The conclusions do not change, but the assumption about the major role played by the Australian-born British diplomat is confirmed.

<sup>41</sup> Lucian Leuștean, *România, Ungaria și Tratatul de la Trianon, 1918-1920*, Iași, Polirom, 2002, p. 160-164.

<sup>42</sup> M. Ormos, *From Padua to the Trianon...*, p. 376-378.

<sup>43</sup> Ignác Romsics, *The Dismantling of Historic Hungary...*, p. 134-137.

<sup>44</sup> Thomas L. Sakmyster, *Great Britain and the Making of the Treaty of Trianon*, in *War and Society in East Central Europe Vol. 6, Essays on World War I: A Case Study of Trianon*, edited by Béla Király, Peter Pastor, and Ivan Sanders, New York, Columbia University Press, 1982, p. 107-129.

<sup>45</sup> Mark Cornwall, *The Flickering Lighthouse: Rethinking the British Judgement on Trianon*, in "Hungarian Historical Review", 9 (2020), no. 1, p. 12.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 19.

<sup>47</sup> *D.B.F.P.*, first series, ed. J. P. T. Bury and R. Butler (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958) vol. 7, p. 383-388 and 440-449.

On 26 February 1920, a Thursday, Leeper records of the meeting of the Supreme Council held in the Government House at 10 Downing Street: "...in the afternoon. Discussion of the Hungarian observations. I had spoken to Lord Curzon about the whole thing beforehand & had got him quite to agree that it was impossible to make any changes now in the territorial clauses of the treaty. I was to have seen Lloyd George at 3.30 before the meeting, but there was no time. Consequently, without any coaching he plunged right into the subject & committed himself to various observations in favour of the Hungarian case. He was strongly supported by Nitti & opposed by Berthelot. Lord Curzon was in the difficult position of being unable to oppose L. G. publicly. Finally, however, the matter was referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers so it should be all right"<sup>48</sup>.

Then, on the following two Sundays, 29 February and 7 March 1920, Leeper met Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, with whom he had a 'working' lunch and dinner, as they would be called today: "Rushed off to the Ritz to see the Romanian Prime Minister, Vaida-Voevod & stayed to lunch with him & two of his delegates, Dr. Braniște & Dr. Poruțiu, both Transilvanian heads of departments. Gave them introductions to people in Oxford. Had a long talk with V-V. on various subjects" and respectively "... went to the Ritz to dine with Vaida-Voevod, the Romanian Prime Minister. Madge & his wife & daughter were there & half-a-dozen Rumanians. After dinner we watched the dancing & I had a long talk with V.V. & got him to agree to various proposals with regard to the settlement of the question of Rumanian requisitions in Hungary, etc."<sup>49</sup>.

Finally, on 8 March, Leeper's account of the meeting which the British Prime Minister did not even attend is as follows: "Attended meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers in Lord Curzon's room at 4.30. Hungarian observations on territorial clauses of the treaty were discussed. Lord Curzon put first the Hungarian, then the Czecho-Serbo-Rumanian case. He called on me to explain the Czecho-Slovak frontier with Hungary & I spoke for about ten minutes. The Italians gave a little trouble & put in more arguments in favour of Hungary but finally everyone accepted a proposal contained in a memo. of mine which Curzon had caused to be circulated to all the Delegates before the meeting which urged that no change could now be made in the Treaty but that to guard against any conceivable injustice the Demarcation Commissions should be authorized to sent reports to the League of nations on any subjects of this kind. This was finally accepted & I felt very pleased"<sup>50</sup>.

Allen Leeper was the expert on Romanian issues in the British delegation: almost all documents concerning Romania passed through him, and he was the first to propose the British "position". Even if some Hungarian or Western historians today question Leeper's expert status, they are wrong. He was indeed the best

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<sup>48</sup> The Churchill Archives Centre, Allen Leeper Papers, Leeper's Diary, LEEP 1/3, p. 57.

<sup>49</sup> Ibidem, p. 60, 67.

<sup>50</sup> Ibidem, p. 68.

expert on Romanian issues, he spoke Romanian and had travelled to Bucharest. It was only natural that he should be consulted on any matter relating to Romania.

At the outbreak of war in 1914, Leeper attempted to enlist, but was rejected as medically unfit even for quartermaster service. Determined to participate in the war effort, he eventually found his place in the Propaganda Department (Wellington House) and then in the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information. One of Leeper's colleagues was Robert W. Seton-Watson, owner of *The New Europe* magazine. Leeper began writing articles under the pseudonym Belisarius. He became particularly interested in Romanian affairs and wrote a pamphlet entitled *The Justice of Rumania's Cause* (1917) and was one of the founders of the Anglo-Roumanian Society, where he served as honorary secretary<sup>51</sup>.

In March 1918 most of the Intelligence Bureau members were transferred to the Foreign Office to form the new Political Intelligence Department, which was to play a crucial role in British planning for the Paris Peace Conference. Leeper arrived in Paris in December 1918 and remained there continuously until 1920, working permanently for the section on Balkan affairs in the *Foreign Office*. He was appointed to the 'Commission for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Romania and Yugoslavia' and, as the other British member, Sir Eyre Crowe, was busy with other aspects of the peace meeting, Leeper came to play an important role in drawing the borders of the new Europe.

Leeper's boss was Eyre Crowe, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and their collaboration was effective. The bond that sympathisers of The New Europe group, which included Allen Leeper, established during the Paris negotiations with Sir Eyre Crowe gave them the practical foundation for their generous ideals and helped them convert their political philosophy into diplomatic strategy. This combination contributed much to the realisation of the new face of Europe, including from the perspective of Romanian territorial claims. Leeper was delighted to work with Crowe: "I like Crowe immensely!", he wrote on 12 February 1919 to his brother Reginald (Rex)<sup>52</sup>. Crowe, for his part, respected Leeper and trusted his assessments. Sir Eyre Crowe was not hostile to the Romanian demands, but, on the contrary, supported them at times, even if he did so discreetly and only when they did not seem excessive. His attitude and actions did not, of course, fall outside the sphere of the defence of British interests, but this increased their value, and his influence on the top decision-makers, David Lloyd George<sup>53</sup>, the Prime Minister, and in particular the Lords Balfour and Curzon, the

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<sup>51</sup> Erik Goldstein, Leeper, (Alexander Wigram) Allen (1887–1935), in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, <https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-40928?rskey=KOnT9C&result=1> [20.11.2019].

<sup>52</sup> The Churchill Archives Centre, Allen Leeper Papers, LEEP 3/8.

<sup>53</sup> David Lloyd George did not trust the Foreign Office, but he was not able to override it in many aspects (G. H. Bennett, *British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919-1924*, St. Martin's Press, London, 1995, p. 11).

Foreign Office Ministers of 1919-1920, was remarkable, as the sources attest and the studies of British historians certify<sup>54</sup>.

What Romanian, Hungarian and British historians have long suspected, namely that the Foreign Office – through Lord Curzon, Sir Eyre Crowe and, above all, Allen Leeper – played a prominent role in drawing the Romanian-Hungarian border, including defusing the crisis of February-March 1920, can now be demonstrated by new first-rate sources. Allen Leeper managed to coordinate with ‘[his] Romanian friends’, as he repeatedly called them in his diary and correspondence, and with French diplomats, to block a major attempt to change the terms of peace with Hungary, initiated by his own supreme head, David Lloyd George, and the Italian Prime Minister Francesco Nitti. Leeper was perhaps the most disinterested of Romania’s friends at the post-Great War peace conference.

### **New contributions on the dispute at the Peace Conference (February-March 1920) concerning the Romanian-Hungarian border**

#### *Abstract*

*The aim of the article is to make some new contributions on the attempt of February-March 1920 to change the Romanian-Hungarian border, the one made at a time when the peace meeting had briefly moved to London and the British and Italian leaders proposed to renegotiate the border line, a position that seemed capable of prevailing despite French opposition. The present article is an endeavour to provide evidence, from unknown or relatively little-known sources, about the man who, in early March 1920, succeeded in blocking the attempt to change the borders established in 1919 in favour of Hungary. Allen Leeper is the name of the Australian-born British diplomat who managed to convince his superiors – Eyre Crowe, Lord Curzon and David Lloyd George – that it was neither fair, just nor practical to alter the border lines already established and announced to all parties concerned. In the end, nothing changed, and the line proposed by the experts in 1919 was to find its place in the peace treaty Hungary signed with the Allied and Associated Powers on 4 June 1920 at Trianon.*

*Keywords: Peace Conference; Romanian-Hungarian frontier; Foreign Office; Allen Leeper; Treaty of Trianon.*

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<sup>54</sup> Sibyl Crowe and Edward Corp, *Our Ablest Public Servant, Sir Eyre Crowe, GCB, GCMG, KCB, KCMG, 1864-1925*, Braunton Devon, Merlin Books Ltd., 1993, p. 303-388; J. S. Dunn, *The Crowe Memorandum: Sir Eyre Crowe and Foreign Office Perceptions of Germany, 1918-1925*, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2013, p. 47-73.

## ABREVIERI

<i>AARMSI</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice
<i>AARMSL</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Literare
<i>AARPAD</i>	= „Analele Academiei Române”, seria II, București, 1879-1916
<i>AA.SS.</i>	= <i>Acta Sanctorum</i> , ed. Bollandisti, III <sup>a</sup> edițiune, Parigi 1863-1870
<i>AB</i>	= Arhivele Basarabiei
<i>ACNSAS</i>	= Arhivele Consiliului Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității
<i>AE</i>	= L'Année Epigraphique, Paris
<i>AIR</i>	= Arhiva Istorică a României
<i>AIAC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie Cluj
<i>AIIAI</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>AIIC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Cluj
<i>AIINC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională, Cluj
<i>AIIX</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>ALIL</i>	= Anuarul de Lingvistică și Istorie Literară, Iași
<i>ALMA</i>	= <i>Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi</i> . Genève.
<i>AM</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei, Iași
<i>AMAE</i>	= Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe
<i>AmAnthr</i>	= American Anthropologist, New Series, Published by Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
<i>AMM</i>	= Acta Moldaviae Meridionalis, Vaslui
<i>AMMB</i>	= Arhiva Mitropoliei Moldovei și Bucovinei, Iași
<i>AMN</i>	= Acta Musei Napocensis
<i>AMR</i>	= Arhivele Militare Române
<i>AMS</i>	= Anuarul Muzeului din Suceava
<i>ANB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, București
<i>ANC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Cluj
<i>ANDMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Direcția Municipiului București
<i>ANG</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Galați
<i>ANI</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Iași
<i>ANIC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale
<i>ANR-Cluj</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Cluj-Napoca
<i>ANR-Sibiu</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Sibiu
<i>ANRM</i>	= Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova, Chișinău
<i>ANRW</i>	= Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Berlin-New York
<i>ANSMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Municipiului București
<i>ANV</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Vaslui
<i>AO</i>	= Arhivele Olteniei
<i>AP</i>	= Analele Putnei
<i>APH</i>	= Acta Poloniae Historica, Varșovia
<i>AqLeg</i>	= <i>Aquila Legionis. Cuadernos de Estudios sobre el Ejército Romano</i> , Salamanca
<i>AR</i>	= Arhiva Românească
<i>ArchM</i>	= Arhiva Moldaviae, Iași
<i>ArhGen</i>	= Arhiva Genealogică
„Arhiva”	= „Arhiva”. Organul Societății Științifice și Literare, Iași
<i>ArhMold</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei
<i>ASRR</i>	= Arhiva Societății Române de Radiodifuziune
<i>AȘUI</i>	= Analele Științifice ale Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași

- ATS = Ancient Textile Series, Oxbow Books, Oxford și Oakville  
 AUAIC = Arhiva Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași  
 AUB = Analele Universității „București”  
 BA = *Biblioteca Ambrosiana*, Roma, Città Nuova Editrice  
 BAR = Biblioteca Academiei Române  
 BArchB = Bundesarchiv Berlin  
 BAR int. ser. = British Archaeological Reports, International Series  
 BBR = Buletinul Bibliotecii Române  
 BCIR = Buletinul Comisiei Istorice a României  
 BCMI = Buletinul Comisiei Monumentelor Istorice  
 BCU-Iași = Biblioteca Centrală Universitară, Iași  
 BE = Bulletin Epigraphique  
 BF = Byzantinische Forschungen, Amsterdam  
 BJ = Bonner Jahrbücher, Bonn  
 BMI = Buletinul Monumentelor Istorice  
 BMIM = București. Materiale de istorie și muzeografie  
 BNB = Biblioteca Națională București  
 BNJ = Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher  
 BOR = Biserica Ortodoxă Română  
 BS = Balkan Studies  
 BSNR = Buletinul Societății Numismatice Române  
 ByzSlav = Byzantinoslavica  
 CA = Cercetări arheologice  
 CAI = Caiete de Antropologie Istorică  
 CartNova = *La ciudad de Carthago Nova 3: La documentación epigráfica*, Murcia  
 CB = Cahiers balkaniques  
 CC = Codrul Cosminului, Suceava (ambele serii)  
 CCAR = Cronica cercetărilor arheologice din România, CIMEC, București  
 CCh = *Corpus Christianorum*, Turnhout  
 CChSG = *Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca*  
 CCSL = *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, Turnhout, Brepols  
 CDM = *Catalogul documentelor moldovenești din Arhivele Centrale de Stat*, București, vol. I-V; supl. I.  
 CDȚR = *Catalogul documentelor Țării Românești din Arhivele Statului*, București, vol. II-VIII, 1974-2006  
 Chiron = Chiron: Mitteilungen der Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, 1971  
 CI = Cercetări istorice (ambele serii)  
 CIL = *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, Berlin  
 CL = Cercetări literare  
 CLRE = *Consuls of the Later Roman Empire*, eds. R. S. Bagnall, A. Cameron, S. R. Schwartz, K. A. Worp, Atlanta, 1987  
 CN = Cercetări Numismatice  
 CNA = Cronica Numismatică și Arheologică, București  
 CSCO = *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium*, Louvain  
 CSEA = *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiae Aquileiensis*, Roma, Città Nuova Editrice  
 CSEL = *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, Wien, De Gruyter  
 CSPAMI = Centrul de Studii și Păstrare a Arhivelor Militare Centrale, Pitești  
 CT = Columna lui Traian, București  
 CTh = *Codex Theodosianus*. Theodosiani, Libri XVI cum constitutionibus Sirmondianis, I, edidit adsumpto apparatu P. Kruegeri, Th. Mommsen, Hildesheim, 1970-1971  
 Cv.L = Convorbiri literare (ambele serii)

„Dacia”, N.S.	= Dacia. Nouvelle Série, Revue d'archéologie et d'histoire ancienne, București
DANIC	= Direcția Arhivelor Naționale Istorice Centrale
DGAS	= Direcția Generală a Arhivelor Statului
DI	= Diplomatarium Italicum
DIR	= <i>Documente privind istoria României</i>
DIRRI	= <i>Documente privind Istoria României. Războiul pentru Independență</i>
DOP	= Dumbarton Oaks Papers
DTN	= <i>Din trecutul nostru</i> , Chișinău
DRH	= <i>Documenta Romaniae Historica</i>
EB	= Études Balkaniques
EBPB	= Études byzantines et post-byzantines
EDCS	= <i>Epigraphik-Datenbank Clauss-Slaby</i> ( <a href="http://www.manfredclauss.de/">http://www.manfredclauss.de/</a> )
EDR	= <i>Epigraphic Database Roma</i> ( <a href="http://www.edr-edr.it/default/index.php">http://www.edr-edr.it/default/index.php</a> )
EpigrAnat	= Epigraphica Anatolica, Münster
ERAsturias	= F. Diego Santos, <i>Epigrafiya Romana de Asturias</i> , Oviedo, 1959.
Gerión	= Gerión. Revista de Historia Antigua, Madrid
GB	= Glasul Bisericii
GCS	= <i>Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller</i> , Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1897-1969
GLK	= <i>Grammatici Latini Keil</i>
HEp	= <i>Hispania Epigraphica</i> , Madrid
„Hierasus”	= <i>Hierasus</i> . Anuarul Muzeului Județean Botoșani, Botoșani
HM	= Heraldica Moldaviae, Chișinău
HU	= Historia Urbana, Sibiu
HUI	= Historia Universitatis Iasiensis, Iași
IDR	= <i>Inscripțiile din Dacia romană</i> , Bucurști-Paris
IDRE	= <i>Inscriptions de la Dacie romaine. Inscriptions externes concernant l'histoire de la Dacie</i> , I-II, Bucarest, 1996, 2000
IGLN	= Inscriptions grecques et latines de Novae, Bordeaux
IGLR	= <i>Inscripțiile grecești și latine din secolele IV-XIII descoperite în România</i> , București, 1976
ILLPecs	= Instrumenta Inscripta Latina. <i>Das römische Leben im Spiegel der Kleininschriften</i> , Pecs, 1991
ILAlg	= <i>Inscriptions latines d'Algérie</i> , Paris
ILB	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae in Bulgaria repertae. Inscriptiones inter Oescum et Iatrum repertae</i> , Sofia, 1989
ILD	= <i>Inscripții latine din Dacia</i> , București
ILN	= <i>Inscriptions latines de Novae</i> , Poznan
ILLPRON	= <i>Inscriptionum Lapidarium Latinarum Provinciae Norici usque ad annum MCMLXXXIV repertarum indices</i> , Berlin, 1986
ILS	= <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i> , 1892
IMS	= <i>Inscriptiones Moesiae Superioris</i> , Belgrad
IN	= „Ioan Neculce”. Buletinul Muzeului Municipal Iași
ISM	= <i>Inscripțiile din Scythia Minor grecești și latine</i> , București, vol. I-III, 1983-1999
JGO	= Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas
JL	= Junimea literară
JRS	= The Journal of Roman studies, London
LR	= Limba română
MA	= Memoria Antiquitatis, Piatra Neamț
MCA	= Materiale și cercetări arheologice
MEF	= <i>Moldova în epoca feudalismului</i> , vol. I-XII, 1961-2012, Chișinău
MEFRA	= <i>Mélanges de l'École française de Rome: Antiquité</i> , Roma

- MGH = *Monumenta Germaniae Historica inde ab anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum auspiciis societatis aperiendis fontibus rerum Germanicarum medii aevi*, Berlin 1877-  
 MI = Magazin istoric, București  
 MIM = Materiale de istorie și muzeografie  
 MM = Mitropolia Moldovei  
 MMS = Mitropolia Moldovei și Sucevei  
 MN = Muzeul Național, București  
 MO = Mitropolia Olteniei  
 MOF = Monitorul Oficial al României  
 Navarro = M. Navarro Caballero, *Perfectissima femina. Femmes de l'elite dans l'Hispanie romaine*, Bordeaux, 2017.  
 NBA = *Nuova Biblioteca Agostiniana*, Roma, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum  
 NDPAC = *Nuovo Dizionario Patristico e di Antichità Cristiane*, I, A-E, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2006; III, P-Z, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2008  
 NEH = *Nouvelles études d'histoire*  
 OI = Opțiuni istoriografice, Iași  
 OPEL = *Onomasticon provinciarum Europae latinarum*, vol. I-IV, Budapesta-Viena, 1994-2002  
 PG = *Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Graeca*, ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris, 1886-1912  
 PIR = *Prosopographia Imperii Romani. Saec. I.II.III*, editio altera, Berlin.  
 PLRE = *Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*, 3 vol., eds. A. H. M. Jones, J. R. Martindale, and J. Morris, Cambridge, 1971-1992  
 RA = Revista arhivelor  
 RBAR = Revista Bibliotecii Academiei Române, București  
 RC = Revista catolică  
 RdI = Revista de istorie  
 REByz = *Revue des Études Byzantines*  
 RER = *Revue des études roumaines*  
 RESEE = *Revue des études Sud-Est européennes*  
 RHP = *Die römischen Hilfstruppen in Pannonien während der Prinzipatszeit. I: Die Inschriften*, Viena  
 RHSEE = *Revue historique de Sud-Est européen*  
 RI = Revista istorică (ambele serii)  
 RIAF = Revista pentru istorie, arheologie și filologie  
 RIB = *Roman Inscriptions of Britain*, Londra  
 RIM = Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, Chișinău  
 RIR = Revista istorică română, București  
 RIS = Revista de istorie socială, Iași  
 RITL = Revista de istorie și teorie literară  
 RIU = *Die römischen Inschriften Ungarns*, Budapesta  
 RJMH = *The Romanian Journal of Modern History*, Iași  
 RM = Revista muzeelor  
 RMD = *Roman Military Diplomas*, Londra  
 RMM = *Römische Militärdiplome und Entlassungsurkunden in der Sammlung des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums*, Mainz  
 RMM-MIA = Revista muzeelor și monumentelor, seria Monumente istorice și de artă  
 RMR = Revista Medicală Română  
 RRH = *Revue roumaine d'histoire*  
 RRHA = *Revue roumaine de l'histoire de l'art*  
 RRHA-BA = *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire de l'Art. Série Beaux Arts*  
 RSIAB = Revista Societății istorice și arheologice bisericești, Chișinău  
 Rsl = Romanoslavica

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<i>SAHIR</i>	= Studia et Acta Historiae Iudaeorum Romaniae, București
<i>SAI</i>	= Studii și Articole de Istorie
<i>SCB</i>	= Studii și cercetări de bibliologie
<i>Sch</i>	= <i>Sources Chrétiennes</i> , Paris
<i>SCIA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istoria artei
<i>SCIM</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie medie
<i>SCIV/SCIVA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie veche (și arheologie)
<i>SCN</i>	= Studii și Cercetări Numismatice, București
<i>SCȘI</i>	= Studii și cercetări științifice, Istorie
<i>SEER</i>	= The Slavonic and East European Review
<i>SHA</i>	= <i>Scriptores Historiae Augustae</i>
<i>SJAN</i>	= Serviciul Județean al Arhivelor Naționale
<i>SMIC</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie contemporană, București
<i>SMIM</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie medie, București
<i>SMIMod</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie modernă, București
<i>SOF</i>	= Südost-Forschungen, München
<i>ST</i>	= Studii Teologice, București
<i>StAntArh</i>	= Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica, Iași
<i>T&amp;MBYZ</i>	= <i>Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de recherches d'histoire et de civilisation byzantines</i>
<i>ThD</i>	= Thraco-Dacica, București
<i>TR</i>	= Transylvanian Review, Cluj-Napoca
<i>TV</i>	= Teologie și viața, Iași
<i>ZPE</i>	= Zeitschrift für Papyralogie und Epigraphik
<i>ZSL</i>	= Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde