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Abrevieri

**Motivations, obstacles and complications on the path of
Polish diplomacy to an alliance with Romania.
Reflections on the 100th anniversary of the Polish-Romanian
military alliance of 1921**

It is enough to look at the map of interwar Europe to understand why the alliance with Romania signed 100 years ago on March 3, 1921, was for Poland one of the priorities of its foreign policy and the pillars of its security. This was mainly due to the threat from Soviet Russia, the need to use safe communication lines in the southern and south-western directions – in a situation where they could be blocked in the western direction by Germany and – reluctant to Poland – Czechoslovakia; and finally for economic reasons – access to Romanian ports on the Black Sea. The Polish-Romanian alliance could also be the basis of a wider defense system from the Baltic to the Black Sea and fill the geopolitical gap that arose after the collapse of Austria-Hungary. However, the path to this alliance was not easy, because the priorities of Warsaw and Bucharest were initially different. Besides, Poles and Romanians were starting from different levels – the first ones were just rebuilding their state after 123 years of captivity, while the Romanians had their own independent existence for a long time and in 1918 they united with the *Regat* other lands like Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia. On the other hand, Poland also integrated its territories, so many similarities could be found between the two countries at that time¹.

During World War I

Polish-Romanian contacts as Polish-Moldavian and Polish-Wallachian contacts date back to the 14th century. In the nineteenth century, when Poland did not exist on the map of Europe, the relations of Polish political emigration with the

* PhD in History, professor hab., Institut of History, University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland; krzysztof.nowak@us.edu.pl.

¹ See Krzysztof Nowak, *Integration of reborn Poland and united Romania. Similarities and differences*, in L. Zabolotnaya, B. Zdaniuk (ed.), *Polish-Moldovan relations to the Polish-Moldovan relations to the centenary of the regaining of independence by Poland*, Chişinău, 2020, p. 210-228.

political and cultural Romanian elites brought much positive energy for the closer ties of the two nations, and many Polish doctors, engineers, lawyers and officials contributed to the civilization development of Romanian lands². The years of World War I were the next stage of Polish-Romanian political contacts.

Until mid-1916, Romania, as a country that did not participate in hostilities, had little interest in Polish affairs. Although also in the political life of the Kingdom of Romania there were divisions between the supporters of the Entente and Central Powers, this situation cannot be compared with the political divisions among Poles who do not have their own state. However, it should be remembered, that in the lands that were the subject of Bucharest's interest: in Bukovina and Bessarabia during World War I there were troops of the Polish Legions (2nd Brigade) fighting against the Russians as part of the Austro-Hungarian army and pro-Austrian orientation of a part of Polish elites and this fact is now an important part of the national identity of Poles. The memory of Polish soldiers from these formations retained rather positive opinions about Romanians³.

After 1916, Poles serving in the Russian army on the Romanian Front came into contact with Romania and the Romanians. After the revolution in Russia broke out in autumn 1917, Polish soldiers (about 4,000) in northern Moldova and Bessarabia formed the 2nd Polish Corp, which after the peace treaty signed on March 3, 1918 in Brest-Litovsk (after which Bolshevik Russia withdrew from the war) had to be disarmed by the Romanians. The Romanians, lonely in the fight against the Central Powers, planned also to use these Poles to fight on their front, but the Poles wanted to return to their homeland and finally the Romanians agreed to it. In March 1918, the Poles left Bessarabia and joined with the 2nd Brigade of Polish Legions (at that time formally known as the so-called Polish Auxiliary Corps) who came from Bukovina on the Dniester River and who after the "first" treaty in Brest (February 9, 1918) giving to the Ukrainian People's Republic part of the Polish lands, disobeyed the Austro-Hungarians. Although the combined Polish troops as the 2nd Polish Corps in May 1918 capitulated to the Germans at Kaniów on the Dnieper, the fact that the Romanians had not disarmed them earlier was remembered by Poles as a friendly gesture by Romania for the cause of Polish

² More, see Krzysztof Dach, *Polsko-rumuńskie stosunki polityczne w XIX wieku* [Polish-Romanian political relations in the XIX century], Warszawa, 1999.

³ Aleksander Smoliński, *Udział II Brygady Legionów Polskich w walkach pod Kirlibabą w styczniu 1915* [Participation of the 2nd Brigade of the Polish Legions in the battles near Cirlibaba in January 1915], in S. Iachimovschi, E. Wieruszewska (ed.), *Historyczne i kulturowe aspekty relacji polsko-rumuńskich. Aspectele istorice și culturale ale relațiilor polono-române* [Historical and cultural aspects of Polish-Romanian relations], Suceava, 2008, p. 45-61; idem, *Obraz Rumunii i Rumunów z czasów I wojny światowej w pamiętnikach Aleksandra Majkowskiego-Polaka i żołnierza armii cesarskich Niemiec* [The image of Romania and Romanians from World War I in the diaries of Aleksander Majkowski, a Pole and a soldier of the Imperial German army], in K. Stempel-Gancarczyk, E. Wieruszewska-Calistru (ed.), *Historia i dzień dzisiejszy relacji polsko-rumuńskich. Istoria și prezentul relațiilor polono-române* [History and present day of Polish-Romanian relations], Suceava, 2017, p. 40-56.

independence⁴. And *vice versa* – support on March 27 / April 9, 1918 the unification of Bessarabia with the *Regat* by Feliks Dutkiewicz – the only one Polish member of the Bessarabian Council of the Country (*Sfatul Țării*), and on November 28, 1918 support for the entry of the entire Bukovina into Romania by the Polish National Council in Chernivtsi, was positive remembered by Romanians⁵. The more so because the public opinion in Poland reacted similarly. This meant that the reborn Poland has no plan to make territorial claims against the Kingdom of Romania.

In the period when Romania withdrew from the war after the capitulation to the Central Powers (May 7, 1918), the diplomacy of the Polish Regency Council operating in German-occupied Warsaw⁶ announced, on October 7, a manifesto proclaiming the rebuilding of independent Poland on the basis of the famous messages from the President of the United States, Thomas Woodrow Wilson. On October 12, the representation of the Regency Council in Vienna informed the head of Romanian diplomacy, Constantin C. Arion, about the appointment of Marian Linde as *chargé d'affaires* of the Regency Council of the Kingdom of Poland in Romania⁷. As Berlin and Vienna were weakening, broader ideas appeared in the Polish-Romanian talks to bring reborn Poland closer to unifying Romania. In this context, it is worth paying attention to the account of the co-founder of the pro-Allied Polish National Committee⁸, Jan E. Rozwadowski, on the talks held in Paris on October 28, 1918 with the Romanian representative to the Allied forces, General Dumitru Iliescu, a close associate of Minister Ion I. C.

⁴ Waldemar Rezmer, *Polskie formacje wojskowe w Rumunii (1917-1919)* [Polish military formations in Romania (1917-1919], in S. Iachimovschi. E. Wieruszewska (ed.), *We wspólnocie narodów i kultur. W kręgu relacji polsko-rumuńskich. Materiały z sympozjum. Comunitatea popoarelor și culturilor. In lumea relațiilor polono-române. Materialele simpozionului* [In the community of nations and cultures. In the circle of Polish-Romanian relations. Materials from the symposium], Suceava, 2008, p. 113-129.

⁵ Ana Grițko, *The activity of Feliks Dutkiewicz in the first Bessarabian Parliament "Sfatul Țării"*, in L. Zabolotnaya, B. Zdaniuk (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 267-271; Ion Filipciuc, *Polonezii din Bucovina solidari cu românii intru unirea cu Regatul României*, in K. Stempel-Gancarczyk, E. Wieruszewska-Calistru (ed.), *O relațiilor polsko-rumuńskich na przestrzeni wieków w stulecie Odzyskania Niepodległości Polski i Wielkiego Zjednoczenia Rumunii. Despre relațiile polono-române de-a-lungul timpului în anul Centenarului Independenței Poloniei și Marii Unirii a României* [On Polish-Romanian relations over the centuries on the centenary of Poland's Regaining Independence and the Great Unification of Romania], Suceava, 2019, p. 409-425.

⁶ Regency Council – an organ of Polish authority created in the territory of the Russian partition as a result of the German-Austrian act of November 5, 1916, which announced the establishment of the Kingdom of Poland – of in fact incomplete independence.

⁷ Krzysztof Nowak, Henryk Walczak (ed.), *„Jeden naród o dwu sztandarach”. Przymierze polsko-rumuńskie (1918), 1919-1926. Dokumenty i materiały. „Un singur popor cu două drapele”. Alianța polono-română (1918), 1921-1926. Documente și materiale* [“One nation with two flags”. Polish-Romanian alliance (1918), 1919-1926. Documents and materials], Warszawa, 2021, no. 1.

⁸ The Polish National Committee operated in the West under the leadership of Roman Dmowski and Ignacy Paderewski from August 1917 to April 1919 in order to rebuild independent Poland with the help of the Entente.

Brătianu. Iliescu said that countries such as Poland and Romania “share not only old historical traditions, but also common interests and the need for a common defense against both Russia and Germany. Together, these two countries will be able to field five million soldiers. Having no industry of its own or the chance to establish one, Romania wants to receive industrial products directly from Poland, and will be able to transport its agricultural products through Poland to the Baltic Sea via the canal that will connect the Dniester with the Vistula. On the contrary, Poland will have an open road to the Black Sea and Asia via the Dniester via Romania”. According to Rozwadowski’s account, Iliescu “for all these reasons” was also “a staunch opponent of the separation of Romania from Poland through the creation of a Ruthenian state, a natural ally of both Russia and Germany. He sees the salvation and future of Romania in strengthening the influence of the West and Western culture in it”. Iliescu also stated that “only Catholicism gives a certain discipline to society”, therefore “he would be very eager to see Romania coming closer to Rome, or its adoption of Catholicism”. According to Rozwadowski, “The above views of general Iliescu exposed him to the reluctance of the Czechs, who want to necessarily separate Romania from Poland by means of Rus and support the Ukrainians for this purpose. [...] They fear the greatness and strength of Poland, so they would prefer to be able to win Ukraine against it, with which they would be directly connected”. At the end of his account, Rozwadowski stated that such conservative politicians as Take Ionescu, Dumitru Drăghicescu, Constantin Diamandi” got tied with the Czechs, so they are opposed to Romania’s neighbors with Poland – they are afraid to spoil their relations with the Czechs and Ukrainians”, but their influence was not very strong in Romania. In turn, the conservatives of the Alexandru Marghiloman faction were then to be closer to the liberals of the former prime minister Ion I. C. Brătianu than Ionescu⁹. Ignoring Iliescu’s overly subjective comments on religious matters, it can be said that the opinions of the Romanian general at the end of World War I contained the most important motives and problems concerning not only the common interests of both countries in the future new Europe, but also Polish activities for the benefit of a military alliance with Romania in the months and years to come. These matters were updated and accelerated between November and December 1918 as a result of geopolitical transformations in Central and Southeastern Europe, when Poland and Romania had to consolidate and secure their new borders.

Polish motivations. Why with Romania?

As mentioned earlier, the very look at the new map of Europe after World War I explains the motivations of the Polish political and military elites to move towards rapprochement with Romania as one of the conditions for the survival of the young Polish state. Although the “traditional” external enemies of Poles, Russia

⁹ Krzysztof Nowak, Henryk Walczak (ed.), *op. cit.*, no. 2.

and Germany, were weakened or plunged into chaos, they did not agree to the formation of Poland in their – as they thought – border territories. The Poles also had conflicts with their new neighbors - Lithuania, which did not agree to include the Vilnius region in Poland, and with Czechoslovakia, which in January 1919 for economic reasons took over – by force – half of Cieszyn (*Teschen*) Silesia, inhabited mainly Poles. The “historic” Polish-Hungarian friendship did little to Poles at that time, because Hungarians, like Germans, were a nation defeated in the war. In this situation, Romania, which did not have border conflicts with the reborn Poland, whose territories, like Polish lands, suffered German and Russian occupation and also underwent difficult integration processes after 1918, became in Polish eyes the only friendly state and ally, above all against the rebirth Russian imperialism, regardless of its political color. In a situation of growing conflicts with Germany and Czechoslovakia, the issue of safe transit to Poland of war material from Romanian ports on the Black Sea also became of significant importance. The importance of the alliance with Romania was evidenced by the fact that Polish politicians discussed its specifics even before the official establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which resulted from the aggravating situation on the Polish borderlands. In December 1918, the delegate of the KNP in London, Władysław Sobański, in a conversation with the Romanian envoy, Nicolae Mișu, pointed to the need to start Polish-Romanian negotiations in order to work out a common position on the establishment of the Polish-Romanian border before the future peace conference. This border, apart from economic benefits – for Romania towards the Baltic Sea and for Poland towards the Black Sea was to be the basis of the Polish-Romanian regional alliance and the way to build a bloc of states between these two seas¹⁰. It was also clear that the Romanian-Polish alliance was to play the role of a *cordone sanitaire* towards Russia and Russian policy, regardless of its ideological tinge, because in any case it would be an imperial policy experienced by Poles from the 18th century and Romanians from the 19th century. It was also obvious for Poles that their better – In their opinion – knowledge of the problems of Eastern Europe – predestined Poland to take the lead in such a bloc. Warsaw also hoped that it would manage to reduce the hostility between Bucharest and Budapest.

The political and military agreements between Poland and Romania were to be followed by economic agreements (the popular slogan “Gdańsk – Constanța”), covering navigation on the Danube, projects of common waterways, rail tariffs and customs, monetary issues and others. The external situation required Poland to quickly conclude military and economic agreements with Romania. Polish public opinion and the press also unanimously emphasized the importance and urgency of this matter¹¹. The fact that Poles had a good reputation among Romanians in the past and representatives of the Romanian authorities sent Polish

¹⁰ Florin Anghel, *Construirea sistemului „Cordon Sanitare”. Relații româno-polone 1919-1926*, Cluj-Napoca, 2003, p. 53.

¹¹ Krzysztof Nowak, Henryk Walczak (ed.), *op. cit.*, no. 12.

diplomats positive signals about the rebirth of the Polish state (“The gross wickedness of the past has been repaired”) and fulfilling the role of leaders of “order in this part of Europe” together with Poland, he made the Polish side optimistic. “We will devote all our efforts to this work. I strongly hope that our two countries will not fail in the noble mission entrusted to them in the face of the dangers of anarchy that threaten us from all sides”, stated Romanian Prime Minister Mihail Pherekyde on February 4/17, 1919 in response to an earlier telegram of the Polish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ignacy Paderewski, informing about his “deepest desire” to establish “like the closest ties of friendship that will connect Poland with the noble Romanian nation”¹².

The implementation of Polish plans to negotiate with Romanians on the alliance and cooperation, especially in the field of transit routes, obviously had to be preceded by arrangements for a common border between the two countries. According to Polish diplomacy, allied relations with Romanians would be strengthened more if this border ran “over as much space as possible”¹³. However, it soon turned out that, regardless of the lack of mutual territorial claims, the situation on the Polish-Romanian border began to complicate and new obstacles appeared on the way to the union of the two countries. It was clear for Warsaw and Bucharest that the way they were resolved, first of all by Poland – as a country more motivated at the time and active in constructing plans for the future cooperation of both countries – would determine the shape of not only the future border, but also Polish-Romanian relations. As general Tadeusz Rozwadowski, head of the Polish military mission in Paris stated in May 1919: “I must emphasize as emphatically as possible that although the Romanian president of ministers, Mr. Brătianu sincerely wishes to obtain a common border and to create even a single front against the Bolsheviks, and in the future against any pan-Russian or pan-Slavic attempts, but Romania will only bind us [the Poles] when we clearly show such strength that we can count on and on which we can rely in the future”¹⁴.

Obstacles and complications

Of course, when discussing the Polish-Romanian alliance, the opinion of France was important, although from Paris’ point of view, such an alliance could be desirable, as it complicated Berlin’s efforts to achieve rapprochement with Moscow. In the first half of 1919, the main obstacles to the rapid and permanent security of the Polish-Romanian border and the rapid conclusion of a Polish-Romanian alliance were, above all, the Ukrainian problem.

Like the provinces of Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania, attached to Romania, many areas to which Poles aspired in the East were ethnically mixed. However, no one in Poland took into account the possibility of a reborn Poland

¹² *Ibidem*, no. 6, 9.

¹³ *Ibidem*, no. 12.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, no. 16.

without Eastern Galicia with the city of Lviv, which at the end of 1918 led to armed clashes with the Ukrainians, who proclaimed the creation of the West Ukrainian People's Republic in this area. The implementation of the territorial demands of Western Ukrainians could have prevented the establishment of a common Polish-Romanian border, so in the Polish-Ukrainian war that lasted until mid-July 1919, the Polish government asked Romania for support. It did not take place immediately, because the Entente powers were initially opposed to the liquidation of the West Ukrainian state, seeing in it and in the Ukrainian People's Republic established in Eastern Ukraine new anti-Bolshevik barriers¹⁵. In the opinion of Polish diplomacy, the Ukrainian movement was "social and political close to Bolshevism", and the thought of using this movement against Bolshevism is illusory, and the Western allies did not yet have "a clear opinion about the essence of the Ukrainian movement"¹⁶.

Initially, Romania calculated similarly to the French, which is why the Polish government delegate Stanisław Głąbiński, who came to Bucharest at the beginning of February 1919, did not receive any details from the Romanian authorities regarding the joint suppression of the "Ukrainian movement" and the need to establish a common border¹⁷. Similar opinions on Romania's cautious attitude towards the Ukrainian question were expressed in April 1919 by the delegate of the KNP in Bucharest, Stanisław Koźmiński, which, however, could have changed in the future, when the Ukrainian forces weakened. During this period, the Polish side sought the consent of the Romanians to transport Polish soldiers still remaining in the south of Russia and between the Dniester and the Danube to Eastern Galicia, so that they could take part in the fight against the Ukrainians¹⁸. It can be said that in general, Romanians, who had little knowledge of the Ukrainian issue at the time, considered it secondary, as they focused on the fight for the West to recognize their new borders and to observe the situation in Hungary. Bucharest considered Polish actions in the East as "superpower dreams"¹⁹. But from the other hand the lack of recognition not only by Bolshevist Russia but also by Ukrainian politicians for *Sfatul Țării's* decision to join Bessarabia to Romania could be a harbinger of many complications in the future.

The situation changed when the Red Army approached Bessarabia and the communist revolution broke out in Hungary. The threat of Romania losing new

¹⁵ Florin Anghel, *op. cit.*, p. 62-64; Walczak Henryk, *Sojusz z Rumunią w polskiej polityce zagranicznej w latach 1918-1931* [The alliance with Romania in Polish foreign policy in 1918-1931], Szczecin, 2008, p. 46-54.

¹⁶ Krzysztof Nowak, Henryk Walczak (ed.), *op. cit.*, no. 8.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, no. 13.

¹⁹ Florin Anghel, *România și Polonia. Farmecul, mirajul și consecvența unui „cordon sanitaire” (1918- 1921)*, in F. Anghel, K. Nowak (ed.), *Odrodzenie Polski I Zjednoczenie Rumunii. W stulecie nawiązania polsko-rumuńskich stosunków dyplomatycznych. Renașterea Poloniei și Unirea României. Despre centenarul stabilirii relațiilor diplomatice polono-române*, Warszawa, 2018, p. 109-111.

provinces, the Bolshevism of Central Europe, internal conflicts among Ukrainians and the lack of willingness among Ukrainians to compromise on border issues (also in Bukovina) forced Romania to become involved in the Ukrainian problem and perceived Poland's greater value than the West-Ukrainian Republic as an anti-Bolshevik buffer. At that time, the Romanian authorities granted Poland military assistance by introducing - at the request of the Chief of the Polish State, Józef Piłsudski - on May 24, 1919 on Pokuttya (pol. *Pokucie*, rom. *Pokuția*), the 8th division of general Iacob Zadik from the neighboring Bukovina area - for pacification purposes²⁰. The successes of Polish troops in the fight against the Bolsheviks changed the attitude of Bucharest and the Western powers to the problem of Eastern Galicia and the importance of the common Polish-Romanian border, not only for the current isolation of the "red Hungary" from Russia, but also in the future. Romania and the French mission headed by General Henri M. Berthelot also gave their consent to the evacuation to Poland of over 4,000 Polish soldiers of general Lucjan Żeligowski, who from Odessa, via Bessarabia and Bukovina in June 1919, reached Eastern Galicia²¹. In addition, about 100,000 Polish civilian refugees from Russia, who were assisted by Romanians in the evacuation to Poland, passed through Romania²². In June 1919, the Polish diplomatic mission was officially established in Bucharest, and in July 1919, the Romanian mission in Warsaw. Poland's role as an anti-Bolshevik barrier also increased, so at the end of June 1919, Warsaw obtained the consent of the Great Powers to occupy all of Eastern Galicia in order to defend it against the Bolsheviks²³.

However, further complications arose in Polish-Romanian relations. The Poles complained about the behavior of the Romanian army in Pokuttya, which Warsaw believed was not friendly to the local Polish population²⁴. The irritation of

²⁰ Florin Anghel, *Construirea sistemului „Cordon Sanitare”*, p. 84-104; Walczak Henryk, *op. cit.*, p. 60-61.

²¹ Waldemar Rezmer, *op. cit.*, p.126-127.

²² More, see Florin Anghel, *op. cit.*, p. 78-83; Paweł Rutkowski, *Tranzyt polskich uchodźców cywilnych z terytorium Rosji Sowieckiej do Polski przez Rumunię w pierwszych miesiącach 1920 roku* [Transit of Polish civilian refugees from the territory of Soviet Russia to Poland via Romania in the first months of 1920], in S. Iachimovschi, E. Wieruszewska-Calistru (ed.), *Relacje polsko-rumuńskie w historii i kulturze. Relații polono-române în istorie și cultură* [Polish-Romanian relations in history and culture], Suceava, 2010, p. 247-254; Tomasz Ciesielski, *Rumunia a problem polskich reemigrantów i uchodźców z południowej Rosji w latach 1918-1920* [Romania and the problem of Polish reemigrants and refugees from southern Russia in 1918-1920], in K. Stempel-Gancarczyk, E. Wieruszewska-Calistru (ed.), *Świat relacji polsko-rumuńskich. Lumea relațiilor polono-române* [The world of Polish-Romanian relations], Suceava, 2012, p. 113-137.

²³ Henryk Walczak, *op. cit.*, p. 44-46; Anna M. Cienciala and Tytus Komarnicki, *From Versailles to Locarno. Keys to Polish Foreign Policy 1919-1925*, Lawrence, 1984, p. 160-164. In June 1919, the Peace Conference approved only the provisional administration of Poland over the territory of Eastern Galicia, which was to be granted autonomy. In the Entente's plans, a plebiscite was to be held after 25 years. Finally, in March 1923, the Council of Ambassadors recognized Poland's sovereignty over this area. However, the Polish authorities did not implement the autonomy expected by the Council.

²⁴ Krzysztof Nowak, Henryk Walczak (ed.), *op. cit.*, no. 22-23, 26-27, 30.

the Polish authorities was also caused by the transport of 10,000 soldiers of the Ukrainian People's Republic, defeated by the Bolsheviks, who took refuge in Romania, from Bessarabia to Eastern Galicia. Romanians explained it with their – supposedly justified – fears, that these troops (disarmed by Romanians) would go to the side of the Bolsheviks²⁵. Despite such incidents, it can be said that the Romanian army played a certain role in the liquidation of the emerging Ukrainian state in Eastern Galicia, which took place in mid-July 1919 and in the consolidation of the Polish-Romanian border on the line of the former Galician-Bukovinian border, and in convincing Paris about the need for such a border. Two weeks later, the withdrawal of Romanian troops from Pokuttya began²⁶. However, it should be emphasized that from the spring to the summer of 1919, the problem of the Hungarian revolution was strategically more important for Bucharest. The decisive role of the Romanian troops in the liquidation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in the first week of August 1919 strengthened Romania's position in the Entente camp. In this situation, the pacification of the Hungarian revolution, the end of the Polish-Ukrainian war in Eastern Galicia and the signing by Poland in May 1919 of the ceasefire agreement with the Ukrainian People's Republic resulted in the fact that, contrary to Poles' expectations, the Bucharest's interest in closer arrangements on the topic of military alliance with Poland has decreased. Nevertheless, the Romanian authorities were still skeptical of Polish actions in the East, and thus also of such proposals from Warsaw in August and September 1919 as the joint Polish-Romanian occupation of Ukraine, for example under the aegis of the League of Nations²⁷.

The path of Polish diplomacy towards rapprochement with Romania was also complicated by Prague's policy. The historical conditions of Polish-Czech relations, the different attitude of the two nations towards Russia and the mutual negative stereotypes did not resemble the sympathetic relations between Poles and Romanians or between Poles and Hungarians. The emerging new Czechoslovak state, small in terms of territory, but economically strong - as the former industrial center of the Austrian Empire – had ambitions to become a political and economic leader in the former Austro-Hungarian areas, therefore it was afraid of a strong and great Poland. In January 1919, the Czechs did not hesitate before an armed conflict with Poland – or at least an ally of the Entente – in order to take over the industrial part of Cieszyn Silesia, inhabited mostly by Poles and this fact worsened relations between Warsaw and Prague for many years. The Czechs also wanted the stabilizing factor in the East to be not Poland, but “white” Russia, and believed that the greater threat would be Hungarian revisionism, not Russian imperialism, and in

²⁵ Michał Klimecki, *Rumunia wobec polsko-ukraińskiej wojny w Galicji (Małopolsce) Wschodniej w latach 1918-1919* [Romania and the Polish-Ukrainian war in Eastern Galicia (Little Poland) in 1918-1919], in S. Iachimovschi. E. Wieruszewska (ed.), *We wspólnocie narodów...*, p. 130-141; Henryk Walczak, *op. cit.*, p. 55-56.

²⁶ Florin Anghel, *op. cit.*, p. 101-104.

²⁷ Idem, *Romania și Polonia...*, p. 110-111; Henryk Walczak, *op. cit.*, p. 68-71.

this direction they conducted political agitation in Bucharest. That is why Czech politicians, headed by President Tomáš G. Masaryk and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Edvard Beneš, were interested in the existence of the Polish state within the ethnographic borders, without Eastern Galicia and the border with Romania, and tried to create a “corridor” to Russia by joining Czechoslovakia of Subcarpathian Rus and the existence of Ukraine, unrelated to Poland²⁸. Poles drew attention to some opinions in diplomatic circles, suggesting the possibility of Ukrainians relinquishing their claims to Subcarpathian Rus in exchange for relinquishing northern Romania of Bukovina to Ukraine. Such information mobilized Romanians to take action against Western Ukrainians and the Czechs’ march towards Russia, which was convenient for the Poles²⁹. Ultimately, the treaty of Saint Germain (September 10, 1919) granted Subcarpathian Rus to Czechoslovakia, but it did not become a “corridor” to Russia, but only to Romania as a member of the Little Entente.

Due to historical reasons, Poland’s rapprochement with Romania was also complicated by Polish-Hungarian sympathies. However, due to the chaos in Hungary after the end of World War I, Budapest was not a significant partner for Warsaw at that time. Regardless of this, Poles tried to convince Romanians (effective?) that their good relations with Hungarians – historical enemies of Romanians – are purely emotional, resulting from the past and not from current political priorities³⁰.

The importance of anti-Bolshevik cooperation with Romania and the rush of Warsaw towards its implementation meant that the caution and maneuvering of Romanians on this topic, as well as the emerging information about Bucharest’s willingness to conclude a separatist peace with the Bolsheviks in exchange for a positive settlement of the Bessarabian issue and Bucharest’s reluctance to recognize the Ukrainian People’s Republic of Ataman Petliura, supported at the time by Poland, began to annoy Poles. In January 1920, there were even voices in the circle of Polish diplomacy suggesting “frightening” the Romanians by discreetly initiating campaigns in Western opinion-forming circles to conduct a plebiscite in Bessarabia (the outcome of which Romanians could not be sure at that time) or the printing of articles in the Western press that Poland, in the face of Romania’s resistance to a joint struggle with Bolshevik Russia, will turn to Hungary³¹.

²⁸ More, see Marek Kazmierz Kamiński, *Konflikt polsko-czeski 1918-1921* [Polish-Czech conflict 1918-1921], Warszawa, 2001, p. 9-42; Sławomir M. Nowinowski, *Konstatacje i nadzieje. Dyplomacja czechosłowacka wobec kwestii bezpieczeństwa zbiorowego w Europie (1919-1925)* [Statements and hopes. Czechoslovak diplomacy towards the issue of collective security in Europe (1919-1925)], Toruń, 2005, p. 47-62; Andrzej Essen, *Polityka Czechosłowacji w Europie środkowej w latach 1918-1932* [Czechoslovakia’s policy in Central Europe in 1918-1932], Kraków, 2006, p. 12-23.

²⁹ Krzysztof Nowak, Henryk Walczak (ed.), *op. cit.*, no. 2,8,16.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, no. 59.

³¹ *Ibidem*, no. 34.

Observing the reactions of the Romanian government to the alliance proposals, Polish diplomats noted that they depended mainly on the current level of threat to the Romanian borders by the Soviets and were not the part of a broader defense strategy. Thus, after the defeat of the “white” army of Denikin, the Bolshevik troops again stood on the Dniester, Romania sent a signal to Warsaw that it was ready to come closer to Poland. But when Moscow started sending signals about the possibility of initiating peace negotiations to Romania, the Romanian government, hoping for a positive settlement of the Bessarabia issue, withdrew from the possibilities of discussing the specifics of the shape of the alliance suggested by Poland³². For this reason, the meetings of the Polish-Romanian military commission held in Warsaw in March 1920 did not bring the breakthrough expected by the Polish authorities³³, although the fact that they took place was undoubtedly a valuable capital for the future. In addition, it can also be mentioned that the Polish side then came up with a project to incorporate Odessa into Romania and the Polish-Romanian protectorate over the future East Ukrainian state. Although according to information from the Polish envoy in London, Romanian Prime Minister Alexandru Vaida-Voevod expressed interest in such a solution at the beginning of March 1920, but in Warsaw the Romanians did not take up this topic officially³⁴. The Poles received more benefits from General Rozwadowski’s mission in Bucharest in May 1920. The Polish side tried to convince Romanians of their plans to create an East Ukrainian state as an anti-Bolshevik buffer. The debaters decided that it was not in the interest of both countries to rebuild a strong Russia and the Polish envoy in Bucharest Aleksander Skrzyński emphasized that Romanians “In the matter of Russia they recognize the concept of our [Polish] government as their own” and that they will support “All efforts to create a number of border states on the territory of the former tsarist regime”. Convinced of the necessity of an alliance with Poland, the Romanian government undertook not to conduct any negotiations and not to sign agreements the content of which would be against Poland and would like a “diplomatic front towards the West” uniform with Poland³⁵.

According to correct opinions of Warsaw, this further rapprochement between Romania and Poland resulted from the well-developing anti-Bolshevik offensive of Polish troops and the allied army of Ataman Symon Petliura towards Kiev. As we know it was for Józef Piłsudski a part of the plan to implement the federal idea of creating democratic states in the East, also acting as a buffer, or *cordon sanitaire* separating Poland from Russia. Generally, however, due to the Entente’s reserve towards Polish offensive actions in the East, Romania was still skeptical of Polish plans related to Petliura, which consequently also limited the chances of finalizing the military alliance with Poland. The Romanians only agreed

³² Walczak Henryk, *op. cit.*, p. 69-72.

³³ Krzysztof Nowak, Henryk Walczak (ed.), *op. cit.*, no. 37-42.

³⁴ Henryk Walczak, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

³⁵ Krzysztof Nowak, Henryk Walczak (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 44-47.

to supply the Ukrainians reconstructed on Polish territory with ammunition and weapons. In the context of Romania's reserve towards the eastern policy of Marshal Józef Piłsudski in the spring of 1920, some historians point out the possible influence of the Polish opposition, led by Roman Dmowski, an opponent of federation concepts, which was contacted by the Romanian envoy in Warsaw, Alexandru Florescu³⁶. It was also not without significance that Romania was burdened by a high contribution imposed by the Entente for requisitions made by the Romanian army in Hungary, which resulted in Bucharest's fears of engaging in projects that Paris and London were against. However, it should also be emphasized that the described fears and maneuvering of Romanians could also result from their defeats and losses during World War I, which is why they were not willing to get involved in projects that they considered risky at a given time.

As could be expected, the optimism of Poles regarding the conclusion of a military convention with the Romanians further weakened in the period of defeats and the retreat of Polish troops from the East in the summer of 1920. Romania declared neutrality, but on the forum of the Council of Ambassadors its diplomacy, led by Take Ionescu, encouraged Europe to grant Poland aid and warned against the threat of Bolshevik conquest of other countries as well. Ionescu also deliberately delayed negotiations with the Soviets, who deluded Romania by making peace and recognizing their power over Bessarabia. Thanks to Romania's benevolent neutrality, material aid from the West for the fighting Poles passed through its territory. Romania also made it possible to transfer the "white" army of General Nicolai Bredov from Poland to the Crimea³⁷. This contrasted with the attitude of Prague, the neutrality of which was clearly hostile to Poland, especially in obstructing the transit of weapons. Besides, Czechoslovakia was at that time more interested in creating an anti-Hungarian bloc (called the Little Entente) and was actively campaigning in this direction in Belgrade and Bucharest. It can be said that Czechoslovak diplomacy overestimated the Hungarian danger and, despite the Red Army's march to the heart of Europe, it underestimated the Soviet threat also to its own independence³⁸. The Romanians did not trust Hungarians, but

³⁶ Michał Klimecki, *Polskie i ukraińskie zabiegi w Bukareszcie w 1920 r. Rumunia wobec sojuszu polsko-ukraińskiego i Ukraińskiej Republiki Ludowej* [Polish and Ukrainian efforts in Bucharest in 1920. Romania towards the Polish-Ukrainian alliance and the Ukrainian People's Republic], in S. Iachimovschi, E. Wieruszewska-Calistru (ed.), *Polska i Rumunia-związki historyczne i kulturowe-przeszłość i dzień dzisiejszy* [Poland and Romania – historical and cultural relations – past and present day], Suceava, 2011, p. 53-59.

³⁷ Rutkowski Paweł, *Rola Rumunii w wojnie polsko-sowieckiej* [The role of Romania in the Polish-Soviet war], in S. Iachimovschi, E. Wieruszewska (ed.), *We wspólnocie narodów...*, p. 157-161. It should be mentioned that another problem in Romanian-Soviet relations was the issue of gold seized by the Bolsheviks, which the authorities of the Kingdom of Romania deposited in Russia during World War I.

³⁸ Marek Kazimierz Kamiński, *Czechosłowacja wobec wojny polsko-bolszewickiej w 1920 roku* [Czechoslovakia and the Polish-Soviet War in 1920], in A. Koryn (ed.), *Wojna polsko-sowiecka. Przebieg walk i tło międzynarodowe* [Polish-Soviet war. The course of fights and the international background Warszawa, 1991, p. 185-198; Essen Andrzej, *Polska a Mała Ententa 1920-1934* [Poland

unlike the Czechs, they also pointed to the Soviet danger, and that is why the head of Romanian diplomacy, Take Ionescu, tried to convince Czechoslovak diplomats to include Poland and Greece in the alliance project (due to Romanians' concerns about Bulgarians). However, the different perception of priorities in European politics, especially the scale of the Soviet threat, as well as mutual competition for leadership in Central Europe and mutual aversion between Czechs and Poles meant that neither Warsaw nor Prague were interested in this project³⁹. Poles remembered that at the time of the greatest threat by the Bolsheviks, Czechoslovakia had a hostile attitude towards Poland. At that time, the Council of Ambassadors divided Cieszyn Silesia and over 100 Poles found themselves outside under the Czech rule.

Towards finalization of the alliance

After the defeat of the Bolsheviks near Warsaw in August 1920, Poland's position was strengthened again as a state that was able to stop the dangerous enemy from the East. So the subject of finalizing the Polish-Romanian alliance resurfaced again. It did not suit Prague, which wanted to reserve for itself the position of a political and economic leader in the post-Habsburg space. The Czechs had a negative attitude towards the separate alliance between Poland and Romania and continued to put pressure on Bucharest to make Romanians focus mainly on the idea of the Little Entente. Poland, in turn, wanted to expand its alliance with Romania to include Hungary, but Romanians did not like such a relationship. Take Ionescu, who came to Warsaw at the beginning of November 1920, openly stated this to the Poles. Ionescu also tried to save his concept of building the Little Entente as a union of five countries (Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Greece), but again to no avail⁴⁰. In this situation, in view of the lack of chances for a victory for the "whites" in Russia and the commencement of Polish-Soviet peace negotiations, Romania – in the face of the threat from the East – decided to resume negotiations in on a bilateral alliance with Poland. In talks held in Bucharest from December 1920, Polish envoy Skrzyński motivated Romanians to make faster decisions in this direction through information about further concentrations of Soviet troops on the Dniester and the threat of their entry into Bessarabia⁴¹.

The Polish-Romanian negotiations concerned two fundamental issues: the signing of the covenant on the alliance and the military convention. It was easier with the first agreement, because the Polish side agreed to include an article on the possibility of concluding an alliance with countries that accept the Treaties of

and the Little Entente], Warszawa-Kraków, 1992, p. 21-36; Sławomir M. Nowinowski, *op. cit.*, p. 72-74, 77-78.

³⁹ Andrzej Essen, *op. cit.*, p. 36-40; Henryk Walczak, *op. cit.*, p. 105-108.

⁴⁰ Andrzej Essen, *op. cit.*, p. 41-43; Sławomir M. Nowinowski, *op. cit.*, p.101; Florin Anghel, *op. cit.*, p. 112-113.

⁴¹ Krzysztof Nowak, Henryk Walczak (ed.), *op. cit.*, no. 59; Henryk Walczak, *op. cit.*, p. 114-116.

Trianon, Sévres and Neuilly, in other words, it was not contrary to the idea of the Little Entente. In turn, the Romanians agreed that the agreement should mention the mutual guarantee of inviolability of the eastern borders of both countries, the course of which was to be described in the content of the treaty⁴².

More complicated were the negotiations on the military convention, which in January 1921 were conducted in Bucharest by General Stanisław Haller and Colonel Julian Stachiewicz on the Polish side, and by Generals Dumitru Strătilescu and Nicolae Samsonovici and Colonel Carol Ressel on the Romanian side. The Romanians' "traditional" concerns about the shape of Polish-Hungarian and Polish-Czechoslovak relations also reappeared. In the first case, Poles replied that it was only about historical sympathies, in the second, that they were conducting peace talks with Prague, despite the fact that Polish public opinion "will long be badly disposed towards the Czechs"⁴³. At one point, the Poles threatened to break the talks and not react from Warsaw in the event of a Soviet attack on Romania. Finally, on January 30, King Ferdinand I told Minister Take Ionescu that he agreed to the alliance with Poland subject to the prior approval of Paris and London, which soon followed. The last agreement on the details of the alliance took place on February 28-March 3, 1921. The Convention on a Resilient Alliance and the Military Convention between the Republic of Poland and the Kingdom of Romania were signed in Bucharest on March 3, 1921. In the first of them, signed by the heads of diplomacy of both of the states Take Ionescu and Eustachy Sapieha, the most important provisions were contained in the words that the two countries undertook *to assist each other in the event that one of them was attacked, without giving any reason, on their present eastern borders*. This meant that the unattacked allied state would declare war on the aggressor. Poland and Romania could not *conclude neither a ceasefire nor a peace without the other*. The *Convention* could not in any way infringe the alliances guaranteeing the maintenance of the Versailles treaties signed by both countries, which mainly concerned the functioning of Romania within the Little Entente. The *Convention* was completed by three secret protocols. *Protocol A* concerned the eastern border of both countries, *Protocol B* guaranteed the confidentiality of the *Convention* until Poland signed a peace with Soviet Russia, *Protocol C* contained Romania's commitment to support Poland in the issue of *de iure* recognition by the Council of Ambassadors of its current border in the former Eastern Galicia and Vilnius Region. Whereas, the secret *Military Convention*, signed on the same day by the Chiefs of the General Staff of both countries, General Constantin Christescu and

⁴² Florin Anghel, *Construirea sistemului „Cordon Sanitare”*, p. 105-117; Henryk Walczak, *op. cit.*, p. 116-120.

⁴³ Marek Kazimierz Kamiński, *Konflikt polsko-czeski*, p. 396-422; Krzysztof Nowak, Henryk Walczak (ed.), *op. cit.*, no. 59; Henryk Walczak, *op. cit.*, p. 127-131.

General Tadeusz Rozwadowski, specified the tasks of both armies in the event of a threat from the Soviets⁴⁴.

Due to the threat to Poland in the west by Germany and in the east by Russian or Soviet imperialism, in the face of the alliance with Romania concluded in March 1921, there was no alternative for Warsaw. Therefore, throughout the interwar period, Warsaw tried to strengthen and improve this alliance. Poles were the more active party, because it was Poland that really needed Romania more than Romania needed Poland. The priorities of Warsaw did not always coincide with the understanding of Bucharest, whose historical experiences in relations with Poland's other neighbors (Germany and Czechoslovakia) and with Hungary were different. Regardless of this, the Polish-Romanian alliance secured Poland and Romania in the East, making both countries, along with their alliances with France, an important element stabilizing the political situation in interwar Europe. The Polish-Romanian border on the Cheremosh river was the border of friendship. Both countries, nations and cultures began to get to know each other and come closer to each other. Despite the fact that in some matters they had a different view of international problems, Poles and Romanians were at that time connected more than divided. The path to Polish-Romanian rapprochement, which was cleared at the beginning of the 1920s, turned out to be a permanent and valuable capital for the future, also in the years of World War II, when thousands of Polish soldiers and civilian refugees found a safe shelter in Romania.

Motivations, obstacles and complications on the path of Polish diplomacy to an alliance with Romania. Reflections on the 100th anniversary of the Polish-Romanian military alliance of 1921

Abstract

The article is a kind of reflection on the occasion of the centenary of the Polish-Romanian military alliance and tries to discuss the problems that Poland faced on the path to this alliance. We can safely say that the process started between Warsaw and Bucharest in 1918-1921 was one of the pillars of Polish foreign policy in the interwar period. The article presents the motivations of the Polish military spheres that were at the source of Poland's rapprochement with Romania, but above all the obstacles and complications that emerged on the path to the alliance formed in March 1921. It was mainly about Ukrainian matters, the threat from the Bolsheviks, the problem of Polish-Czech and Polish-Hungarian relations, Romania's frequently changing foreign policy priorities. As shown in the article, based largely on the analysis of sources, Poland was dependent on the alliance with Romania than vice versa, and it was the Polish side that was more active.

Keywords: Poland; Romania; alliance; interwar period; Little Entente.

⁴⁴ Henryk Walczak, *op. cit.*, p. 121-140. Full texts of Polish-Romanian agreements from March 3, 1921, see e.g. Krzysztof Nowak, Henryk Walczak (ed.), *op. cit.*, no. 66-67.

ABREVIERI

<i>AARMSI</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice
<i>AARMSL</i>	= Analele Academiei Române, Memoriile Secțiunii Literare
<i>AARPAD</i>	= „Analele Academiei Române”, seria II, București, 1879-1916
<i>AA.SS.</i>	= <i>Acta Sanctorum</i> , ed. Bollandisti, III ^a edițiune, Parigi 1863-1870
<i>AB</i>	= Arhivele Basarabiei
<i>ACNSAS</i>	= Arhivele Consiliului Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității
<i>AE</i>	= L'Année Epigraphique, Paris
<i>AIR</i>	= Arhiva Istorică a României
<i>AIAC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie Cluj
<i>AIIAI</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>AIIC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Cluj
<i>AIINC</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională, Cluj
<i>AIIX</i>	= Anuarul Institutului de Istorie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași
<i>ALIL</i>	= Anuarul de Lingvistică și Istorie Literară, Iași
<i>ALMA</i>	= <i>Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi</i> . Genève.
<i>AM</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei, Iași
<i>AMAE</i>	= Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe
<i>AmAnthr</i>	= American Anthropologist, New Series, Published by Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
<i>AMM</i>	= Acta Moldaviae Meridionalis, Vaslui
<i>AMMB</i>	= Arhiva Mitropoliei Moldovei și Bucovinei, Iași
<i>AMN</i>	= Acta Musei Napocensis
<i>AMR</i>	= Arhivele Militare Române
<i>AMS</i>	= Anuarul Muzeului din Suceava
<i>ANB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, București
<i>ANC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Cluj
<i>ANDMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Direcția Municipiului București
<i>ANG</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Județean Galați
<i>ANI</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Iași
<i>ANIC</i>	= Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale
<i>ANR-Cluj</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Cluj-Napoca
<i>ANR-Sibiu</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Sibiu
<i>ANRM</i>	= Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova, Chișinău
<i>ANRW</i>	= Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Berlin-New York
<i>ANSMB</i>	= Arhivele Naționale. Serviciul Municipiului București
<i>ANV</i>	= Arhivele Naționale, Vaslui
<i>AO</i>	= Arhivele Olteniei
<i>AP</i>	= Analele Putnei
<i>APH</i>	= Acta Poloniae Historica, Varșovia
<i>AqLeg</i>	= <i>Aquila Legionis. Cuadernos de Estudios sobre el Ejército Romano</i> , Salamanca
<i>AR</i>	= Arhiva Românească
<i>ArchM</i>	= Arhiva Moldaviae, Iași
<i>ArhGen</i>	= Arhiva Genealogică
„Arhiva”	= „Arhiva”. Organul Societății Științifice și Literare, Iași
<i>ArhMold</i>	= Arheologia Moldovei
<i>ASRR</i>	= Arhiva Societății Române de Radiodifuziune
<i>AȘUI</i>	= Analele Științifice ale Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași

- ATS = Ancient Textile Series, Oxbow Books, Oxford și Oakville
 AUAIC = Arhiva Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași
 AUB = Analele Universității „București”
 BA = *Biblioteca Ambrosiana*, Roma, Città Nuova Editrice
 BAR = Biblioteca Academiei Române
 BArchB = Bundesarchiv Berlin
 BAR int. ser. = British Archaeological Reports, International Series
 BBR = Buletinul Bibliotecii Române
 BCIR = Buletinul Comisiei Istorice a României
 BCMI = Buletinul Comisiei Monumentelor Istorice
 BCU-Iași = Biblioteca Centrală Universitară, Iași
 BE = Bulletin Epigraphique
 BF = Byzantinische Forschungen, Amsterdam
 BJ = Bonner Jahrbücher, Bonn
 BMI = Buletinul Monumentelor Istorice
 BMIM = București. Materiale de istorie și muzeografie
 BNB = Biblioteca Națională București
 BNJ = Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher
 BOR = Biserica Ortodoxă Română
 BS = Balkan Studies
 BSNR = Buletinul Societății Numismatice Române
 ByzSlav = Byzantinoslavica
 CA = Cercetări arheologice
 CAI = Caiete de Antropologie Istorică
 CartNova = *La ciudad de Carthago Nova 3: La documentación epigráfica*, Murcia
 CB = Cahiers balkaniques
 CC = Codrul Cosminului, Suceava (ambele serii)
 CCAR = Cronica cercetărilor arheologice din România, CIMEC, București
 CCh = *Corpus Christianorum*, Turnhout
 CChSG = *Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca*
 CCSL = *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina*, Turnhout, Brepols
 CDM = *Catalogul documentelor moldovenești din Arhivele Centrale de Stat*, București, vol. I-V; supl. I.
 CDȚR = *Catalogul documentelor Țării Românești din Arhivele Statului*, București, vol. II-VIII, 1974-2006
 Chiron = Chiron: Mitteilungen der Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, 1971
 CI = Cercetări istorice (ambele serii)
 CIL = *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, Berlin
 CL = Cercetări literare
 CLRE = *Consuls of the Later Roman Empire*, eds. R. S. Bagnall, A. Cameron, S. R. Schwartz, K. A. Worp, Atlanta, 1987
 CN = Cercetări Numismatice
 CNA = Cronica Numismatică și Arheologică, București
 CSCO = *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium*, Louvain
 CSEA = *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiae Aquileiensis*, Roma, Città Nuova Editrice
 CSEL = *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, Wien, De Gruyter
 CSPAMI = Centrul de Studii și Păstrare a Arhivelor Militare Centrale, Pitești
 CT = Columna lui Traian, București
 CTh = *Codex Theodosianus*. Theodosiani, Libri XVI cum constitutionibus Sirmondianis, I, edidit adsumpto apparatu P. Kruegeri, Th. Mommsen, Hildesheim, 1970-1971
 Cv.L = Convorbiri literare (ambele serii)

- „Dacia”, *N.S.* = Dacia. Nouvelle Série, Revue d'archéologie et d'histoire ancienne, București
- DANIC = Direcția Arhivelor Naționale Istorice Centrale
- DGAS = Direcția Generală a Arhivelor Statului
- DI = Diplomatarium Italicum
- DIR = *Documente privind istoria României*
- DIRRI = *Documente privind Istoria României. Războiul pentru Independență*
- DOP = Dumbarton Oaks Papers
- DTN = *Din trecutul nostru*, Chișinău
- DRH = *Documenta Romaniae Historica*
- EB = Études Balkaniques
- EBPB = Études byzantines et post-byzantines
- EDCS = *Epigraphik-Datenbank Clauss-Slaby* (<http://www.manfredclauss.de/>)
- EDR = *Epigraphic Database Roma* (<http://www.edr-edr.it/default/index.php>)
- EpigrAnat = Epigraphica Anatolica, Münster
- ERAsturias = F. Diego Santos, *Epigrafiya Romana de Asturias*, Oviedo, 1959.
- Gerión = Gerión. Revista de Historia Antigua, Madrid
- GB = Glasul Bisericii
- GCS = *Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller*, Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1897-1969
- GLK = *Grammatici Latini Keil*
- HEp = *Hispania Epigraphica*, Madrid
- „Hierasus” = *Hierasus*. Anuarul Muzeului Județean Botoșani, Botoșani
- HM = Heraldica Moldaviae, Chișinău
- HU = Historia Urbana, Sibiu
- HUI = Historia Universitatis Iassiensis, Iași
- IDR = *Inscripțiile din Dacia romană*, Bucurști-Paris
- IDRE = *Inscriptions de la Dacie romaine. Inscriptions externes concernant l'histoire de la Dacie*, I-II, Bucarest, 1996, 2000
- IGLN = Inscriptions grecques et latines de Novae, Bordeaux
- IGLR = *Inscripțiile grecești și latine din secolele IV-XIII descoperite în România*, București, 1976
- ILLPecs = *Instrumenta Inscripta Latina. Das römische Leben im Spiegel der Kleininschriften*, Pecs, 1991
- ILAlg = *Inscriptions latines d'Algérie*, Paris
- ILB = *Inscriptiones Latinae in Bulgaria repertae. Inscriptiones inter Oescum et Iatrum repertae*, Sofia, 1989
- ILD = *Inscripții latine din Dacia*, București
- ILN = *Inscriptions latines de Novae*, Poznan
- ILLPRON = *Inscriptionum Lapidarium Latinarum Provinciae Norici usque ad annum MCMLXXXIV repertarum indices*, Berlin, 1986
- ILS = *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, 1892
- IMS = *Inscriptiones Moesiae Superioris*, Belgrad
- IN = „Ioan Neculce”. Buletinul Muzeului Municipal Iași
- ISM = *Inscripțiile din Scythia Minor grecești și latine*, București, vol. I-III, 1983-1999
- JGO = *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*
- JL = Junimea literară
- JRS = The Journal of Roman studies, London
- LR = Limba română
- MA = Memoria Antiquitatis, Piatra Neamț
- MCA = Materiale și cercetări arheologice
- MEF = *Moldova în epoca feudalismului*, vol. I-XII, 1961-2012, Chișinău
- MEFRA = *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome: Antiquité*, Roma

- MGH = *Monumenta Germaniae Historica inde ab anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum auspiciis societatis aperiendis fontibus rerum Germanicarum medii aevi*, Berlin 1877-
 MI = Magazin istoric, București
 MIM = Materiale de istorie și muzeografie
 MM = Mitropolia Moldovei
 MMS = Mitropolia Moldovei și Sucevei
 MN = Muzeul Național, București
 MO = Mitropolia Olteniei
 MOF = Monitorul Oficial al României
 Navarro = M. Navarro Caballero, *Perfectissima femina. Femmes de l'elite dans l'Hispanie romaine*, Bordeaux, 2017.
 NBA = *Nuova Biblioteca Agostiniana*, Roma, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum
 NDPAC = *Nuovo Dizionario Patristico e di Antichità Cristiane*, I, A-E, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2006; III, P-Z, 2e edizione, Marietti, 2008
 NEH = *Nouvelles études d'histoire*
 OI = Opțiuni istoriografice, Iași
 OPEL = *Onomasticon provinciarum Europae latinarum*, vol. I-IV, Budapesta-Viena, 1994-2002
 PG = *Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Graeca*, ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris, 1886-1912
 PIR = *Prosopographia Imperii Romani. Saec. I.II.III*, editio altera, Berlin.
 PLRE = *Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*, 3 vol., eds. A. H. M. Jones, J. R. Martindale, and J. Morris, Cambridge, 1971-1992
 RA = Revista arhivelor
 RBAR = Revista Bibliotecii Academiei Române, București
 RC = Revista catolică
 RdI = Revista de istorie
 REByz = *Revue des Études Byzantines*
 RER = *Revue des études roumaines*
 RESEE = *Revue des études Sud-Est européennes*
 RHP = *Die römischen Hilfstruppen in Pannonien während der Prinzipatszeit. I: Die Inschriften*, Viena
 RHSEE = *Revue historique de Sud-Est européen*
 RI = Revista istorică (ambele serii)
 RIAF = Revista pentru istorie, arheologie și filologie
 RIB = *Roman Inscriptions of Britain*, Londra
 RIM = Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, Chișinău
 RIR = Revista istorică română, București
 RIS = Revista de istorie socială, Iași
 RITL = Revista de istorie și teorie literară
 RIU = *Die römischen Inschriften Ungarns*, Budapesta
 RJMH = *The Romanian Journal of Modern History*, Iași
 RM = Revista muzeelor
 RMD = *Roman Military Diplomas*, Londra
 RMM = *Römische Militärdiplome und Entlassungsurkunden in der Sammlung des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums*, Mainz
 RMM-MIA = Revista muzeelor și monumentelor, seria Monumente istorice și de artă
 RMR = Revista Medicală Română
 RRH = *Revue roumaine d'histoire*
 RRHA = *Revue roumaine de l'histoire de l'art*
 RRHA-BA = *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire de l'Art. Série Beaux Arts*
 RSIAB = Revista Societății istorice și arheologice bisericești, Chișinău
 Rsl = Romanoslavica

<i>SAHIR</i>	= Studia et Acta Historiae Iudaeorum Romaniae, București
<i>SAI</i>	= Studii și Articole de Istorie
<i>SCB</i>	= Studii și cercetări de bibliologie
<i>Sch</i>	= <i>Sources Chrétiennes</i> , Paris
<i>SCIA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istoria artei
<i>SCIM</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie medie
<i>SCIV/SCIVA</i>	= Studii și cercetări de istorie veche (și arheologie)
<i>SCN</i>	= Studii și Cercetări Numismatice, București
<i>SCȘI</i>	= Studii și cercetări științifice, Istorie
<i>SEER</i>	= The Slavonic and East European Review
<i>SHA</i>	= <i>Scriptores Historiae Augustae</i>
<i>SJAN</i>	= Serviciul Județean al Arhivelor Naționale
<i>SMIC</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie contemporană, București
<i>SMIM</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie medie, București
<i>SMIMod</i>	= Studii și materiale de istorie modernă, București
<i>SOF</i>	= Südost-Forschungen, München
<i>ST</i>	= Studii Teologice, București
<i>StAntArh</i>	= Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica, Iași
<i>T&MBYZ</i>	= <i>Travaux et Mémoires du Centre de recherches d'histoire et de civilisation byzantines</i>
<i>ThD</i>	= Thraco-Dacica, București
<i>TR</i>	= Transylvanian Review, Cluj-Napoca
<i>TV</i>	= Teologie și viața, Iași
<i>ZPE</i>	= Zeitschrift für Papyralogie und Epigraphik
<i>ZSL</i>	= Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde